In 2005–06 I was working with two epidemiologists at the Johns Hopkins University on a mortality study of the Iraq War. They were conducting the survey; they had done one already in 2004, and I commissioned them to do another, larger survey. We had no good account of the number of Iraqis who had died as a result of the conflict, and for many reasons I thought this was important. So we proceeded with some internal funds, and I hoped to raise more to publicize the survey’s results.

I set out to raise funds from a group of donors—peace and security funders—I knew somewhat well, having once been part of that cohort as the executive director of the Winston Foundation for World Peace, which spent out its endowment in 1999 after operating for thirteen years. It was the legacy of Robert Winston Scrivner, a widely revered grantmaker with the Rockefeller Family Fund and a leader among the antinuclear funders of the late 1970s and early 1980s. In thinking about the value of the Iraq mortality study, I believed that one aspect that would appeal to peace donors was how the survey would bring attention to the colossal human cost of the war. The news media had paid too little heed to this dimension, the U.S. government was doing everything it could to distract from it, and thus one of the signal virtues of civil society—drawing attention to neglected and important consequences of public policy—could come powerfully into play.

The survey would produce other useful data—how, when, and why people died; where and by what means; and who did their relatives think was responsible—information of value to the military and to policy analysts as well as to historians who were struggling to sort out the dynamics of the Iraqi resistance. Because the 2004 survey estimated nearly one hundred thousand deaths in the first eighteen months of the war, and the violence of the war had escalated dramatically in the ensuing year,
it was likely that new mortality figures would be shockingly high and possibly a wake-up call for the U.S. public. I thought the donors would see this as an opportunity to support the most advanced technique for estimating mortality and stir a public discussion about the costs of war.

I was wrong. As I discovered over the coming months, the peace donors as a whole seemed indifferent. Two old friends in the donor community who were instrumental in supporting the antinuclear movement provided small grants, as did a foundation not associated with peace and security funding, the Open Society Institute. The several others I approached had either no relevant funding program remaining, did not take unsolicited proposals, or evinced no interest in addressing the many issues pertaining to the U.S. intervention in Iraq or Afghanistan.

The number of foundations promoting peace—nonviolent problem-solving, in effect—had been declining since the late 1980s. The many foundations, including the Ford Foundation, which had left the field, was somewhat understandable given the demise of the Cold War, even as that rivalry had ended due in part to the work of the peace movement of the previous decade or more.¹ Be that as it may, and despite the outbreak of many “small” wars in Africa, the Middle East, and the former communist sphere, much of the U.S. donor community had moved on to other things. Some were interested only in nuclear weapons. Others had drifted off to address racism or gender as a cause of war and insecurity.

I found the indifference mystifying. The Iraq and Afghanistan wars touched upon so many issues these liberal or progressive foundations cared about—U.S. military adventurism, the racial and class injustice of the all-volunteer military, the waste of tax dollars on useless wars, the tinderbox of the Middle East, and the hope for post-Cold War leadership on sustainable development, among others. That there was virtually no support for antiwar activism or analysis was an almost complete turnaround from a generation earlier. And in this one episode was a confluence of trends in grant-making that I find both perplexing and worrisome. It goes from smallish things like the way foundations operate to much more consequential choices about how to promote social change. In this, the traditional liberal values of transparency, openness, democratic decision-making, economic fairness, and the progressive role of the state were often upended.

What happened?

THE WAGES OF ISOLATION

Certainly one of the major changes in organized philanthropy over twenty years is the institutionalized isolation of the donors. Foundations
open to unsolicited proposals are fewer in number than ever before. The typical mode of operation is for such a foundation to define program areas and then go out and find grantees to carry out the self-defined mission. Even though most boards do not possess the expertise to shape such a mission, and staffs are relatively small and limited in their capacities, the practice of proceeding like a quasi-operating foundation is appealing in part because scarce resources can be targeted.

