Robert L. Gallucci, SFS Dean, and Janne E. Nolan

Michael Green

Security and Diplomacy in the 21st Century

Dr. Janne E. Nolan
Project Chair

The efforts of the Discourse, Dissent and Strategic Surprise working group underscored the need for reforms not just in the intelligence community, as has been widely advocated since 9/11, but to redress shortcomings in the policy-making process as well. To this end, the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy has launched a new study to identify systemic weaknesses in the way the U.S. government integrates intelligence support, diplomacy, and policy implementation in the management of international security problems. An experienced group of former policymakers and specialists, many of whom served on the previous panel and once again chaired by Janne Nolan at ISD, is drawing lessons from recent historical cases of regional nuclear proliferation. The objective is to produce recommendations for improving the way intelligence informs policy choices to help sustain effective initiatives aimed at achieving desired security outcomes in the 21st century.

The study, generously supported by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, is examining four cases of governmental efforts to address the rising threat of nuclear proliferation, including North Korea, South Asia (with the study of India and Pakistan combined in one case), Libya and Iran. By examining the relative strengths and weaknesses of U.S. nonproliferation strategies as they applied in these cases, this inquiry will help policy-makers to identify improvements in policy and intelligence processes that may be needed to support successful American initiatives to counter complex regional and global security threats, currently and in the future.

Core Project Themes and Questions

In the 21st century, dealing with states that are proliferating is no longer the only concern. The spread of transnational terrorist groups and the growing problems posed by insurgencies operating in Iraq has demonstrated the ability of actors armed with rudimentary weapons or with the use of suicide bombers to inflict serious damage on American interests. The threat posed by the spread of nuclear technologies increases exponentially when one considers the potential consequences of a nuclear weapon in the hands of belligerents who have committed themselves to a violent, anti-Western global Jihad.

This shift in the perception of the importance of proliferation threats has prompted a range of new military and other coercive instruments to contain states with nuclear ambitions. The limitations of coercive instruments alone to induce nuclear restraint, however, including air strikes or sanctions, have created urgent requirements for other instruments of dissuasion, including bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. Countering 21st century global proliferation imposes new demands on policy-makers to devise policies which go beyond the long-standing efforts to persuade states to accede to and comply with the international non-proliferation regime, as embodied in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. As such, the U.S. has found it necessary to try to overcome long-standing domestic skepticism about engaging enemies diplomatically and to promote new far-reaching and innovative instruments needed to persuade states to forgo nuclear ambitions. It is to these ends that we undertake a study of potential reforms in the policy and intelligence processes that will be needed to ensure future success. U.S. efforts to stop the spread of nuclear programs is a good way to examine broader questions about how to deal with the complex security environment of the 21st century.

The Study Group is examining four cases of nuclear diplomacy that cover a diverse spectrum of policy and intelligence gathering results:

The Study Group so far has met to examine North Korea (February 27, 2007) and South Asia (June 5, 2007) case studies.

Reports

U.S. Strategy to Stem North Korea's Nuclear Program: Assessing the Clinton and Bush Legacies, Working Group Report Number One, February 20, 2007

India, Pakistan and American Nuclear Diplomacy, Working Group Report Number Two, June 5, 2007

Project Chair

Dr. Janne E. Nolan, a former national security official in the State Department and a staff representative to the Senate Armed Services Committee, has served as a member of several government commissions, including the investigation of the l998 embassy bombings in East Africa chaired by Admiral William Crowe. She is the author of numerous books and articles about the politics of national security and teaches at Georgetown University and the University of Pittsburgh's Graduate School of Public and International Affairs.

Working Group Members

[T]e India-Pakistan case raised three important lessons for the intelligence and policy communities. First, the U.S. government needs to drastically improve its ability to understand (through intelligence) and affect (through policy) public opinion on the streets of the countries of South Asia. Second, insecurity is a driver of proliferation, and therefore the U.S. government should work to address the scourge of insecurity as well as the symptom of proliferation. Finally, bringing the intelligence and policy communities together contributes to the development of a coordinated "big picture" strategic framework, but as the failures in South Asia show, it will not guarantee success, particularly in the absence of sustained high-level commitment and engagement.

From India, Pakistan and American Nuclear Diplomacy, Working Group Report Number Two, June 5, 2007