INTRODUCTION

This panel on global democratization is part of an ongoing ISD effort to focus policy debate on a topic of growing importance. The first in this series of panel discussions was held shortly after 9/11, and was entitled “Sustaining Global Democratization: a priority now more than ever”. That title could serve well for this panel also, as the connected issues of democratization and nation building are more timely and urgent than ever. In the new National Security Strategy, the President commits the U.S. to “extend the benefits of freedom across the globe.” Democratization is no longer on the fringes of the policy debate. Uppermost on the agenda of policy maker and analyst are the open questions relating to Afghanistan, Iraq and the West-Bank/Gaza. How our democracy promoting goals are to be pursued and achieved in these and other cases is far from clear. Panelists today and at subsequent forums will bring the benefit of their wide experience to these issues. The problems that we discuss are global in nature. Today’s panel will for the most part focus on the Middle East. Other regions will be the focus of attention at subsequent forums.

DEMOCRATIZATION AND MIDDLE EAST PEACE

— Philip Wilcox

We should begin our discussion by asking two questions; “why has democracy lagged in the Middle East?” and “why has the U.S. been slow to see U.S. interests in encouraging democratic change”.

Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Central Europe have seen remarkable, if uneven, progress toward democracy. In the Middle East while some countries have made progress toward democracy—such as Turkey and Lebanon—others, such as Syria, Iraq, and Libya have been essentially untouched by the process of democratization. The majority of states have only fledgling democracies. Overall the region is one of the world’s least democratic.

In explaining this disparity we see little correlation between political and economic development, a parallelism some have used to explain democratic development elsewhere. The oil states are examples of countries that have made economic gains unaccompanied by political liberalization. The failure of such countries to provide their citizens with adequate opportunities to participate in the political life of their countries was the root cause of the despair that has fueled support for terrorist groups in the region. For this reason, the United States has a clear interest in encouraging democratic change in the region. Unfortunately, this has not been a U.S. priority.

PANELISTS

Philip Wilcox
President, Foundation for Middle East Peace

Leslie Campbell
Middle East Regional Director, National Democratic Institute

William Zartman
Jacob Blaustein Professor of International Organizations, School of Advanced International Studies

Phyllis Oakley
Former Assistant Secretary for Population, Refugees and Migration, Department of State

Moderator

Elizabeth Spiro Clark
ISD Associate
The pace of democratization has been affected by colonialism, the growth of various forms of mass communication (telephones, TV, the internet), rising levels of education, and other trends. However, it is important to recall that democratization is an organic process, one that takes time to take root and solidify. This is particularly true in the Middle East, which does not have a democratic history. Further, democratization in the region was slowed by the Arab-Israeli wars and the Cold War, which proved to be major diversions from the pressing internal political issues faced by countries in the region. Concentrated in the hands of the rulers, oil, too has been a netdrag on political liberalization in the region. With exploding populations and declining hands of the rulers, oil, too has been a net drag on political liberalization in the region. With exploding populations and declining populations and declining freedoms, the region has seen little progress in democratization. The view from Washington was that it was easier to deal with autocrats than to cope with the uncertainties that accompany democracy. American policy makers feared that rapid democratization would eliminate regimes with whom we had worked successfully and replace them with unstable and unfriendly governments, either leftist or Islamist. These fears guided American policy when we helped overthrow the democratically elected Mossadegh regime in Iran in the fifties, consistently embraced autocratic and feudal regimes in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf, and backed the Algerian military’s decision to overturn the elected government in the early 1990’s. Also in the interests of stability, Washington’s attachment to Israel, though we regularly describe it as “the only democracy in the region” has outweighed our interest in freedom and democracy for Palestinians and and end to Israel’s occupation. The Oslo agreements marked a change in this regard, but the focus was still on security and stability, not freedom.

To be sure, democratization creates risks and uncertainty, but in the long term, the historical record suggests that the greater risk lies in suppressing popular democracy and inviting periodic violent upheavals and even greater instability. The optimal policy for the U.S. is to encourage evolutionary democratic change without inviting destructive upheavals.