This is, in my view, a mistake. As a foundation director, I found that maybe 10–20 percent of the most satisfying grant-making we did derived from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) I did not know before they approached us and convinced me that their work was high quality and relevant to our goals. Foundations that exclude such new blood in their systems will be anemic, precisely because the major contribution NGOs make is new energy and innovative ideas. We know from several academic studies that one way to change the world is to introduce new principles of action, or norms, that resonate with the public and become politically salient. NGOs, particularly social movements, are the institutions most likely to cause “norm emergence,” as that is a principal goal of many in issue advocacy, and most issues cry out for new ideas to break through stalemates in domestic or global politics. That's not to say that such new ideas cannot emerge from established charities or governments or businesses or universities. But it is to say that a wellspring of ideas is being capped, in effect, by the now ubiquitous practice of having already chosen grantees to carry out the mission hatched in foundation board meetings. Even knowledge production in universities and think tanks is supported by foundations with their own mission in mind, limiting the types of independent research that will be supported and reach an audience in the nonprofit world.

The practice is self-perpetuating, moreover, because the donor and grantee in fulfilling the mission have identical interests with regard to assessing performance. Grantee performance has supposedly come under more rigorous scrutiny in recent years, but if the grantee and the funder are working hand-in-glove, then the objectivity of evaluations becomes questionable. Internal mechanisms of accountability in foundations are notoriously lax, so in a quasi-operating foundation, the problem is even more acute. This would tend to act against “new blood” in grant-making because it would also cast doubt on the staff-and-board-approved mission and the staff management of that mission. Those are difficult obstacles to overcome.

Another form of isolation is growing. That comes in the form of the consultant and the donor-advised fund, both of which create a space between the donor and the grantee. Consultants come in all shapes and
sizes, filling various roles including temporary foundation staff members. Donor-advised funds, like those in the Boston Foundation or the Tides Foundation, to cite two well-known examples, are more permanent. There are often good reasons for this arrangement—some individual donors do not have the time or interest to oversee a foundation—but the space is created all the same. What this widespread practice does, in addition to contributing to isolation, is reduce diversity. If hundreds of donors are handing grant-making responsibility to a handful of such umbrella organizations and consultants, then decision-making is in fewer and fewer hands. The possibility, again, of welcoming new ideas is inevitably reduced, because the donor-advised funds have, naturally enough, their own philosophy of grant-making and their favorite grantees.

Isolation also comes in the form, for want of a better term, of class connectedness. The socioeconomic class of foundation officers tends to be well educated and at least moderately privileged, although some diversity has crept in over time. (In this regard, gender diversity, while welcome and in full bloom, is less relevant than class, national, and racial origins.) A prominent Turkish intellectual once remarked to me, “You and I are more alike than I am alike most Turks or you are alike most Americans.” He was right, of course. There is now a global “class” or strata of educated activists and intellectuals who share values, perspectives, goals, and aspirations on a vast array of public concerns—mainly a western, liberal, market-oriented approach. What this means for grant-making is a mixed bag. It internationalizes the epistemic and resource networks we inhabit, a good thing. But it tends to limit whom we connect to in the developing world. As the scholar Paul F. Steinberg argued more than a decade ago, the environmental activists in developing countries who receive funding from U.S. foundations and international organizations are those who speak English, may have degrees from U.S. universities, and are otherwise “connected.” Yet some of the hardscrabble work inside those countries to enact reform is done by domestic groups with no international connections—or funding.3

In all these cases, isolation need not be deadly—conscientious grant-makers are aware of these bubbles and likely do their best to step outside of them. But they nonetheless exist and are reinforced by the general tendencies of grantees to defer excessively to the judgment of donors. It is also reinforced by other provinces of the international order; I have heard the cadre of western aid workers who travel from emergency to emergency referred to as “mobile sovereigns.” The global governors in the world’s institutions derive their power from institutional authority, expertise, and principle-based authority, among other, related sources.4
All of these facilitate a “class” of elites who share a common view of the world and reinforce that set of beliefs and practices through institutional norms. Foundations are members of that community, while not formally “governors.” But it is a status that fosters isolation from all but those who travel in those circles.

**BEING, OR NOT BEING, A “CHANGE AGENT”**

The conceit of many foundations nowadays, those interested in public policy, is the notion of being a “change agent,” one who promotes social, economic, and political change. We fund change agents, we are change agents, we celebrate change. This is one of the most durable social archetypes of western civilization, the embrace of change, and it is a sturdy value of the U.S. experience, too.

