



*Schlesinger Working Group  
on Strategic Surprises*

# Challenges for a New Administration

SCHLESINGER WORKING GROUP REPORT, FALL 2000

Prepared by Aleksandar D. Jovovic

## OVERVIEW

The Institute for the Study of Diplomacy hosted the fall 2000 meetings of the Schlesinger Working Group on the topic of possible foreign policy strategic surprises facing the incoming Administration. To provide a starting point for the discussion, working group members identified more than a dozen scenarios that could:

- Take a new administration by surprise (an event not covered in the transition briefing books).
- Present a considerable challenge to the President.
- Pose a significant discontinuity or shift in the current trend line.

Of these scenarios, some were judged more credible in the near to medium term than others. At the same time, working group members recognized that a short list of potential surprises or unanticipated outcomes could not cover all the possible challenges the new Administration may face. Accordingly, much of the discussion of specific scenarios took place under broader rubrics, which could apply in multiple situations.

Where appropriate, the working group identified policies that could prevent such a crisis, as well as actions that would mitigate the event and protect U.S. interests if it took place. In an effort to further illustrate the beneficial aspects of preparing for one specific surprise, the group also noted a number of other unexpected events or discontinuities that could unfold in a similar manner.

## SUMMARY

The Group discussions — over 7 hours of meetings in October and November, 2000 — identified six major unanticipated challenges to the incoming President that could take place in the

near to medium term future:

• **Leadership Loss** — The unexpected interruption or end of a number of powerful presidencies could pose a significant challenge to U.S. policy-makers. U.S. relations with many nations are conducted with and through key foreign leaders who so dominate their political systems that an early end to their tenures could leave their countries adrift and our relations unhinged.

• **State Collapse** — While the U.S. is mindful of regional powers, it seems less informed of the consequences of potential state breakdown or collapse. Battered states may be more prone to export instability, which in some instances could envelope entire regions.

• **Unintended Consequences** — Unintended outcomes of U.S. policies could pose a significant problem to policy-makers, and threaten the very goals such policies were meant to further.

• **Enhanced Influence of Non-State Actors** — The post-Cold War world has seen a burgeoning of events precipitated by non-state actors. While the information revolution has mostly benefited NGOs with laudable goals, it has also given terrorist and criminal networks access and capabilities unimaginable a decade ago.

• **Trend Acceleration** — Current trends can lull policy-makers into complacency or continuing policies that require change. Once a series of events takes place, it becomes increasingly difficult to gauge its speed and direction. The pace of events may overtake U.S. policy-makers if they do not undertake an immediate review of present conditions.

• **Accumulating Evidence** — The steady accumulation of evidence of global changes can be just as illusory. Decision-makers may be prone to disregard individual incidents, failing to identify the overarching trend, until faced with a global crisis.

The Institute for the Study of Diplomacy of Georgetown University launched the Schlesinger Working Group in 1999. This program recognizes the distinguished public career of Dr. James R. Schlesinger and his remarkable contributions to national security policymaking and strategic thought. This project is based on a multi-year Working Group initiative with a mandate to review and assess a range of possible scenarios that contain significant potential for strategic surprise and for unanticipated outcomes. The Schlesinger Working Group relies on a permanent “core membership” of generalists from the policy-making and research communities and academia (please see page 2), who are sometimes joined by respected authorities on specific regional or functional topics under consideration. The meetings are chaired by Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies Dr. Chester A. Crocker and ISD Director Professor Casimir A. Yost.

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\* Core members of the Schlesinger Working Group were not asked to approve this Report. The Report, however, relies heavily on the discussions of the group. As such, this document reflects the general ideas of working group members, but is not a consensus document and cannot be ascribed to any individual member.

#### LEADERSHIP LOSS

*A number of important democratic victories in recent years, notably in Indonesia, Mexico, and Iran have given renewed hope to the prospects for world-wide democracy. They have encouraged U.S. policy-makers and contributed to a sense of complacency and an air of self-congratulation. These hopes are often founded on the election of a popular reformist chief executive, and as such the domestic base for true democratic change and stability may be shallow. In other instances, U.S. policies have become overly dependent on Washington's relations with longstanding, but isolated chief executives. U.S. policies and interests, and for that matter the prospects for democracy in the countries at hand, could be badly shaken by the premature end of an executive's tenure.*

**The Mexican Case.** U.S. decision-makers may be placing too many bets on the impressive presidential victory of Vicente Fox, Mexico's center-right President. While Fox is a popular and charismatic leader, he will preside over a country suffering from an increasing North-South divide. The new Mexican administration will be plagued by an inherently divided parliament, and powerful and potentially rebellious PRI governors in the provinces. If something were to happen to Fox prematurely ending his presidency, Mexico could find itself in turmoil, with labor unions, criminal elements and powerful political forces battling it out in the aftermath.