Today, the Bush Administration is giving more attention to democratization, though its commitment in this respect is uncertain. Also, much good work in this area is being done by private non-government organizations, sometimes with official U.S. support. Whatever its intentions, however, the fact is that the United States does not know very much about how to promote democracy. We need to think more seriously and intensely about this task.

There is a school of thought that says democracy is not compatible with the tenets of Islam. This is simply not accurate. The Koran speaks very clearly about key religious principles that are by their very nature democratic. What we call illiberal, anti-democratic “fundamentalism” is often a departure from fundamentals in the Koran. Iran’s Islamic Republic, Taliban in Afghanistan, the regime in Sudan were radical departures and not the norm. They have also been failures. The reasons for the lack of democracy, civil society and freedom in the Arab and Muslim world are not teachings of Islam, but history, politics, culture and economics.

The Koran preaches that no leader may rule without popular consent and consultation of the governed through the practice of Shura. So the Koran, like the U.S. Constitution says government must request consent of the governed and that people have a right not to be coerced. The Koran also forbids “coercion in religion”. The Prophet’s “Compact of Medina” which was the charter for governing the first Islamic state in Medina called for such government by the consent of the governed, and identical rights and tolerance for all citizens, both Muslims and non Muslims.

The Koran encompasses the concept of change. The Koran calls for freedom of thought through the practice of Ijihad, which is consistent with tolerance, and the reinterpretation of religion to meet contemporary challenges through democracy.

Indeed, it is hard to imagine a successful democratic state in the Muslim world that does not refer openly to Islam. There is
an ongoing debate among Islamic scholars about the relationship between Islam and democracy and human rights, with many scholars arguing that the religion is clearly supportive of these principles. Unfortunately today, these people have a greater voice in the United States and EU than they do in the Middle East. However, if political and economic conditions evolve favorably in the Islamic world these moderate voices will grow stronger and there will be a true Islamic Reformation.

Promoting democracy should be a high priority for U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. Let me suggest some ideas for what the U.S. can do in the near and medium term, recognizing that we are dealing with a long-term challenge.

- The U.S. role should be one of friendly persuasion. We should not expect rapid change. We should redouble our work with women’s groups, the media, and other progressive elements of civil society. Clearly, we need to devote more resources to these efforts.

- The United States needs to avoid hypocrisy, to which people in the region are very sensitive. We should not compromise our democratic principles in times of crisis. In this vein, we should be wary about singling out the Middle East and Middle Easterners for additional screening, visa requirements, and other efforts in the fight against terrorism.

- The U.S. needs to reengage quickly in the Israel-Palestinian conflict. There is potential for democratic reform within the Palestinian Authority, but this is simply impossible without parallel progress in the political process. The Palestinians are uniquely ready for democracy, but there is no realistic prospect of this until the external pressure created by the occupation ends. The Arab world sees a glaring double standard when we press the Palestinians on democratization without pressure on the Israelis to stop the settlements, withdraw from the West Bank and obey international law and UNSC resolution. We need to pay much more attention to the grave violations of Palestinian human rights by Israelis.

- The U.S. should stop exaggerating military force in the war against terrorism. It is of limited use. It scares and alienates large masses of people, encourages extremists and undermines liberals who are friends of the U.S.

- The United States needs to invest more in education for Muslims, both here and in the region. There is not much prospect for promoting change in the political sphere in many Middle East countries, but we can use our economic leverage to push for change in other spheres.

- Longer term, we need to reduce our reliance on Middle Eastern oil. Our dependence affects our ability to pursue our long-term interests in the region.

- We also should review the presence of troops in Saudi Arabia. Clearly, this cannot be done in the immediate term, to avoid having it seen as a victory for Osama bin Laden.