One can scarcely argue against change, and human agency is that which we seek to achieve. So, in a sense, foundations have always seen themselves as agents of change or supporting agents of change. At root, this conceit assumes that the foundation is undertaking grants that challenge the status quo, most particularly government policies. This is true of those involved in international affairs but also applies more broadly. You cannot be a change agent if you are merely reinforcing established policy and practice.

The foundation world tends to be rather cautious in its choices, however, casting some doubt on its self-image of an avant garde. The grant-making of the peace funders, for example, tends to reflect the priorities of the national security state, namely, obsessions about both nuclear weapons and terrorism. Many other worthwhile issues—human security, women and security, the security implications of globalization, the growing insecurity of major cities of the global south, to name a few—go begging. That some of these, such as the drug cartels’ grip on many Latin American countries, have enormous consequences for hundreds of millions of people right now is a peripheral concern in organized, private philanthropy. Like most public policy professionals, foundation officers want to be players in Washington, and you cannot play if you are not in Washington’s game. Focusing on marginal topics puts you on the margins. It is from those margins where change often originates, however. Most foundation officers understand this but see themselves as a broker between the powerful and the powerless.

Any notion of being a change agent requires that one knows how change occurs. A theory of social and political change is a sine qua non of successful change agenting, so to speak, and foundations are well aware of this. “The problems foundations aim to address exist in social ecosystems,” writes one major foundation president. “We try to identify
the key drivers in each system and the points at which the system can be influenced for the better. How we will exert that influence is a ‘theory of change,’ a set of hypotheses about cause and effect that guides how we will try to have an impact on the situation.”5 But the actual theories of social change that foundations operate on are rarely articulated.

To the extent that such theories are discernible, they seem to fall into three categories. The first and most prominent is elite decision-making. The audiences for much of the product of foundation grants are Washington policymakers and gatekeepers—think tanks and the news media—which is occasioned by endless courting rituals and policy studies. Needless to say, such a strategy requires the grantee to possess credibility with this audience, which overall is a group that is dedicated to incremental change. The grantee must be regarded as equally cautious. This elite model also works on the global stage, with audiences being international organizations and foreign states. Indeed, the U.S. model is simply transferred abroad, with goals of capturing the attention of important people, the news media, and so on.

The second theory is about mobilizing civil society on behalf of some set of norms or specific policy goals. Years ago, in the salad days of social movements, mobilizing large numbers of activists and formulating demands on officials were strategies that a few progressive foundations would employ. David Hunter of the Stern Fund and Leslie Dunbar of the Field Foundation were two of those who argued for and supported such mobilization. The major changes we have seen in U.S. society were muscled onto the national agenda mainly through mass movements—civil rights, antiwar, feminism, environmentalism—whether supported by foundations or not (most were not at their early stages). “Resource mobilization” became a key tenet of social movement theory, one in which the opportunities for significant change and the actors who would press for it required “resources”—not just money, but skills, access, networks, et cetera—to realize this potential.6 A number of observers see the major foundations as a buffer against deep social change, having a “cooling out” effect against more radical action and essentially preserving the status quo with a more humane face.7 Thus, for example, the trend to support think tanks and academics working on nuclear arms issues after the Reagan-Gorbachev détente in the late 1980s, rather than the grassroots movements demanding an end to nuclear weapons—indeed, the movement that may have persuaded the nation’s leadership to seek rapprochement to begin with.8 The funded intellectuals sought in effect to manage the residual nuclear competition and sustain U.S. nuclear superiority; the activists wanted to eliminate nuclear weapons and the hazardous fuel cycle. A cynic might attribute this strategy to the prevalence of like-
minded people in government, academia, think tanks, and foundations, people with similar educational backgrounds and outlooks, although as usual the phenomenon was complex and not so easy to sort out.

