



*Schlesinger Working Group
on Strategic Surprises*

A Turning Point for Turkey

SCHLESINGER WORKING GROUP REPORT, FALL 2001

Prepared by Aleksandar D. Jovovic

The Institute for the Study of Diplomacy of Georgetown University launched the Schlesinger Working Group in 1999. This program recognizes the distinguished public career of Dr. James R. Schlesinger and his remarkable contributions to national security policymaking and strategic thought. This project is based on a multi-year Working Group initiative with a mandate to review and assess a range of possible scenarios that contain significant potential for strategic surprise and for unanticipated outcomes. The Schlesinger Working Group relies on a permanent “core membership” of generalists from the policy-making and research communities and academia (please see page 2), who are sometimes joined by respected authorities on specific regional or functional topics under consideration. The meetings are chaired by Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies Dr. Chester A. Crocker and ISD Director Professor Casimir A. Yost.

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OVERVIEW

The Institute for the Study of Diplomacy hosted the fall 2001 meetings of the Schlesinger Working Group on the topic of Turkey. Our selection of Turkey is a reflection of the daunting choices and challenges that face this country, as well as its inherent importance. Turkey is at a crossroads not only due to its strategic geographic location, but also because of the key internal economic, social and political problems it must resolve. It faces difficult dilemmas on the question of Cyprus, its relations with Greece, and its cooperation with Israel. It has been forced to accept open-ended delays on EU membership, and it may have to yield some influence on the issue of European defense. Turkey walks a fine line between firm support for the Iraqi containment scheme and tacit admission of its dependence on the resulting smuggling business. On the home front, its tendency to ban pro-Islamist parties and its treatment of the Kurdish question may be unsustainable, while serious structural problems and rigidities in the economic system threaten to derail the impressive economic gains of past decades. And finally, the political system itself, rife with corruption and sustained by a bloated bureaucracy and entrenched party politics, is under growing strain.

SUMMARY

The Group’s discussions — over seven hours of meetings in October and November 2001 — examined the current state of affairs within Turkey, as well as the implications external events have on Turkey and its foreign policy. Members of the Schlesinger Working Group identified the following key challenges that face the Turkish Republic:

- Economic frailty, exacerbated by an evident

lack of will for thorough structural reforms.

- An ossified political elite, unwilling to make difficult decisions, challenged by entrenched and growing Islamist movements, and prone to wait for cues from the armed forces.

- A military torn between the desire to stay out of the political limelight and an institutionalized tendency to meddle in running the country.

- Turkish perceptions of its preeminent importance to the Western alliance, and particularly the US, coupled with historically rooted suspicions about European designs on Turkish territorial integrity.

- A lack of foreign policy vision, making Ankara dependent on brinkmanship, which could lead to serious clashes over European defense issues and the status of Cyprus.

- An unwillingness to undertake the full gamut of necessary changes for Turkish membership in the EU.

- Regional tensions that hamper political stability and economic reforms.

- The issue of expanding the US-led war against terrorism towards Iraq, which necessitates Turkish participation or at least acquiescence.

THE ECONOMY

The frailty of Turkey’s economy became painfully evident during the currency crisis of February 2001, when financial panic erupted after a damaging, yet essentially frivolous, political squabble between Turkey’s prime minister and president. Since then, Turkey’s economy has struggled to regain momentum, further battered by general investor avoidance of emerging markets, and strong reservations among creditor nations, led by the US, to involve themselves bilaterally in reviving the country’s economy. Still, much-needed financial aid did arrive from the IMF, and

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Turkey is about to receive a third infusion of \$10 billion, which no doubt, was aided by increased US interest in Turkey's stability. Participants noted that Turkey's efforts in the reform process have been sporadic, with necessary reforms often put off to the last possible moment, and implemented only after concerted international pressure. Still, Turkey has made some important steps, particularly in reforming its banking system. Yet, these changes go relatively unnoticed, due to the country's failure to effectively communicate its intentions and accomplishments. Creditors remain skeptical, and interest rates for Lira-denominated borrowing remain high.