If, as it appears likely, we intervene in Iraq, this will be a test case for U.S. democratization goals. Obstacles to democracy are very high in Iraq, although it has an educated middle class and oil wealth. Do we invade, get rid of Saddam Hussein and then get out? This appears to be the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. If we stay will we make sustained, long term, expensive effort to create an Iraqi democracy? Do we know how? There has been minimal public discussion of these issues by the Administration. If we hand over power to another thuggish Baathist regime, will we not betray the Iraqi people? If we stay as a proconsular regime, how do we win confidence of Iraqis and other Arabs whose historic memory of colonialism is strong? Are we willing to make long term commitment and investment in nation building, in a situation where this will be even more difficult than in most? If post-Sadaam Iraq emerges as another thuggish autocracy we will have failed.
Elections, when done well, are critical for democratization. They can serve as a catalyst for broad political development, or nation building. There is an evolution of thinking about elections, especially in the growing democracy promoting community. There is a movement away from a focus on “free and fair” elections and providing the stamp of approval (or disapproval) to a broader focus on the political system itself.

A few years ago, the National Democratic Institute—along with a number of others in the OSCE, at the German stiftungen, our counterparts in the U.K. and elsewhere—set to work to develop a comprehensive set of standards that describe a “genuine” election.

“Genuine elections”, according to a paper written by NDI’s director of election programs, Patrick Merloe, “provide the means for the people of a country to express their political will. The electorate must be free and must believe that it is free to make political choices without intimidation. . . . [The electorate] must be adequately informed, [confident] that its choices will be accurately recorded; free to exercise their rights of political expression; free to associate; political contestants must, in fact, be given a fair chance of reaching the voters and winning their support—that is, a reasonably “level playing field;” electoral administration must be both impartial and effective; the news media must be free; citizen organizations must be able to participate in the electoral process. [These points] highlight that it is not enough to meet bare minimum legal standards to organize genuine elections, but that the political contestants and the general public must develop confidence in the electoral process.” If citizens of a country do not feel that a process is genuine, then it doesn’t matter if the international community thinks it was OK.

Now we are going beyond the point of genuine elections to a new stage. In the West Bank and Gaza, in Afghanistan, in Kosovo and Bosnia, we are talking more about, in a perfect world, what I would call “meaningful elections”. Meaningful elections provide a wedge to open further democratic opportunities. New parliaments and local councils may challenge the status quo. The role of women, traditionally outsiders in the political process, can be strengthened, and so on.

Elections in Authoritarian or Semi-Authoritarian Settings

Unfortunately many countries that hold regular elections have contrived ways to limit the “meaningfulness” of elections. As a recent Carnegie Endowment report put it liberalized autocracies that have contrived to appear pluralistic “have created deeply entrenched ruling systems that are surprisingly effective at resisting democratic change.” In these settings although elections can insert a wedge into the system to open it up, typically they are top-down, controlled openings. Elections in this context can serve to consolidate and solidify mechanisms and institutions that are barely better than the authoritarian version. Many of the rulers who pursue these technical openings organize elections that can pass the checklist above that emerged from the deliberations at the OSCE and elsewhere. Observers sometimes feel like they have to give the stamp of approval because all the specific items are present—even thought the overall environment just doesn’t feel right.

The Case of Pakistan

In the case of the recent parliamentary election in Pakistan, an international pre-election mission organized by NDI was able to address the question of a possible “tactical opening” even prior to election day: “The ability of Pakistan to achieve democratic governance will depend on whether its leaders demonstrate the determination and the political will required to address the systemic problems that have thus far impeded democratization. Just as the military must assume its proper role in a democratic system, political leaders must develop parties and institutions that are accountable and open to democratic participation by those who have been left out of politics, and both military and political leaders must recognize in practice that the authority to govern
derives from the will of the people.” The report noted that the upcoming polls “could provide a way to establish a peaceful transition to democratic civilian governance, if the elections process was deemed credible by the people of Pakistan and if there are immediate steps following the elections to transfer full powers to Parliament and a democratically mandated government . . . Should these developments not take place, however, the upcoming elections will have been a hollow exercise.”

New Issues Arising from Potential 2003 Palestinian Elections

The Palestinian case provides a test of whether elections can contribute to nation building. NDI, and others, were asked by USAID to assess the prospects for elections in the West Bank and Gaza, following President Bush’s call for elections.