The United States can do little to protect Fox's presidency. Therefore, the U.S. must broaden and deepen its support for democratic and civic forces in Mexico. Working group members generally felt that Mexico would not be immediately enveloped in violent turmoil if Fox were to leave the presidency. They highlighted Mexico's generally conservative and cautious outlook, as well as vivid memories of politically inspired violence of the previous century as proof of such a claim. Furthermore, Mexico's drug barons may also keep a low profile if such an event were to take place, since they are believed to be averse to publicity. At the same time, several issues need to be noted: Mexico's presidential succession laws are intricate and could cause important obstacles to a smooth succession, Fox's cabinet, while intellectually impressive, appears to be politically inexperienced, and criminal elements would be sure to take advantage of a slackening of the "war against drugs."

Changes in Mexican attitudes (an evident weakening of anti-American rhetoric in Mexican

public life) may actually have placed the U.S. in a better position to offer guidance in a presidential crisis. Therefore, the U.S. must strengthen ties with civic groups, labor unions, and local and state governments (and particularly with the influential state governors). Much of this can be done through colleague-to-colleague and local contacts, and positive and public reinforcement of the principles of rule of law. It must be accomplished with clear respect for Mexico's sovereignty, with the U.S. acting as a friend and ally, concluded working group members.

A number of other key countries could also be thrown into turmoil if faced with an unexpected end to their president's tenure. Colombia (see the Spring 2000 *Schlesinger Working Group Report* entitled **Colombia at the Crossroads**) would face an uphill battle if President Pastrana were to prematurely leave office. Many consider the country's party and political system bankrupt, while the country is embroiled in civil strife. In the Colombian case, the U.S. should reach out to alternate sources of power and influence and act as a stabilizing force to temper a potential "loss-of-leadership" crisis. Similar observations may be appropriate in the cases of Egypt and Nigeria.

#### STATE COLLAPSE

*It is evident that the U.S. is deeply concerned with the policies and intentions of emerging regional powers across the globe. It is equally worrisome that not as much attention is being paid to weakening and failing states. These two related forms could pose considerable challenges to an incoming president, particularly if they develop in key parts of the world. Weakened states can export instability, much as one would expect a "rising power" to do, while failing states can do even greater damage - dragging entire regions down with them. It may be tempting to ignore these problems, particularly if they occur gradually. However, the cost of inaction will only grow as the crisis progresses.*

**Failing African State Case.** A scenario featuring "state collapse" in Africa sounds at first glance like yesterday's news. But the international community has witnessed how large-scale disorder in a small country such as Lebanon, Afghanistan, Rwanda or Bosnia can negatively transform the surrounding region. State collapse and large-scale violence with accompanying human trauma in a place like the Congo (larger than the U.S. east of the Mississippi) has already begun, but the full ramifications are only dimly understood. This scenario already affects nine neighbors and

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includes over a dozen official and rebel military formations. Sub-Saharan Africa's more promising states (Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia, South Africa, Mozambique, Botswana) risk getting sucked into the mire, while Congo's more interventionist neighbors (Namibia, Angola, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Rwanda) already are deeply engaged in it, a pattern that could spread instability across Congo's borders. Left to its own devices, this quagmire in Central Africa could become an engine for region-wide failure, a crossroads for illicit enterprise and terrorist networks, and a laboratory of disease and human degradation. At the same time, the prospect of political-territorial fragmentation will grow, engaging a range of military actors in efforts to break up or sustain region-wide boundaries. In the balance would be the political norm of legitimacy of inherited borders, however artificial, which has helped sustain Africa's fragile order for 40 years. A failed Congo could become impossible to ignore, just as it proved to be in 1960, but for quite different reasons.

There was no consensus among working group members on how to "sell" further U.S. involvement in this key region, taking into account the seemingly intractable and inherently dangerous environment of Central Africa. Some working group members argued that well-publicized humanitarian concerns would be enough to jar the United States into action. Others added that the issue of AIDS could bring home the plight of Africans to Congress, which could in turn galvanize the President into action. The U.S. may have to rely on the U.N. to help solve Africa's growing problems, or as one skeptical participant explained, use it as an alibi for American inaction. The case for sustained U.S. engagement in Central Africa — diplomatic rather than military — would require hard slogging to sell.