For many foundations, however, the preponderance of practice is to support service organizations meant to fill particular needs and educate recipients, typically underrepresented populations. For example, the Rockefeller Foundation has made a number of six-figure grants to Mercy Corps, a faith-based humanitarian relief organization, to integrate climate change ideas into many of its other activities. This work presumably seeks to educate local actors on green goals; it does not, however, challenge directly the causes of climate change, a cardinal difference from social movements. This service orientation is a corrective approach, a belief in evolutionary change or building resilience, and is more progressive than simply supporting a hospital or museum. But it is to some degree merely filling in where the public sector should be and only indirectly addresses the causes of the injustice at issue.

This orientation, however laudable in most instances, does not add up to a theory of social change apart from the anodyne notion that broadening knowledge of climate change or HIV or soil erosion or nuclear war somehow is sustainably preventative. Evolutionary change does occur, of course, but it scarcely represents the kind of change agenting that most foundations would see themselves as promoting. These kinds of grants may be problem-solving in very specific circumstances, but they are not agents of structural change.

THE SOCIAL ENTREPRENEUR

The third theory of funder-stimulated social change is based on the notion of entrepreneurship. “Social entrepreneurs are individuals with innovative solutions to society’s most pressing social problems. They are ambitious and persistent, tackling major social issues and offering new ideas for wide-scale change,” notes Ashoka, a leading NGO promoting these change agents. “Rather than leaving societal needs to the government or business sectors, social entrepreneurs find what is not working and solve the problem by changing the system, spreading the solution, and persuading entire societies to take new leaps.”

The embrace of entrepreneurship in the nonprofit world has been one of the sturdiest and most compelling ideologies of organized philanthropy in the last twenty years.

The fundament of the entrepreneur is to recognize an opportunity that others have not and to devise an efficient means to exploit that opportunity. The social entrepreneur sees an opportunity or a need that can be addressed through business-like activities. This can be a form
of innovation, a new way to do something more efficiently—and social innovation is a term that goes hand-in-hand with social entrepreneur.\textsuperscript{11} The Ashoka definition is ambitious, the supposition that the social entrepreneur will change the system, spread the solution, and convince entire societies to transform themselves. Finding such examples of that would be difficult, but one should nonetheless honor the spirit of that aspiration. More prosaically, those dedicated to this kind of endeavor suggest that applying business principles and practices to solve social problems will yield better results, provoking and bracing values of efficiency, accountability, self-reliance, and sustainability. It often involves alliances with businesses to achieve some specific goal.

The idea of the social entrepreneur is scarcely new, however, even if the term is. Innovators of various kinds, from engineers (the actually trained innovators) to business leaders to educators to scientists and so on have long been doing things that transform their “social ecosystem” (also known as “society” or “social organization”) and that make life better for many people, oftentimes without pecuniary reward. A good example is Margaret Sanger, the nurse who dedicated her life to the benefits of birth control, founded the World Population Council, and raised money to develop the birth control pill. Altogether, a stellar example of a social entrepreneur. An innovator who came to be supported by foundations and had transformative effects was the agronomist Norman Borlaug, who was a principal instigator in the 1960s of the “green revolution.” One could find many other examples, but the point is that social entrepreneurship has been pursued to advance social, political, and economic action for many decades. If there is something new in the concept and practice, it is that more attention is being paid to the process of social innovation and the conscious application of business techniques.

The notion of the lonely entrepreneur or pioneer who outwits the inert establishment plays strongly into our national myths and indeed myths more universally.\textsuperscript{12} But the idealization of the social entrepreneur has its hazards. One was voiced by just such a person, Kjerstin Erickson, who started in her early twenties a NGO working with refugees in Africa. “My concern with the label ‘Social Entrepreneur’ is that it’s ego-flaming at best, and sector-defeating at worst,” she writes in a blog of the Skoll Foundation, among the most enthusiastic proselytizers for the concept. “In a business setting, the label entrepreneur is, by definition, person-centric. It draws the attention not to the specific enterprise that is being created but to the person doing the creating. It subtly affirms the notion (however accurate) that it’s the specific traits of a specific individual that matter to the success or failure of a venture. In short, it’s all about you.”\textsuperscript{13} Projects of any kind, even those that are transforma-
Conceits of the Change Agenda