When the assessment team took up its work in July 2002 we found three distinct schools of thought had emerged:

- Palestinians who saw elections as an opportunity to re-elect the current Palestinian leadership, with a renewed mandate that would reinforce Arafat’s position. Though they had some conditions, and they wanted to set the details of how the elections would be held, they were strongly in favor of moving quickly ahead.

- Israelis who thought Palestinian elections would be either unimportant or a bad idea, precisely because they would reinforce Arafat’s authority. They saw reform of Palestinian institutions, especially the security side, as much more important, along with financial reform. They saw the need to find a non-corrupt finance minister and apparatus as critical to progress. Political reform would cap the process, rather than be the starting point.

- Palestinians, and some Israelis, who thought elections needed to be held, and soon. The current PLC, they said, is illegitimate, as its term has expired. But elections under the prevailing conditions in the West Bank and Gaza may not be meaningful—the renewed Israeli occupation has helped to polarize the Palestinian citizenry and extremists could well prevail in early elections. This school of thought believes that there are preconditions for meaningful elections. Palestinians need freedom to travel, to organize new political parties and movements; they need revisions of the election law, real public debate and discussion on the framework itself.

Overriding other problems is the issue of voting in Jerusalem. The Israelis are against any voting in East Jerusalem and the Palestinians will not participate in an election without it.

The delegation, in looking at the prospects for elections in 2003, was mindful of the criticisms of the 1996 Palestinian elections, mainly, the criticism that the election process failed to bring about significant political reform. As the NDI/Carter Center report stated,

“The election did not serve as a catalytic moment for democratic political organizing as transition elections often do. Some political observers expected that elections would precipitate new political arrangements and that the traditional Palestinian factions that had emerged would evolve in response to electoral competition. As a result, the elections were largely a competition among local Fateh leaders and between Fateh candidates and independents.”

The 2002 delegation felt compelled to define the concept of “meaningful elections” for its August 2002 report.

“Meaningful elections mean that the outcome is not predetermined or entirely predictable, that the process allows disparate voices to organize and to be heard, and that governing institutions to be elected are perceived to be significant and accountable by the electorate. Elections are also meaningful when not regarded as singular events, but as elements of a political process that will extend beyond the 2003 elections cycle and contribute to the development of democratic Palestinian institutions.”

Looking to the future, the international community should not care about the specific outcome of the election, the partisan
outcome of the election, but the product of the election is important, in this case a new Palestinian Legislative Council. And Palestinians want more than an election that just ratifies the recent leadership with no change.

Finally, I would note also that the matter of candidature is in many ways the issue of the day. Is it reasonable to say that violent combatants may not be allowed to participate in the political process? That those who advocate or participate in violence could reasonably be excluded from the electoral process? Who decides this, how and when is an issue on the table for resolution, will have important consequences for democratization in general. Imposing such a standard will be an evolution of ideas on what is internationally acceptable.

It is important to distinguish what I have said about moving the focus to standards for meaningful elections and the role standards play as criteria for membership in certain international and regional institutions. The prestige of being a member of these institutions can be an important incentive for some countries to make changes in their political system. Experience has shown that carrots can be as powerful motivator as sticks. The criteria I have discussed for meaningful elections are not necessarily the best measures for the purpose of deciding membership in international organizations. The criteria for deciding when applicants have crossed a democratic threshold can evolve however. The Palestinian case is suggestive in this regard.

CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND DEMOCRATIZATION
— William Zartman

To explain the issues relating to “so-called” nation building and managing conflict resolution as they pertain to democratization we must first clear away some confusing semantics. First, let us look at the word “democratization”. I believe that there are no true democracies in the world—only democratizing countries. When a country reaches that high plateau, when it can confidently say that it has “achieved” full democracy (as tends to be the case here in the United States), it is likely to go downhill. Democracy, in reality, is a process—something toward which we must work, maintaining and defending as we grow. It is not a perfect condition in which we all sit in the clouds dressed in white robes, and we must never view it as such.