**A Weak China.** While China is a first-tier country in U.S. decision-making circles, almost all scenarios about future crisis events begin with the view of China as a "rising power" — the notion that China is on the verge of becoming a robust power. Such an emboldened China, pundits comment, would surely be tempted to threaten U.S. superpower status, starting with the status of Taiwan. However, what is often neglected is that such a China might feel secure enough not to pursue confrontational politics. On the other hand, a China racked by a banking crisis, failing state-owned enterprises, escalating unemployment, and a weakening of Communist party

legitimacy and authority might also present a serious challenge to U.S. policy-makers. China's neighbors could see massive refugee flows from the mainland. Facing strong pressures at home (including the rise of unsanctioned groups such as Falun Gong), unable to quell calls for increased "local democracy" in towns and cities, and provocative talk in Taiwan, Chinese leaders might opt to shore up sagging internal legitimacy with a forceful bid to "repatriate" Taiwan. In this case, the crisis may be similar to what analysts expect, but the symptoms of this scenario will be markedly different, making early detection and action more difficult.

Interestingly, participants noted that China's attitudes towards the United States were generally unfavorable, which to some extent flies in the face of reason: the U.S. has ostensibly aided China in past decades, first in deterring Soviet hegemony, then playing an important role in opening and developing China's economy. Yet official circles, particularly in the armed forces, continue to treat the U.S. as an adversary. Such a sense of grievance and historic entitlement will make U.S. dealings with Beijing difficult.

There may be little the U.S. can or should do to insure internal stability in China. Washington can continue to support China's economic reforms. It must also work to improve relations with China's powerful and insular military. Paradoxically, perhaps the best tool of leverage the U.S. has are the tens of thousands of American-educated young Chinese, many of whom have returned home upon the completion of their studies. On the political front, the U.S. will need to continue to keep China abreast of movements on National Missile Defense. The U.S. will need to continue to support Taiwan, taking into account Chinese sensitivities. Forward basing of troops and material in Japan and Korea will remain crucial. Ironically, one participant noted that either a gravely weakened or powerful China could prove useful for the United States — in both cases neighboring countries would look to the U.S. for aid and support.

It needs to be noted that Congo and China are not the only states facing internal challenges. Both Colombia, plagued by civil war and organized crime, and Pakistan, whose military government continues to flounder, could also be examined under the state collapse rubric. Indonesia (discussed in depth in the Fall 1999 *Schlesinger Working Group Report* entitled **Indonesia in Transition**) represents a case study of the problems flowing from a weakened state.

**UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES**

*Unintended consequences of U.S. policies could pose a significant problem to policy-makers, and threaten the very goals such policies were meant to further. In an increasingly inter-connected and fluid international situation, narrowly formulated policies and programs can have increasingly wide-spread repercussions. Attempts by the U.S. to construct a limited ballistic missile shield against “rogue” missile attacks, could spark further realignments among the nuclear club. Changes in the U.S. economy, including movement in Federal Reserve rates (meant to guide the domestic economy), have increasing effects on the global economy. Such unintended consequences must be on the minds of members of the incoming Administration.*

**Arms Competition.** The United States must be particularly wary of initiatives backfiring. One such potential event would involve current proposals for National Missile Defense (NMD). The development of this initiative (in its several proposals) is ostensibly meant to deter small scale or “rogue” nuclear attacks on the U.S. It is not meant to negate Russia’s nuclear deterrent. However, the U.S. is now dealing with an expanded number of small-scale nuclear powers including China, India and Pakistan. U.S. NMD decisions could trigger (or be used to justify) Chinese nuclear weapons upgrading and modernization efforts. Such a turn of events could trigger a further build-up by Beijing’s regional rival, India. This in turn could provoke Pakistan into further nuclear force modernization, touching off a full-scale regional nuclear arms race — a series of events NMD was not meant to provoke.

Some members of the working group discounted this scenario, arguing that it would not take place in the near future and therefore did not fit the criteria. Others pointed out that the modernization of China’s nuclear forces was an ongoing process, and its pace would be only marginally affected by NMD. Still others noted that the scenario assumes an incorrect sequence of events: Pakistan may soon be driving the arms race, while the Indians appear to be having problems modernizing their nascent nuclear arms program. If in fact the scenario were correct, the U.S. could do little to forestall it. Measured statements and timely briefings could perhaps put some Chinese policy-makers more at ease, as would a more limited or revised form of missile defense. In sum, members appeared skeptical about this particular scenario, but accepted the principle that unintended consequences of policy

decisions were a potential challenge to the new Administration.