Social entrepreneurship has also been criticized, from within, for fetishizing the business model, for demanding that “clients” pay some modicum for services to demonstrate their commitment, for example, or applying quantitative costs-and-benefits logic to assessing impact. Paul Farmer made this point at a Skoll Forum in 2008, decrying “an ideology that has crept into the social entrepreneur movement. Indeed, this may be the Achilles heel of the movement. And so—surprise—the culture I wish to speak about is our own. Among some entrepreneurs, it’s not popular to talk of rights. We speak, instead, of ‘product’ and ‘brand.’ Patients and students—children!—become ‘clients’ or even ‘customers.’ The notion of ‘sustainability’ becomes a blunt instrument used against the poor. I’ve seen it time and time again.”

Social entrepreneurship is, like its for-profit sister, disinclined to fuss with the structure of politics, interests, and ideology. It is very practically oriented in this sense—what works and helps people is good. The weakness of this orientation is that other very powerful players are political, interest-laden, and promoting ideologies in direct conflict with sustainability, equity, and the like. New and exciting projects can happen, but old-style politics and wastefulness and inequality will persist and in fact can coexist. The essential agnosticism about politics on the “social edge” means the enterprise as a whole will be small. As Farmer said in his 2008 speech in pleading the value of the public sector:

Not only because a functioning public health or education system is often the only way to bring a novel program to scale, and not only because we need the participation of governments to address the current environmental crises at the transnational scale needed to make a difference. There is another reason to fight the neoliberal gutting of the public sector, and that is this: only governments can confer rights. The right to health care and the right to education can be moved forward by people like us, but non-government organizations, universities, foundations, and forward-thinking businesses are not, alas, in the business of conferring rights. And without
basic rights—to water, security, health care, the right not to starve—then the world’s poor do not have hope of a future.17

Farmer’s perspective underscores how social entrepreneurship implies a claim that is outsized in relation to its actual potential. Its reliance on business models also begs the question of its newness and appropriateness to solve social problems, which commerce rarely does apart from contributing to economic growth.18 Entrepreneurship, thinking “outside the box,” particularly when applied by Americans or Europeans to developing societies, can be—is often intended to be—disruptive of social relationships and state-society relations, typically with unknown consequences.

Foundations are quite clearly drawn to this trend. Phrases like strategic philanthropy, impact investing, social ventures, and civic entrepreneurs stand alongside social entrepreneurship not only in the proliferation of how-to books (How to be a Social Entrepreneur: Make Money and Change the World, or The Power of Unreasonable People: How Social Entrepreneurs Create Markets That Change the World). They are now frequently heard catch words of organized philanthropy. In September 2012, at a White House conference on “innovation in philanthropy,” the keynoter discussed “impact investing” and “strategies for getting more donors to channel their money into for-profit businesses that are advancing social missions.”19 The business-nonprofit social venture model is featured extensively on Council of Foundation conferences and Chronicle of Philanthropy articles. It is more a phenomenon of newer funds, often those growing from high-tech wealth, and some community foundations.

The conceit here derives from two things: First, that much about social entrepreneurship is new, or what is new (the mixing of for-profit and nonprofit enterprise) actually performs better than what came before; and second, that this implies a theory of social change that should be embraced. I suggest that neither of these is demonstrably true, and in the case of the second—the imputed theory of social change in social entrepreneurship—I expect it is demonstrably false.

SOCIAL CHANGE AND PHILANTHROPY

To my own question at the beginning of this chapter—“What happened?”—I offer this provocation: Organized philanthropy turned its back on social movement and advocacy activism (to the extent it was committed to it) not only out of frustration with its results. Like many others in U.S. society, organized philanthropy turned away from government as an answer to solving social problems, perhaps as a result of
how the political right captured that discourse under President Reagan and simultaneously drained states, municipalities, and federal agencies of the resources to address problems effectively. Just as many peace and security donors stopped funding war studies and activism after the Cold War ended, much of the philanthropic community has shifted away from advocacy, organizing, and knowledge production to activities that seek to bypass the state. The exultation of civil society in the 1990s and the subsequent rise of social entrepreneurship are, in effect, a no-confidence vote in working with public institutions to address problems. And by so doing, it is a no-confidence vote in addressing these issues structurally.

