



A Vision for Sustainable Peace:

Building an inclusive future for South Sudan

APRIL 25, 2018

Institute for the Study of Diplomacy

Georgetown University

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Capstone completed in fulfillment of the Certificate of Diplomatic Studies,
Institute for the Study of Diplomacy

Georgetown University

April 25, 2018

Acknowledgments

This report would not have been possible without the many people who helped us along the way. We would like to thank former Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan Donald Booth; former Assistant Secretary for African Affairs and former Ambassador to South Africa Jendayi Frazer; former Assistant Secretary for Population, Refugees and Migration Ann Richards; and Freedom House Africa Director Jon Temins. The insights they shared with our class were informative, touching, and inspiring all at once. We also wish to thank Daisy (Wei) Zhang for her assistance with the printing and binding of this report and the rest of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy for their support. Above all, we are grateful to our professor and mentor, former Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of African Affairs and former Ambassador to Liberia Linda Thomas-Greenfield. Her wisdom, advice, and humor have carried us through this semester and will guide us long after it is done.

Key Acronyms

ACC	Anti-Corruption Commission
ARCSS	Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (2015)
AU	African Union
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005)
DDR	Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
EITI	Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
EU	European Union
GBV	Gender-based violence
GDP	Gross domestic product
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SPLA-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Army - In Opposition
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SPLM/A	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

South Sudan, the world's youngest state, is still struggling to establish a stable government that works for its people. Corruption, violence, greed, distrust, and human rights abuses are pervasive and inhibit the country from achieving peace, stability, and prosperity. The government of South Sudan, including President Salva Kiir, is responsible for perpetuating a deadly and destructive civil war, blocking progress by breaking past peace agreements, and starving its people of safety and access to education, water, health, and economic growth.

This report puts forth a new approach to ending the war in South Sudan and setting it up for success. This vision of the future is built on inclusivity, sustainability, and a fresh start with new leadership. The authors propose ten recommendations under the three goals of establishing a vision, expanding the table, and ensuring sustainable peace. Due to the complex nature of the crisis and the number of stakeholders involved in the conflict and peace negotiations, these recommendations are aimed at a wide variety of actors: the government of South Sudan, the European Union (EU), the United States, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the African Union (AU), and the United Nations (UN).

The paper looks at these ten recommendations under the three thematic goals. However, it is important that the roadmap to peace in South Sudan is established and made clear. First, the authors believe that the AU should take on the burden of leadership currently shouldered by IGAD. IGAD and the AU should then work with the international community to pressure Salva Kiir to step down as president, leading the way for a transitional government and a transitional justice project. Both the government and the justice project must be supportive of the involvement of civil society groups, especially the inclusion of women, youth, and religious leaders. Finally, these governmental and judicial steps must be combined with locally driven initiatives to ensure sustainable peace. This will include bolstering local development and peacebuilding through the provision of sufficient aid and the protection of aid workers and civilians. This process should maintain a local focus on community peacebuilding mechanisms and incorporate an expanded narrative of the conflict. Another essential step in this process will be anti-corruption efforts and community-based disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.

Policy Recommendations

Establishing a Vision

- 1) The AU should take on the primary role in mediating peace talks.
- 2) IGAD and the AU should pressure Salva Kiir to step down and resign.
- 3) The government of South Sudan should create a transitional justice project.

Expanding the Table

- 4) IGAD, the UN Mission to South Sudan (UNMISS), and the government of South Sudan should address underlying drivers and structural constraints.
- 5) The government of South Sudan should focus on enacting a permanent constitution with commitments to women's rights and gender equality.
- 6) Women, youth, and religious leaders must be meaningfully included in negotiations.

Ensuring Sustainable Peace

- 7) Humanitarian assistance must be funded and non-combatants, aid workers, and civilians must be protected.
- 8) UNMISS should reintroduce a new peace-building support plan that focuses on local peace-building mechanisms.
- 9) The government of South Sudan should expand the powers of the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) and join the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).
- 10) Community-based disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration must be prioritized.



