Chair: Robert L. Gallucci, Georgetown University General James T. Scott, Harvard University H. Allen Holmes, Former Asst. Secy. of Defense Princeton N. Lyman, Aspen Institute Rapporteur: Steve Ball
"With growing globalization, an array of nasty threats, like terrorism, international crime, mass destruction technologies, and civil unrest, and with increasing numbers of Americans working and traveling abroad, any administration is hard put to protect American interests and the lives and safety of American citizens." The Honorable Allen Holmes
"Diplomatic readiness will be defined by the skills and insights to understand situations of importance to the United States and the ability to mobilize the resources necessary to address them." The Honorable Princeton Lyman
The state of United States diplomatic readiness is low. Panelists pointed to foreign service officer shortages, inadequate training, and deteriorating infrastructure as the dangerous result of a foreign affairs budget that is underfunded.
The picture is particularly troubling considering the complex nature of the world security environment which, panelists argued, calls for a better resourced, trained and manned U.S. diplomatic effort. Otherwise, the United States will find its
national security policy more and more defined by the use of America's armed forces. Military engagements in Grenada and in some parts of Africa could have been less demanding with more effective preventive diplomacy, according to General Scott.
In today's untidy world where our overseas commands continue to be challenged, our diplomats and their skills are sorely needed," said Allen Holmes. The next administration will be presented with a growing number of situations around the globe, any number of which could provoke a crisis. The complexion of the 21st century security challenges will include not only traditional security crises, but also the consequences of failed states that are incapable of addressing the most basic services and where humanitarian concerns impel US action or intervention.
"Africa may not be at the top of our strategic concerns, but it is the area with the most
instability, most demand on humanitarian intervention and where much of the controversy over
peacekeeping takes place," Lyman noted. "What we have are a series of envoys running around
to the Congo, Burundi, and other countries. They have no staff, very little political clout and very little real weight behind them. They are, like I once described UN efforts of this kind, walking naked into the jungle. This is not a diplomatic capacity to deal with potential crises of major and long-term consequences for the U.S."
It may be arguable whether the AIDS crisis is a United States national security issue, but, "we haven't even begun to understand the long term political and social consequences of millions of people starting to die in Africa, South Asia and all areas in the former Soviet Union," Lyman stressed. The states where this crisis is looming most seriously are precisely those least capable of addressing the problem. Though the political and social consequences have yet to be realized, the impact could be felt globally.
The global nature and increasingly technical character of impending security threats will demand well-crafted and targeted multilateral solutions. "The complexity of the issues and the concept of a multipolar world means that we are going to be involved much more multilaterally than we've been before," Lyman added. Being effective and influential on complex issues in multilateral negotiations requires a skilled and trained diplomatic corps.
Experience has taught us that security crises demand early and robust military response. However, we have also learned that a successful endgame is defined by smooth transition from Department of Defense to Department of State management. Allen Holmes cited examples in Bosnia and Operation PROVIDE COMFORT in Northern Iraq where successes were brought about by close professional coordination between State and DOD. However, when hostilities subside, as in Haiti, General Scott noted, turnover of tasks from the military to State is sometimes long in coming. The demands of civil society development and institution building often exceed the capabilities of the Country Team. Our diplomatic missions are under-staffed and under-resourced and, therefore increasingly rely on the military to carry out often delicate and demanding post-crisis tasks.
General Scott said that strapped ambassadors are increasingly turning to the military to carry out diplomatic duties. U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines from the five regionally oriented Unified Commands (Central Command, Southern Command, Pacific Command, European Command, and Joint Forces Command) are becoming integral members of the U.S. diplomatic presence. General Scott stressed that "CINC's don't desire the role of proconsul, they don't want to displace Ambassadors or diplomats. [However], they find themselves more and more relied upon to exercise 'operational diplomacy' because of the resources the CINC's possess. The demining exercises, transportation assets and manpower all send a powerful and lasting message. The issue is [that] there is no off-set from the State Department."
Below the CINC level, U.S. Ambassadors are turning to their defense attaches to perform diplomatic functions beyond their military expertise and calling on non-commissioned officers to support embassy functions in ways that non-military embassy staff would have done in the past. The long-term and insidious nature of many developing threats requires early and accurate involvement of trained foreign service officers, but General Scott noted that reduced manpower and funding mean that such disproportionate reliance on the military is often the only option available to the ambassador.
Military commanders want U.S. diplomatic missions to succeed in the business of strengthening U.S. bilateral relationships so that they can resolve disputes through discussion and negotiation. Experienced commanders know all to well that the failure to build strong international partnerships to treat the causes of conflict today can easily lead to costly military responses tomorrow, " Holmes emphasized.
Finally, citing another example of the poor state of pur diplomatic readiness, Princeton Lyman pointed to Nigeria, a major oil supplier to the United States and the largest country in Africa. Nigeria is on the brink of serious religious and ethnic conflict, a democracy suffering from great instability. "There is no consulate in the north with the large Muslim community, none in the east, none in the very troubled Delta area and our embassy has no political counselor because the Department of State is so short of senior officers."
In summary, the panelists described a post cold war period that has been marked by a hectic and uncertain world security environment and the outlook is for more of the same. U.S. diplomacy and foreign assistance have not received adequate funding during the past ten years. The growing challenges of the 21st Century -- HIV-AIDS, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), transnational crime, and ethnic and regional conflict -- will require better trained, equipped, and experienced diplomats aggressively conducting preventive diplomacy. A weakened diplomacy without the foreign assistance tools to improve the chances for success will increase threats to U.S. security interests and boost the need to deploy the U.S. armed forces, a risk that is unnecessary and a policy that is short-sighted and costly in the long-term.