Confidence in Turkey's economy could be aided by more direct bilateral aid, primarily from the US, since international financial institutions such as the IMF are already over-extended in Turkey, and will be hard-pressed to lend much more. Direct aid coming from Washington would also signal a stronger US commitment to Ankara's financial stability. While the Bush Administration and its Treasury Secretary, Paul O'Neill, displayed some skepticism about these practices, Turkey's key role in the US-led anti-terrorism campaign appears to have altered some of their thinking on this issue. Still, Turkey is far from fully resolving its difficulties. The country's elite, be it the military, political or business community, remain divided on the necessary course of reforms, and lack enthusiasm for deep changes in the way the country conducts its business. In the end, Turkey may successfully exit the crisis if external pressure for reforms remains strong. However, marginal and temporary improvements may only take the political heat off the elite and lessen their commitment to reforms.

THE POLITICAL ACTORS

Turkey's mainstream political parties are hitting record low points in the popularity polls, as the public voices its general disillusionment with the political system. If elections were held soon, many established parties could find themselves locked out of parliament thanks to Turkey's unusually high 10% electoral hurdle for parliamentary representation. The only notable exception to this trend is the new Islamist party led by the charismatic former mayor of Istanbul, Tayyip Erdogan, which has shown strong potential for growth despite legal attempts to ban its activities. Yet Prime Minister Ecevit's broad-based coalition has been rather resilient, and has even displayed moments of strength, as the recent preliminary approval of 34 of 37 constitu-

tional changes (required of Turkey in its pursuit of EU membership) shows. The apparent cohesiveness of the coalition parties seems to result from a general consensus that elections at this time would benefit none of them.

Notwithstanding the present political understanding among mainstream parties, participants noted that Turkey desperately needs an infusion of new political blood into the system. The present political leaders, mostly aging political veterans, remain mired in personal animosity and factional squabbles. Some believe that Kemal Dervis, Turkey's well-respected, yet maverick, economics minister, is one of the new political faces. President Sezer, the well-regarded former head of the constitutional court, is another new addition to the political system. Yet both Dervis and Sezer are hampered by a number of weaknesses. Each lacks strong organized political backing, while Dervis is also a target of much popular anger over the economic pain his reforms are inflicting. For his part, Sezer is bolstered by his strong stand on corruption, and has recently impressed on the foreign policy front, but remains somewhat of a political wildcard. Furthermore, it seems that he is not prepared to play the role of a buffer between the armed forces and the civilian elite, as did former President Demirel, nor to be the oil for Turkey's rusty political machinery. The bottom line remains that Turkey's present political establishment lacks accountability and remains deeply reliant on the military's shadowy guidance. It has displayed a marked avoidance of biting the bullet, trusting that the armed forces, directly or through Turkey's National Security Council, will step in to make the hard decisions and difficult choices, leaving the civilian political establishment relatively unscathed by painful political decisions.

THE ARMED FORCES

Turkey's recent history and the military's own actions have propelled the armed forces into an important role in Turkey's political life. Yet, it was noted that the military is not in a hurry to become embroiled in the current crisis, no doubt because it recognizes it lacks true solutions for the country's accumulated economic and social problems. Having said this, the military will remain an important factor in political decision-making, and appears to be as firm a bulwark against Islamist encroachment into political life as it ever was. The armed forces remain staunch defenders of "Kemalist" ideology and its secular worldview. The military is purged at least once a

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year of any pro-Islamic sympathizers, making Islamist infiltration, particularly of the officer corps (as has happened to an extent in Pakistan), far harder to envision. Participants noted that the exact role the generals should play remains debatable, with some looking to the military to “cleanse” the present political scene, and others viewing the military’s role as overly visible and a burden on democratization. This discussion quickly ushered in a debate on the merits of democracy versus stability, and on the interests of outsiders. Now more than ever, as the anti-terror campaign focuses on Iraq, outsiders are likely to favor forces of continuity and stability within Turkey’s elite.

Yet “Kemalist” ideology is not the only factor influencing the policies of the armed forces. The Turkish military, participants explained, is thoroughly ideological but can shift a few degrees to the left or right of the political center, as it did in the 1960s and 70s. The current policies tend to be closer to those of right-wing nationalist political groups, reinforcing the military’s hard line on Kurdish rights and the future of Cyprus. The generals have also shown considerable skepticism over the benefits of Turkey’s potential membership in the European Union. The Working Group concluded that the armed forces were likely to avoid entering the fray of political and economic in-fighting, but could feel compelled to react to what they see as threats to Turkey’s national security, or prolonged refusal by the political elite to make the difficult decisions awaiting Turkey.