INTRODUCTORY BACKGROUND

South Sudan has a long and complex history of internal conflict, beginning with civil wars against northern Sudan that resulted in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and independence in 2011. The movement for an independent South Sudan was heavily influenced by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), whose armed wing is referred to as the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). Jointly known as the SPLM/A, it was established in Ethiopia in 1983 and led by Chairman John Garang until his death in a helicopter crash in 2005.¹

After his death, Salva Kiir became president of South Sudan and chairman of the SPLM/A.² He had always idealized an independent South Sudan, and during the civil war, he expanded his political and military constituencies for that cause. Finally, under the auspices of the African Union (AU) and according to the stipulations of the CPA, a referendum for South Sudan's independence was held in January 2011. The result was almost 99 percent support for secession from Sudan.³

The CPA was a landmark agreement that ended the second civil war between northern and southern Sudan in 2005. It was celebrated for giving more autonomy and the provision for an independence referendum to the South but criticized for inconsistencies and a lack of clarity with regard to state formation and institutionalization.

Thus, the Republic of South Sudan was officially declared on July 9, 2011, with Salva Kiir retaining his position as president. That makes it the world's youngest nation, one that has known little peace. Within two years, South Sudan was embroiled in its own civil war.⁴

Current Political Conditions

The underlying factors of prior conflicts in South Sudan can be seen in contemporary disputes, which are primarily between President Salva Kiir’s ethnic Dinka community and the Nuer community of his former vice president, Riek Machar, who now leads the SPLA-In Opposition (SPLA-IO).⁵ Kiir is the only remaining founder of the SPLM/A.⁶ Most concur that the power struggle began within the SPLM but soon reignited factional fighting within the army in 2013.⁷ On December 15, 2013, shooting broke out in an SPLA barrack in the capital city of Juba.⁸ From there, fighting escalated into other areas of Juba, then north to Bor and Malakal.⁹ It is not entirely clear what caused the outbreak of violence: a coup attempt by deposed Vice President Riek Machar, a mutiny by the SPLA, or ethnic struggles. What is clear is that the uprising began a downward spiral into conflict just two years after South Sudan gained independence.

Transitional Government of National Unity

01	Executive heads	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • President Salva Kiir • 1st Vice President Taban Deng Gai • 2nd Vice President James Wani Igga
02	Additional bodies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Jieng Council of Elders (presidential advisors) • 30 Ministries • Bicameral National Legislature
03	Government type	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Presidential Constitutional Republic
04	Framework	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan (20110)

As Kiir and Machar deepened their opposition, the conflict adopted an ethnic component. Factions formed along tribal lines, with the Nuer joining Kiir and the Dinka siding with Machar. This, along with South Sudan’s deeply rooted patronage systems in politics, were two drivers of the conflict.¹⁰ These patronage systems predate its independence, thus making state formation almost impossible to achieve due to the rampant corruption.¹¹ In this way, South Sudan is a kleptocracy – a militarized, corrupt, neo-patrimonial system of governance – that has drained the

state of revenue that could have otherwise been spent on public services and institution-building.¹² This style of monetized and militarized governance was essentially carried over from the way Sudan ran South Sudan before independence.

Arguably, oil revenues collected by government have made the government/military apparatus even more corrupt. According to the World Bank, “South Sudan is the most oil-dependent country in the world, with oil accounting for almost the totality of exports, and around sixty percent of its gross domestic product (GDP).”¹³ Oil production has been interrupted by the conflict. Without a political resolution, it is expected to reduce steadily and become negligible by 2035.¹⁴ Though oil contributes to most of South Sudan’s GDP, the vast majority of livelihoods are in low-productive, unpaid agricultural and pastoral work. This means that as the economy worsens due to dropping oil prices and production hurting the GDP, extreme poverty is rising, reaching almost 66 percent in 2016.¹⁵

In the past, agreements to end hostilities have been made and subsequently violated. Under intense pressure from the UN, both Kiir and Machar signed the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS) in 2015, which promised to demilitarize Juba




and mandated that access to oil fields be shared between the government and opposition forces.¹⁶ Those commitments have yet to be realized. It also reinstated Machar as Vice President, a position that he held for a short period of time before violence broke back out.¹⁷ The most recent agreement to end hostilities was signed in December 2017, but the fighting continues. The areas that are most affected by recurring violence are Western Bahr el Ghazal and the greater Equatoria and Upper Nile regions, much of it at the communal level over local disagreements.¹⁸ In blatant violation of international law, civilians are routinely targeted, resulting in systematic human rights abuses that include: arbitrary arrest, detention, torture, sexual violence, looting, and destruction of property.¹⁹