This could be seen in international grant-making, where the emphasis on specific kinds of problem solving trumped a more transformative politics. The structural adjustment policies of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the bilateral aid agencies, which demanded that states in the developing world shrink before loans would be granted, significantly disabled those states and forced them to turn away from a fairly successful development model, import substitution. The neoliberal model won out, and, remarkably, organized philanthropy began to follow in these footsteps. Instead of supporting “contentious politics” to empower ordinary citizens to demand more of the state, more equitable distribution most importantly, many of the liberal donors funded NGOs to be service providers. This donor agenda, which persists, “bureaucratizes and professionalizes the NGO sector, and, in so doing, leads to a shift in the discourse from social welfare and redistribution to individualism, entrepreneurship, self reliance, and empowerment,” writes a scholar who saw this unfold in Bangladesh.20 The leverage that such agencies from the north—public and private—can exert is extraordinary, particularly when they are working (consciously or not) from the same blueprint. Even something as widely praised as microfinancing, perhaps the exemplar of venture philanthropy or social entrepreneurship, can be regarded as a piece of the neoliberal scheme. “As part of neoliberal economics prescriptions for poverty alleviation,” three organization theorists write, “microenterprising activities are also intended as a replacement for social welfare programs and the role of the state, helping to privatize and deregulate societies toward a market economy.”21

By reflecting the agenda or the predispositions of the U.S. government, among other powerful players, the philanthropic sector has made consequential choices, many of which help people in need. But they are choices that are reflective, and they do not involve a plausible theory of social change. Teaching a man to fish, the oft-used metaphor of philanthropy nowadays, is not a strategy. It does not ask the harder questions
about poverty, inequality, rights, and power. It does not address the matter of what happens to the fishers once the skills have been transferred and the social enterprise is complete. Has the disequilibrium of power been rectified? Is an unresponsive state more secure? I conducted a brief analysis of what factors are most important in economic growth in the midsized countries with different levels of economic and political freedom, corruption, and other attributes, and the factor that stood out as the key to economic performance was inequality. Countries with more equal societies also do better for their citizens in terms of growth and, obviously, in the distribution of the benefits of growth. That is a structural issue: how inequality occurs, how it persists, what actions—actions by the state—are needed to make the system more equitable. Now there would be a challenge for the foundation community, one with a manifold potential for economic justice.

There is a line of critical thought that says that all development aid, including that from charitable foundations, should be ended, that it is so distortive of local knowledge and preferences that the $50 billion in economic assistance from north to south is simply not worth it. (A small fraction of that comes from U.S. foundations.) I disagree with that, but it is actually a good starting point for a new discussion about change agents and venture philanthropy. As we used to say, "If you’re not part of the solution, you’re part of the problem."

ENDNOTES


11. “We define social entrepreneurship as having the following three components: (1) identifying a stable but inherently unjust equilibrium that causes the exclusion, marginalization, or suffering of a segment of humanity that lacks the financial means or political clout to achieve any transformative benefit on its own; (2) identifying an opportunity in this unjust equilibrium, developing a social value proposition, and bringing to bear inspiration, creativity, direct action, courage, and fortitude, thereby challenging the stable state’s hegemony; and (3) forging a new, stable equilibrium that releases trapped potential or alleviates the suffering of the targeted group, and through imitation and the creation of a stable ecosystem around the new equilibrium ensuring a better future for the targeted group and even society at large.” Roger L. Martin and Sally Osberg, “Social Entrepreneurship: The Case for Definition,” Stanford Social Innovation Review (2007); online. http://www.ssireview.org/articles/entry/social_entrepreneurship_the_case_for_definition.

12. The cultural scholar Richard Slotkin brilliantly assayed this in his trilogy on the “frontier myth.” See the third volume, Gunfighter Nation: The Myth of the Frontier in Twentieth Century America (Scribner, 1992), for a summation and its application to recent history.


15. For the best articulation of this, see Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty (Crown, 2012).


17. Ibid.


21. M. B. Calás, L. Smircich, and K. A. Bourne, “Extending the boundaries:
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