Second, what does the phrase “nation building” mean? The process of democratization is often mistakenly called “nation building”. As any student in even the most rudimentary political science class knows, however, this is the wrong term to use; “nation” refers to a community or an identity among people, and cannot typically be created by an outside force. The early American colonists did indeed engage in the process of “nation building”, setting forth a new civilization and culture on a new continent; today, however, we are in the business of “state building”, as we establish governments and institutions by which a territory can be organized. It seems to me that if we cannot even get the name right, we cannot possibly do the entire process effectively. Although I will primarily speak about Africa, what I say should apply equally to other regions of the world. Africa, that big “island” on the other side of the world, is often viewed in the West as the least important of the great continents; however, it can teach us many lessons about conflict resolution and democratization.

What are these lessons? First, we must remember that conflict within a state is a symptom of some deeper ailment, and we need to take it seriously. Silence is also an indicator that something is wrong. During the Cold War we often viewed internal conflicts and challenges to governments as an aberration, or as the work of a nefarious opponent on the other side. We did not, typically, take notice of the reasons why conflict arose in the first place. Whether or not a specific conflict is right or wrong, we must take notice whenever conflict arises—since it tells us when something is wrong. A good case study comes from the RUF—Revolutionary United Front—in Sierra Leone, a political movement seemingly without cause that routinely chopped off the hands of people who tried to vote. Its presence...
tells us that there is something wrong with the society in Sierra Leone—a society in which young men drop out of school at an early age, only to be recruited into a violent extremist group without any real agenda. The RUF is, primarily, a symptom of deeper social woes.

There is a similar group in the Ivory Coast today—a group so obscure that I do not even know its name—that has no leader, no cause, but simply tells us that something is unwell in what used to be a model African state. These conflicts tell us to pay attention to problems, but in official diplomacy, we tend to simply take the government of a divided state as legitimate, writing off any conflict as the work of crazy minorities. We do not often inform ourselves of the problems at issue in such conflicts. In the former Zaire, we had little contact with the present regime when it was only a small regional uprising—but we maintained close dialogue with Kinshasa, wrongly assuming that it controlled the entire country rather than the small tract of land around the city.

When a conflict ends, we must recognize that it is necessary to build a state before beginning the process of democratization. It is wrong to view democratization as a component of the process of state building itself, because the democratization effort assumes that a state is already in place. We got our signals crossed in Yugoslavia, where we insisted on democratization before the rest of the apparatus was in place, and the entire country fell apart.

It is also important that we never presuppose movements in a conflict to be “democratic” in nature. No nationalist movement is fully democratic; the American Revolution came close in this regard, but in the end, all movements seek to gain power for themselves. We must look first for a resolution of the conflict, and not simply call on democratization as a precondition for peace.

Effective democratization demands that we begin the process with local elections first. When elections take place for the first time, it should be at a level close to the people; in Africa, however, democratizing states often have presidential elections first. In such systems, new governments do not get a real idea of issues of local concern. When democratization begins at the top, political parties become sycophantic groupies looking to back whoever won. Elections are indeed important, but increasingly we are beginning to realize that elections themselves don’t necessarily resolve conflicts. Issues are only resolved when we work from the bottom up, not from the top down. Faced with lack of resolution after an election, many groups revert to the only means they have to push their agenda—violence.

Because democracy is a process, our periscopacious newspapers tend to judge a democratic system by its most recent election. We must remember, though, that there are aberrations in any democratic system; our own country’s history includes both good and bad elections. It is much more important that democracy build a habit of voting and holding one’s ruler accountable. Many initial aberrations exist in Africa, where political parties, at least initially, tend to draw on ethnic constituencies. This is inevitable at first—elections simply become ethnic contests. Democratization, as a process, eventually moves beyond that, as parties build coalitions between ethnic groups.

The point has been made on this panel that one criterion for a democratic general election is that the outcome of the election must not be predictable. Is this really the case? What if the government is doing well and meeting the people’s needs, thereby making its victory highly predictable? Another common criterion for democratic elections is the notion that parties must alternate power, giving opposition groups time in power; by that criterion, however, France was not democratic until 1980. It was also mentioned that violent combatants should be banned from participation in elections? I ask, how does this apply to soldiers?