PERCEPTIONS OF TURKEY

Throughout the discussion, it was evident that political perceptions of Turkey (from both within the country and abroad) play an important part in the political decision-making process. Indeed, the Turkish political elite’s view that their country is indispensable (to the West in particular) appears to have as much impact on their decisions as does their faith in the ability and will of the armed forces to make things right when all else fails (and perhaps even before). At the same time, there may always be a hint of distrust of European intentions, as one participant coined — a “Treaty of Sevres complex,” referring to a defunct 1922 great powers’ plan to dismember Turkey. Still, the certainty that is placed on Turkey’s importance is critical since it seems to hamper the Turkish leadership’s will to implement difficult or unpopular reforms, particularly in the economic sphere, but also on the issue of corruption and human rights. With this and the international anti-terrorist

campaign in mind, Turkey’s leaders may be poised to capitalize on further aid and Western concessions, which may be beneficial in the short-run, but could put off necessary long-term reforms.

Some participants noted that Turkey’s overall situation, despite the dire economic condition the country finds itself in and the political and institutional weaknesses noted, was quite good — particularly if the country is compared to other Muslim or Middle Eastern states. And indeed, Turkey’s democratic institutions are better developed than those in Jordan, military discipline and capabilities are far more impressive than in Indonesia, and Turkey’s attitude towards religious tolerance, particularly for non-Islamic faiths, is immeasurably more evident than in Saudi Arabia. Yet however upbeat this assessment is, it is counterbalanced to a significant degree by the fact that both the Turks themselves and most Western observers hold Ankara up to a European, developed-country yardstick, rather than a Third World standard. When this is done, Turkey’s challenges (economic, political, and social) are more readily apparent. Turkey is not oblivious to these issues, and recent impressive constitutional legislation is working to remove some of the barriers to Turkey’s potential accession to the European Union. It remains to be seen if these and other changes will be enough to convince skeptical European decision-makers (see below).

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

Numerous participants underscored their concern over Turkey’s apparent lack of vision in the foreign policy sphere. It appears that no Turkish leader since Turgut Ozal has been able to fashion a broad set of political principles to guide Ankara through the murky waters of European, Caucasus, Central Asian and Middle Eastern politics. Indeed, the new brand of Turkish politicians are prone to shun foreign policy and concentrate on domestic affairs, as did President Necdet Sezer, who upon taking office, promptly dismissed much of his foreign policy staff. Such political meandering, coupled with a reliance on military influence in the decision-making process, and a marked tendency towards aggressive brinkmanship (evident in Turkey’s pressure on Syria to hand over PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, and Turkey’s response to Congressional action on the Armenian question) are likely to produce a worrisome combination of political defensiveness and military bluster. Such attitudes do not bode well if Turkey aims to enhance political and security stability within its strategic neighborhood.

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Cyprus and Greece — One of Turkey’s greatest foreign policy challenges in the short-term will be the status of the divided island of Cyprus, an issue that numerous members of the working group referred to as an impending “train wreck” (although this might erroneously imply that they are on the same ‘track’). The island’s decades-long status quo is about to be shattered by Cyprus’ pending admission into the European Union. While the internationally recognized Greek Cypriot government (which controls most of the island) is eagerly awaiting accession to the EU and has gone to great lengths to qualify for membership, Ankara awaits this event with both dread and defiance. The admission of a well-qualified (despite its previous image as an “aircraft carrier for the mafia”) but divided state, occupied in part by a fellow NATO member state, which in turn also wants to join the Union, presents a serious challenge for policy-makers in Brussels and NATO. Still, the EU has little choice, faced with Greek demands that the island be admitted and vows to delay the entrance of a host of other applicants, if a decision on Cyprus is postponed. Despite misplaced optimism that the parties (or the UN) will take action and resolve this issue, Cyprus will certainly warrant increased US attention, since Washington is the only actor that has significant influence over all the interested parties. US decision-makers might even have to ponder the radical proposal to formalize the division of the island, one participant noted.