**Economic Interdependence.** A decade-long era of prosperity has lulled many Americans into a false sense of economic security and independence. The strong U.S. economy was able to weather the Asian financial crisis, and mitigate the Mexican currency crisis. Record U.S. trade deficits and strong domestic consumption have absorbed increasing numbers of foreign products. At the same time, economic fundamentals in Japan (Asia’s former powerhouse), China (with its faltering state-owned sector), and Europe (still grappling with economic integration and a disappointing showing of the Euro) remain weak. Realignment and changes in the U.S. economy can destabilize numerous markets abroad that are dependent on the cost of capital (set primarily by the U.S.) and large trade deficits generated by the U.S. economy (primarily with Asian countries). Aside from economic effects (particularly evident in countries such as Argentina), changes in the U.S. economy could have significant political repercussions, including instability, regime change (such as the recent coup in Ecuador), and the collapse of international trade agreements. The economies of the world have never been more intertwined nor, in some respects, more dependent on the U.S. — a fact that must never slip from the minds of U.S. policy-makers. Economic growth and the continuing openness of markets in the U.S. are prime factors contributing to global economic prosperity.

**ENHANCED INFLUENCE OF NON-STATE ACTORS**

*The post-Cold War world has seen the burgeoning of non-state actors. Groups previously limited by the confines of finances and geography can now operate globally at an insignificant expense. On one hand, activist and non-governmental groups have utilized the information revolution to coordinate and cooperate with like-minded organizations across the globe. The results of such work were more than evident in the recent progress on banning landmines, or in Seattle, where labor, fringe left-wing and activists groups shattered what was to be an orderly meeting of world financial and trade officials. On the other side of the spectrum, criminal and terrorist groups have also taken advantage of the giant leaps in information and telecommunications. They have become all the more potent as a result. Non-state actors appear poised to play an ever-increasing role in world events.*

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### *World Wide Web vs. World Trade Organization.*

There has been a marked trend to accept as final the breathtaking economic, social, political and communications changes termed “globalization” that have dominated the past decade. “The End of History” theme describes these turbulent times as a final chapter in the development of socio-political systems and a victory for Western democracy and market economics. However, recent events point to a fierce, ideological rejection of globalization by a combination of leftist, isolationists and activists in the U.S. and key European nations, as well as certain developing country governments (but not others) across the globe. So far these diverse elements have not congealed into a clear unified voice. But there is a possibility that we have become complacent about the direction of this transitional age. The answer to such a question may prove crucial to decision-makers if faced with a disintegration of support for institutions and international regimes such as the WTO, the IMF and the United Nations. If such institutions were to come under serious challenge, what direction would the international community adopt, and how should the United States react?

Most participants seemed to feel that anti-globalization forces were a loud but fringe minority, mainly based in the well-off northern hemisphere. The fact that attitudes towards the IMF and World Bank are more positive in the developing world was used as evidence for such a view. However, international institutions could do more to address key public health and global issues that have produced considerable political pressure in recent years. Some participants went further, arguing that the real problem (aside from activist “Luddites”) was a trend in the labor movement against export-led growth, which can threaten domestic jobs. Other discussants also highlighted a worrying trend of anti-Americanism, often equated with globalization (particularly in some parts of the Islamic world). Coupled with growing unease in the Middle East, such feelings could endanger not only U.S. political interests, but also economic ones (already evident as part of recent anti-American consumer boycotts in the Islamic world).

### *Weapons of Mass Destruction on U.S. Soil.*

The possibility of a significant act of terrorism in the U.S. has proven an interesting topic for both Washington and Hollywood. And while it is certain that a number of agencies and government entities have spent considerable time working out contingencies for such a tragic event, some par-

ticipants remain convinced that the wider U.S. decision-making community will be surprised and unprepared for such an event.

One scenario offered by participants was the delivery of a primitive weapon of mass destruction (WMD) to a U.S. port through the easily penetrable container shipping system. By definition, the perpetrator might be hard to identify and could be a non-state actor. The discovery, let alone activation, of such a device would seriously challenge policy-makers. Both the Congress and the public would demand a vigorous response to such an event. However, other working group members argued that such doomsday events were first on the minds of policy-makers. Furthermore, decision-makers were constantly planning for such an event. This group concluded that such a topic was far from a “surprise.” Others, however, felt that the U.S. was thoroughly unprepared for a serious terrorist attack, and that America’s relative isolation had lulled policy-makers into a false sense of security.