Moving from conflict resolution to democratization often requires that we build local third parties—officials to serve as domestic mediators in the future. Such officials can be office holders, traditional authority figures, or members of local societies. A significant problem in democratizing countries is the challenge of non-democratic parties—parties whose very
platform stands for the demise of the system itself. Such parties claim to have a monopoly on the political process and the support of the people. The question remains, should democracy include the election of people dedicated to the destruction of democracy? Should people be elected when they want to limit future elections to a constituency that ascribes to their doctrine? Turkey faces criticism for its policy banning the participation of political parties whose platform includes religion. The answer to this question is not obvious, and we must think deeply about it.

Democracy is a collective enterprise. We must remember this when we intervene on its behalf; intervention for the sake of democracy should itself be the collective effort of the international community. This minimizes the chance that one country will pursue its own interests under the guise of democratization.

Finally, the situation in Afghanistan illustrates the point that if we are to be involved in conflict management in a country, we must typically be involved for a considerable amount of time. We must get out of the old American habit of rolling up our sleeves and declaring the problem solved before this is actually the case; at the same time, we must be careful not to stay too long and govern people’s affairs for them. The maxim is: stay as long as you must, but get out as soon as you can. The crutch of American support can be a long lasting disability.

AFGHANISTAN: NO QUICK FIXES

— Phyllis Oakley

In taking up this opportunity to talk today about the prospects for democracy in Afghanistan, it is tempting to say that this could turn out to be a very short discussion. However, there are lessons to be learned from the past that can lengthen the odds on nation and democracy building in Afghanistan today. I will lay out these lessons and their relevance for U.S. policy.

There are several reasons why I think Afghanistan got to the situation it finds itself in today. We must understand this background.

1. The Afghan resistance was always very tribal, it was never united (as it was in Tito’s Yugoslavia against the nazis, or in Ben Bella’s Algeria against the French).

2. Pakistan played a key role in this, in keeping the Afghans divided.

3. The U.S. did not ever expect they would win. We never thought we would succeed in pushing the Soviets out of Afghanistan. We just wanted to make their time in Afghanistan as painful as possible. In the end, we did not defeat the Soviets; they decided it was too expensive—in lives lost, and in money spent.

Because we did not expect to win, there was no planning for a post-Soviet government. The conventional wisdom was that, if they did win, the resistance forces would simply go in and take over the government. Najibullah held on longer than we thought possible. The AIG (Afghan Interim Government) never agreed on how to govern. The result was, eventually, that the Taliban came to power, pushing against the Northern Alliance to smaller and smaller areas of control.

Those of us who are old Afghan hands had a “bible,” and it was Louis Dupree’s classic history of the country. And he said that foreign armies always failed to last long in Afghanistan for 4 reasons:

1. They were foreign, and so they never understood the place.

2. They invariably supported unpopular emirs.

3. They had unreliable proxies among the local armies.

4. They failed to pay enough tribute to the Khan.

Some, perhaps not all, of these lessons, apply today. We may have learned something from this history.

Today, the U.S. is not in Afghanistan alone. There are 9,000 U.S. soldiers in the country, and mainly outside of Kabul, and there are another 1,200 non-U.S. soldiers in the country.
We are not making the wrong choice of a leader to support. In my view Karzai is the right guy. He is the only guy. But it should not be “our” guy who governs. It would be better if his security depended on a multinational force, rather than U.S. mercenaries.

The key is to help the Afghan government, for it is a weak government. Karzai needs to be seen as getting foreign aid, and he needs to be seen to be distributing it fairly.

There is a lot of talk of civil society and NGOs, but the most important thing is to strengthen the government.

By contrast with post-Soviet Afghanistan there is planning. The Bonn Process did bring Afghans together; it did lead to elections, of a kind; and it has led to a process where the Afghans themselves are writing a constitution. That we have not heard much about the drafting of the constitution is a good thing. It suggests it is not a very contested process. The key issue will be finding the right balance between the center and the periphery. There are many groups, from the Baluchs in the south to the Uzbeks in the north. There have always been warlords, or regional powers, governors. The difference now is that they have so many guns.