Perhaps the most crucial issue surrounding the Cyprus question is identifying the real value Turkey places on its security presence on the island, and what sway the issue has over the general public. There are evident differences among the political elite, while the military overall puts more of a stake in its presence in the Turkish-controlled area. Indeed, even if elite opinions were clear, the Cypriot issue has strong emotional roots in the body politic. Rauf Denktash, leader of the Turkish Cypriots, is a commanding figure on the mainland, and has important influence with the political elite and the public. Some participants argued that he may even be setting Turkey’s policy towards Cyprus. Prime Minister Ecevit, known as the “Lion of Cyprus,” has strong ties to the island, due to his key role in the 1974 Turkish intervention. Aside from the status of Cyprus, a number of other key disputes also mar Greco-Turkish relations: control over islands and islets in the Aegean Sea, and territorial water and over-flight issues. Indeed, if it were not for Cyprus, some participants noted that Greece

would actually want Turkey in the European club, since it would restrain Ankara’s maneuvering room on a score of smaller bilateral issues.

EU Membership for Turkey — Turkey’s relationship with Europe is deeply intertwined with the Cyprus issue. Yet public perceptions and elite opinion further complicate this issue. Participants noted the deep (and often obscured) divisions among members of the civilian and military elite, as well as misgiving over membership harbored by some parts of the general public. EU signals that Turkey may never qualify for membership have certainly dampened some of the elite’s appetite for becoming part of Europe. Indeed, only the business community seems overwhelmingly on board. Others feel that joining surrenders too much of Turkey’s national identity and sovereignty, while many simply have little opinion at all. Turkey has also successfully blocked the EU’s European Security and Defense Initiative, aimed at creating a robust European military first response force, which will require NATO’s logistical aid (there are some new signals that an understanding has been reached) — a potential indicator of how Turkey could cause problems for Europe if it is frozen out of the EU. On the surface, however, Turkey remains on track, with the parliament’s preliminary approval of over 30 constitutional changes (on such issues as human and political rights, and the influence of the military) paving the way for an application for EU membership. Still, just below the surface, key issues remain unresolved — numerous loopholes remain that allow for military influence on political issues through the National Security Council, and the results of proclaimed civil rights reforms, ostensibly aimed at broadening the rights of the disaffected Kurdish minority, are open to interpretation.

Russia, Central Asia and the Caucasus — Despite stronger economic ties, Ankara’s relations with Moscow have remained strained. Hopes that ties between the two powers would improve dramatically in the aftermath of the Cold War have largely been dashed, primarily due to the fact that the two countries continue to be locked in a competitive posture regarding Central Asia, the Caucasus, and energy issues. Participants noted that Turkey’s avowed ambitions to become a significant Central Asian player, utilizing linguistic and ethnic kinship with the dominant groups there, has come to little, while Moscow has done much to regain clout in the

area. In the Caucasus, the two states remain at odds with Turkey displaying tacit misgivings about Russia's treatment of Chechnya (although Turkish criticism remains constrained by its domestic Kurdish problem), and openly supporting Azerbaijan in the dispute over Caspian Sea oil, going so far as to put on a military air show after an Iranian naval show of force. Turkey, thanks to the planned Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, which now appears to be proceeding thanks to strong support by Western oil firms (primarily BP), is also an important non-Russian controlled outlet for energy. These issues, coupled with what one participant explained as an underlying perception of Russia as the "great adversary" by many in the Turkish military, bodes ill for any major improvement in Russo-Turkish relations. Furthermore, Ankara is likely to look unfavorably on Russia's improved ties with the US, since it could only diminish Turkey's strategic importance in Washington's eyes.

Israel — There is no better example of Turkey's pragmatic approach to international affairs than its relationship with Israel. Ankara has established strong military and intelligence ties, as well as political and economic connections, with its neighbor, despite the fact that the two countries are clearly divided by religion. Surprisingly, even Ankara's Muslim Arab neighbors have grudgingly accepted these ties, concluding that Turkey's specific political, economic, but also cultural and ethnic, identity allows for such seemingly unorthodox alliances. Having said this, a closer look at the two countries displays a number of shared interests: both states are staunch US allies; they are often seen as outsiders in the Middle East; and each has come into conflict with some of its Arab neighbors (particularly Syria). Turkey and Israel have not only benefited from military and intelligence cooperation — their two economies are also the most vibrant and open in the region. Finally, Turkey has benefited from Israel's influence and access to the US Congress. Such access has enabled Ankara to more effectively combat legislation critical of Turkey and its history, particularly over its past treatment of the Armenians and issues surrounding its relations with Greece (traditionally, along with Israel, both of these groups have unrivaled Congressional support).