### **TREND ACCELERATION**

*Current trends may lull policy-makers into complacency or allow them to continue with unrealistic policies. Once a new trend begins, it becomes increasingly difficult to gauge its speed and direction. Events may overtake U.S. policy-makers, if they do not undertake an immediate review of present conditions. Perhaps the most pressing issue is the sanctions regime against Iraq. In the face of continued U.S. pressure (sometimes supported by the United Kingdom) for a continuation or strengthening of the sanctions regime, Arab countries and Russia, as well as some U.S. allies, have begun dismantling the embargo against the regime in Baghdad. At the same time, across the globe, increasing rapprochement between the two Koreas may soon begin to strain U.S. presence in the South. Clear majorities in South Korea already favor a gradual ending of U.S. military presence on the peninsula. Such pressure could endanger U.S. presence (and military capabilities) in the wider region of East Asia, shifting the balance of power away from the U.S. and its allies.*

*Iraq Resurgent.* In the heat of the debate over how to uphold the faltering sanctions regime, U.S. decision-makers may “lose sight of the forest” — the fact that Iraq may be emerging as a regional player after a decade of isolation and crippling sanctions. But America’s problems might not stop there: dynastic instability in the Saudi Kingdom, a key ally and mainstay in the

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Iraqi containment scheme, and challenges to the Mubarak regime might also weaken the U.S. hand. Furthermore, current public opinion among Arab nations in the Middle East is increasingly critical of U.S. policies in the region. As such, the United States can expect further challenges, as well as the potential for additional political surprises. With oil prices at all-time highs, such a series of events (an example of how a crisis can escalate and spiral) would present a critical challenge to the incoming Administration.

Participants urged the incoming Administration to immediately review U.S. Gulf policy, with an emphasis on adapting and making the Iraqi sanctions regime more nuanced. Furthermore, generalized economic sanctions must be reviewed, since they represent the most vulnerable element of the embargo in the eyes of Middle Eastern governments and the public. The United States will have to concentrate on the WMD threat, and may have to act militarily, even unilaterally, if further weapons development is detected, group members concluded.

**Korea.** With recent diplomatic initiatives receiving attention in the media, it is unnecessary to underline Korea's importance to U.S. decision-makers. However, the working group felt that "trend acceleration" on the Korean Peninsula could catch policy-makers off guard. What may now seem like a steady, albeit bumpy, progression towards detente on the Korean peninsula could turn into an accelerating engine of attitudinal change placing a question mark on further U.S. military presence on the ground in that part of East Asia. With U.S. troop presence already unpopular among a significant number of South Koreans, a surprising fall in tensions could place U.S. decision-makers in a difficult position to further rationalize or explain the deployment of some 37,000 personnel on the peninsula to the U.S. and Korean public. The U.S. will have to work actively and engage Asian publics broadly in laying out the implications for regional stability of a rapid draw down of U.S. military presence.

#### ACCUMULATING EVIDENCE

*While most discussions of the working group center on strategic surprises that take place with relative haste, it is important to note that some gradual and slow-moving events could take the new Administration by surprise as well. These events act much like the erosion of beaches — it is a continuous and relentless process that often takes years to register. The damage, when evident, however, is far from*

*negligible. Since the sudden discovery of the ozone hole, there has been concern about the possibility of another environmental shock, perhaps the discovery of a yet unnoticed phenomenon. In the sphere of international politics, a parallel trend may be rearing its head — a move away from democracy. The democratic revolution of the 1990s has lulled policy-makers into a false feeling of security, which could quickly fade if more countries are confronted with economic and political crises.*

**A New Environmental Shock.** The discovery of the ozone layer hole brought about a serious evaluation of global environmental policies that led to the Montreal Treaty. At that time, nations were able to harness a sense of cooperation that ushered in a series of steps to halt and reverse this dangerous environmental trend. Will nations be prepared to confront a new global challenge of these or greater proportions? In spite of the fact that most environmental shifts (such as climate change) are gradual, U.S. policy-makers could be confronted with a sudden surprise, particularly since it is now apparent that scientists were unwittingly following ozone layer depletion, but discarding the results as flawed for some years before the discovery. With technological innovations moving at breathtaking speed, and discoveries sweeping away our misconceptions on a daily basis, the U.S. must be prepared to confront dramatic discoveries in the sphere of the environment. This may pose a challenge to decision-makers, taking into account the differing developmental priorities of advanced and industrializing states and a deepening North-South divide.