When I was involved in Afghanistan policy (after the departure of the Soviets), I used to ask returning Afghans two questions. What form of government did they envision? And is there a “Golden Age” in Afghan history that they look back to?

The answer to the first question was always consternation; they hadn’t thought about changing the form of government. They just wanted ‘their guys’ to be back in power. So the thought of changing the form of government never arose.

The answer to the second question was always one of puzzlement. They guessed it was the late 60s or the early 70s. The King ruled with a light hand. There was a balance between the provinces and the national government. Lots of foreign aid was coming in, from the U.S., the Germans, etc. There was a certain amount of prosperity as a result of this aid.

Looking forward:

1. We need to make a long-term commitment to Afghanistan. We need to “Let Afghans be Afghans.” We need to have realistic expectations about what is possible. Ahead troubles abound.

2. Pakistan is troubling. The religious parties were strengthened by the recent elections there. Will they protect the Taliban in their areas, or will they cooperate with Musharraf and the international community?

3. What Afghanistan is today is not a failed state, but a broken state that needs to be put back together again. We have not paid enough “tribute” and committed sufficient resources towards putting together Afghan’s broken state.

DISCUSSION

In the discussion, panelists reflected further on democratization in the Middle East and its impact on U.S. interests. Mark Palmer commented that a major failing of foreign policy thinkers was the failure to predict the rapid growth of democracy. The Middle East was the only part of the globe left relatively untouched. If Iraqis are able to achieve a democratic government, and Iran were to follow suit there could be a sudden sweep of democracy through the region. Wilcox responded that Iraq was the least likely place in the region for democracy to hold. Iran is far ahead in democratic development and its citizens have a fairly well developed political consciousness. A democratic change there would encourage change in the regions. Zartman said that Morocco with a steady progress towards democracy was one of the most encouraging states in the region, but that it would still take probably 20 years of progress at the current modest pace before it could be considered a truly democratic country. Iraq, with no democratic tradition, would take far longer. Also on the subject of Iraq, Zartman responded to another questioner stating that the way the U.S. could move from being a war-maker to a democracy builder was through multilateralism that keeps the U.S. from looking solely at its own interests.
Panelists agreed that there were areas of conflict between U.S. interests and democratization in the Middle East. Campbell said that it was legitimate to worry that the outcome of democratic elections would be “one vote, one time.” Oakley agreed that the U.S. has been afraid of instability and therefore cautious in supporting democratic processes. However, there should be greater recognition that in the long run the risks posed by a lack of democracy in the Middle East were higher than any short-range dangers caused by instability.

Discussion also focused on issues relating to democracy standards. One questioner asked Campbell to follow up on his statement that involvement in violence could be a bar to participation in a democratic election in the West Bank/Gaza and wanted to know whether such a requirement would exclude Arafat from a political process. Campbell reiterated that his organization, NDI, was neutral on the question of whether Arafat should be able to stand as a candidate and had taken the position that elections should be postponed because there was no way to have a debate, make the technical preparations, or have candidates have the needed freedom of movement to have meaningful elections that would be a catalyst for further democratization. Holding elections now would lead to an outcome that would give rise to institutions that would be the product of inflamed passions and that would not be a check on executive power.

In terms of restrictions on party participation, Campbell said that the more it was possible to draw Hamas into a political process the better. If Hamas were to enter into elections, it would need to establish a political wing, however. Those actively engaged in violence should, of course, be excluded from the political process. The process would have to be devised and policed by the Palestinians themselves. Oakley added that the transition from violence to political participation, as in Ireland or Sri Lanka, was an important subject that needed more research.

ABOUT ISD

The Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, founded in 1978, is part of Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and is the School’s primary window on the world of the foreign affairs practitioner.

ISD studies the practitioner’s craft: how diplomats and other foreign affairs professionals succeed and the lessons to be learned from both their successes and failures. Institute programs focus particular attention on the foreign policy process: how decisions are made and implemented.

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The Institute’s immediate constituency is Georgetown students. ISD staff and associates teach courses, organize lectures and discussions, mentor students, and serve on university committees.

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