The Balkans — Participants noted Ankara's limited political role in Southeast Europe, a development that may elicit some surprise if one takes into account the Ottoman Empire's historic

influence in the area. Turkey appears to have been too constrained by its membership in NATO, as well as its own separatist war with Kurdish insurgents, to openly aid fellow Muslims in Bosnia and Kosovo (limiting itself to moral and humanitarian support and NATO actions), while it has long elicited suspicion among the Slavic ethnic groups. With this assessment in mind, and aside from its relations with Greece, Ankara is not expected to play a prominent role in the region in the near term.

THE WAR ON TERRORISM

It is evident that Turkey's already prominent role in European and Middle Eastern security, and its close military relationship with the United States, will only be enhanced by the current campaign in Afghanistan. Indeed, it was noted that the repercussions of terrorism resonate widely with the Turkish public (already accustomed to political violence), eliciting much needed sympathy, something the US squarely lacks among other Muslim countries. Turkey remains a key component in the Iraqi containment scheme (hosting *Operation Northern Watch*), and has maintained ties with America's other critical Middle Eastern ally — Israel. Indeed, the US may look to Turkey to provide key liaison work with Pakistan (and particularly its military, whose commander-in-chief, Pervez Musharraf, attended a Turkish military academy), and valued advice and perhaps manpower in dealing with a post-Taliban Afghanistan.

Strongly tied to this issue is Turkey's attitude towards religion. As already mentioned, it appears that Turkey's military is immune to Islamist infiltration in the short term. Indeed, the Turkish public is shielded in part from the Arab world by linguistic differences and historic tensions, which have sometimes put it at odds with its neighbors. The pro-Islamic media, while picking up on some of the rhetoric of the popular Arab press, has remained muted, no doubt wary of Turkey's strongly secular censors. Yet, Islamic political forces are not powerless. They command an increasing number of supporters, and one participant warned that they could harness growing social unrest to destabilize the country. For now, though, Turkey's government retains its generally tolerant and secular stance and will probably manage to put a damper on widespread anti-American protests or actions, barring developments that would steer the US-led war on terrorism in the direction of a perceived all-out US attack on Islam.

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Iraq — Continued US reliance on Turkey comes at a price for both nations. Participants noted that Turkey would view a “phase II” widening of the war against terrorism towards Iraq with great trepidation, and perhaps outright political resistance. The Iraqi sanctions have already thrust heavy economic costs on Turkey, and Turkey fears that the collapse of the regime in Baghdad could open the doors to the dismemberment of Iraq, perhaps leading to the creation of an independent Kurdish state — a development vehemently opposed by Ankara. Participants had differing views on whether Turkey could stomach some form of Kurdish autonomy, and discussed what value US assurance on this issue would have. A new regime in Iraq would carry another hidden political cost for Turkey — the loss of geo-strategic importance (naturally, along with many benefits for Turkey). A stable and moderate regime in Baghdad would greatly lessen the need for an overt US military presence in the region, reducing Turkey’s importance.

The crucial question for Turkish decision-makers is the stability of post-Hussein Iraq and the composition of its government. Current developments in Afghanistan will do much to assure or disturb policy-makers in Ankara. If the international community, led by the US, is able to stabilize the situation on the ground (by intensifying humanitarian activity and establishing an interim government that is able to provide a modicum of security and begin economic recovery), then official Ankara may acquiesce to US attempts to unseat Hussein. Naturally, the key issue for Turkey remains a guarantee of the territorial integrity of Iraq — which for official Ankara translates into a denial of any independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq.

CONCLUSION

In light of the Working Group’s mandate to examine strategic surprises, participants identified a number of potential unanticipated events and surprise scenarios:

- The conflict in Afghanistan has played a role, albeit strenuously denied, in the third delivery of IMF aid to Ankara. Indeed, across the board, Turkish problems will receive more US and international attention, perhaps preventing the emergence of a serious crisis for some time.

- Despite strong political signals of Ankara’s deep reservations about any attempt to topple Saddam Hussein, Turkey may prove itself more cooperative than expected. Turkey’s attitude will depend on the success of the US-led campaign in

Afghanistan, the existence of a clear endgame in Iraq (which would maintain the country’s territorial integrity) and Washington’s ability to engage in some difficult diplomatic horse-trading.