Participants were reminded that some environmental changes could happen unbeknownst to the public, in spite of scientific strides. Such changes, as for instance, shifts in ocean currents and temperatures, could wreak havoc on a great number of countries. Recent discoveries of large-scale decay of coral reefs, which could indirectly impact up to half a billion people (through changes in fisheries and decreasing tourism revenues) all point to the possibility of such a trend. On the more positive side, participants noted that a large portion of total greenhouse gas emissions came from combustion engine vehicles — technology that could soon be replaced by cleaner electric or hydrogen engines. Overall, however, even if environmental shocks are detected, it has proven increasingly difficult to achieve new global standards and consensus to halt or reverse environmental damage and confront risk.

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*Backing Away from Democracy.* Developments in the late 1980s and early 1990s suggest a triumph of democratic ideals over authoritarian and totalitarian regimes in Europe, Latin America, Asia and Africa. The wave of democratic transformation (including the recent democratic changes in Belgrade) has led to a sense that the ideals of freedom of speech and association, as well as free and fair elections, have now become a universal norm across the globe. However, a number of states may experience reversals. Russia's democratic credentials are increasingly shaky, while Peru and Venezuela's political systems have been battered by populist and authoritarian tendencies. Nigeria's nascent democracy is threatened by renewed sectarian violence. With these events in mind, U.S. decision-makers must be prepared for the possibility of a serious reversal of the "democratic trend."

Some participants explained the shifts as cyclical, while others identified more long-term negative changes, particularly in the developing world. In any event, it would be wise to tone down the triumphal rhetoric, and look more towards long-term approaches and institutions as the real tools for strengthening/returning to democracy throughout the world. The U.S. must recognize potential agonizing trade-offs in countries facing leadership transitions, state failure, or regional political or economic instability. While "in your face" democracy promotion may not offer the best route, nurturing civil society around the world and prodding governments to broaden participation can make a difference in countries that are prepared to change.

**CONCLUSION:  
PREPARING FOR THE UNEXPECTED**

This report points out a number of potential strategic surprises that could take place in the

near to medium term future. These unanticipated events or breaks in the current trend line could pose a significant challenge to an incoming Administration already battered by a short and difficult transition. In an effort to identify the broader scope of each candidate surprise, the report has established six general rubrics.

*Leadership Loss* describes how the unexpected interruption or end of any one of a number of powerful presidencies could pose a significant challenge to U.S. policy-makers. *State Collapse* highlights U.S. indifference to the consequences of potential state weakening or collapse. Failing states may be more prone to export instability, which in some instances could envelope entire regions. *Unintended Consequences* points out the potential unintended and often contradictory results of U.S. policies. *Enhanced Influence of Non-State Actors* alerts U.S. decision-makers to the increase of events precipitated by non-state actors, both legitimate and illicit. The *Trend Acceleration* scenario warns policy-makers that trends can lull policy-makers into complacency or furthering unrealistic policies. A number of developments may overtake U.S. policy-makers if they do not undertake an immediate review of present conditions. *Accumulating Evidence* argues that decision-makers may be prone to disregard individual incidents, failing to identify the overarching trend until faced with a global crisis.

While the report does illustrate each broad category with concrete examples, it is crucial to note that evidence of these challenges is present in other countries and regions as well. Contingency planning for one form of crisis or expected event will certainly prepare the incoming Administration for dealing with broader problems, wherever they arise. ■

**ISD MISSION AND PROGRAMS**

The Institute for the Study of Diplomacy (ISD), founded in 1978, is part of Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and is the School's primary window on the world of the foreign affairs practitioner.

ISD studies the practitioner's craft: how diplomats and other foreign affairs professionals succeed and the lessons to be learned from their successes and failures. Institute programs focus particular attention on the foreign policy process: how decisions are made and implemented.

ISD conducts its programs through a small staff and resident and nonresident associates. Associates, who include U.S. and foreign government officials and other foreign affairs practitioners, are detailed to or affiliated with the Institute for a year or more.

The Institute's immediate constituency is Georgetown students. ISD staff and associates teach courses, organize lectures and discussions, mentor students, and participate on university committees. ISD's larger constituency is the broader academic and policy community. The Institute reaches this group through its conferences, working groups, publications, and research activities.