- The status of Cyprus remains a sleeper issue — within a year’s time, two crucial US partners could be at loggerheads. Imminent decisions on Cypriot membership in the EU are driving this issue to the fore and US policy-makers may have to contemplate more radical solutions to the problem, including formalizing the division of the island. It is worth noting, however, that this new sense of urgency may actually produce a favorable outcome at talks in Nicosia, though this remains a less anticipated result.

- Setting aside common wisdom, Athens may actually favor Turkey’s admission into the EU — in order to limit Ankara’s room for maneuver on a number of bilateral disputes, though few envision Turkish membership in the coming several years.

- While the working group remains certain of the core secular values of Turkey’s officer corps, little is known about the religious orientation of conscripts within the armed forces.

Members of the Working Group concluded that true economic and political reforms in Turkey require a continued sense of urgency, as well as a generational change in the country’s leadership. If the present elite continues its course of ambivalence and Turkey’s economy continues to simply coast, Turkey could be headed for a serious crisis. To prosper, Ankara will have to wean itself away from its entrenched reliance on military guidance, and will have to reinvigorate public trust in the government. The armed forces, for their part, appear prepared to stay out of the political fray, while its officer corps appears immune to Islamist infiltration in the near to medium term. However, if the perceived confrontation between Islam and the West grows, and if the country is marred by economic and social problems, conscripted troops may not share their officers’ “Kemalist” ideology. Turkey’s elite will have to shun their grandiose notions that Turkey is indispensable to the West, as well as discard fears that some in Europe are secretly conspiring to dismember the country. In the eyes of Western decision-makers, Turkey is an important and valued ally, but such suspicions and perceptions are an unwise basis for decision-making, which is further hampered by the leadership’s lack of a foreign policy focus, and an evident tendency to rely on brinkmanship, rather than diplomacy and compromise, to accomplish

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important foreign policy goals.

Turkey's first test case may be the impending crisis over the status of Cyprus. Although still off the radar screens of some observers, this issue must be addressed with haste, in order to avoid a serious showdown in the coming year between the EU and Turkey, two critical US partners. Turkey's relations with Russia and the former Soviet republics will be less important (aside from energy issues, which remain a salient topic for Moscow and the West). Ankara still regards Russia as a strategic adversary, while it has failed to make significant inroads among Turkic-speaking peoples in Central Asia. These trends, taking into account Turkey's present economic weakness, are likely to continue. Relations with Greece (setting aside Cyprus) are more important, with numerous petty, but politically dangerous issues always susceptible to flare-ups. Ankara's discreet political and security ties with Israel will continue unabated, unless the current Palestinian crisis escalates into all-out war, while Turkey's influence will remain marginalized on the Balkans.

Increased turmoil in the Middle East, as well as any escalation of the perceived confrontation between the Islamic world and the West will increase the pressure on Turkey's secular elite. Participants noted that one Islamist party, led by a former Ankara mayor, stands to gain from further political and economic turmoil. Pressure on Turkey will also increase if the United States decides to intervene in Iraq to ensure that it does not produce weapons of mass destruction, but

also with the unspoken goal of toppling the regime of Saddam Hussein. Any Turkish participation in efforts to destabilize the current Iraqi regime will require persuasive guarantees that a new government in Baghdad will continue to control the entire country, and that any Kurdish entity that remains in the north will not endanger Turkey's security and territorial integrity. Turkey's attitudes towards moves against Hussein will depend to a great extent on the international community's efforts to swiftly finish off the Taliban-Al Qaeda alliance, and begin the difficult task of reconstructing war-ravaged Afghanistan.

Ultimately, the coming several years are a key turning point for Turkey. Numerous external challenges lie in the road ahead; some more evident (such as the Iraqi question), others less talked about, but equally disruptive (such as the Cyprus quandary). On the home front, Turkey faces a generation of ossified political leaders, and a system of governance plagued by corruption and an unsustainable bureaucracy. These difficulties are sure to exacerbate growing social and economic problems, which cannot be solved by the military or by simple injections of foreign aid. On one hand, the working group concluded that challenges to the Turkish state must be avoided with skill and forethought. At the same time, it is clear that only a true sense of crisis, pervading both Turkey's general public, its business community and political and military elite, can spur any real improvement of the country's political and economic foundations. ■

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