The Humanitarian Crisis

The seemingly endless conflict and direct targeting of civilians in South Sudan has resulted in what has now been identified by the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR) as the fastest growing and largest refugee situation in Africa.²⁰ At the end of 2017, the number of South Sudanese refugees continued to increase in six neighboring countries: the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic

of the Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda.²¹ The total number of refugees in these countries is around 2.5 million and is expected to rise to 3.1 million in 2018.²² The pace of the exodus has increased in the past two years, as two thirds of post-2013 conflict refugees sought asylum in 2016 and 2017.²³ Many more are affected by this conflict within South Sudan – there are now approximately 1.87 million internally displaced South Sudanese.²⁴



Source: UNHCR, “South Sudan Regional Refugee Response Plan: January – December 2018.”

An issue of immediate concern in South Sudan is food insecurity. In February of this year, three UN agencies warned that more than 7,000,000 people – about two thirds of the population – could become severely food insecure in the coming months unless humanitarian agencies can receive adequate funding, support, and access to populations in need.²⁵ In January 2018, there was a 40 percent increase in the number of severely food insecure people compared to one year ago.²⁶ Multiple factors are contributing to the mounting food insecurity, including food production, economic output, bureaucratic challenges, and natural causes. The conflict has reduced local food production as people have been displaced or dispossessed of their land and livelihoods. The economic conditions in South Sudan mean markets are unable to provide adequate food supplies. And finally, natural causes like floods, infestations, and prolonged dry spells have reduced production.²⁷

The humanitarian response in South Sudan is facing a number of major challenges. Accessibility and donor fatigue coupled with poor infrastructure inhibit the ability of aid workers to reach those who most need their help.²⁸ This is further complicated by the conflict as seen by the fact that in 2017 there were 1,159 humanitarian access incidents reported by aid agencies.²⁹ These incidents include murder, robbery, looting, threats, harassment, and delayed or denial of passage.³⁰ Sadly, since 2013, 98 aid workers have been killed in South Sudan, 30 of whom were killed in 2017.³¹ Due to these factors, hundreds of aid workers had to be relocated, leaving hundreds of thousands to suffer without lifesaving supplies. It also resulted in loss of humanitarian resources (principally food) to armed forces.³²



Building a Response to Challenges in South Sudan

The crisis in South Sudan is facing a number of major challenges that impede its resolution. The political system is in disarray, with defunct leaders that do not care or provide for their people. Economically, state capture and corruption are abundant throughout all levels of government, from the highest level where oil resources are sequestered to the lowest level where bribery is commonplace. From a diplomatic perspective, international pressure has failed to resolve the situation, especially the current peace negotiations hosted by

IGAD that have been futile in their attempts to reach a settlement between South Sudan's political factions and end the conflict. Meanwhile, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations struggle to receive sufficient funding for the humanitarian crisis in the nation, with the UN estimating a funding gap surpassing \$600 million dollars in late 2017.³³ In order to combat this array of issues, a comprehensive plan of action must be developed that specifically meets the issues in South Sudan and the needs of its people. The authors considered these challenges and needs while tailoring their recommendations toward achieving a long-lasting and sustainable peace. The plan can be broken down into three parts: establishing a vision, expanding the table, and ensuring sustainable peace. They will be discussed and developed at length in the following sections.





ESTABLISHING A VISION

African Engagement

In February 2018, the African Union announced that it was considering sanctions against the government of South Sudan. After years of civil war, this is a marked change from the past rhetoric of the AU. The organization has often been slow to criticize African leaders, let alone take decisive action against them. However, as war rages on in South Sudan with negotiations to revitalize the 2015 ARCSS now broken down, the AU must take a more decisive role than it has in the past. The absence of its leadership in peace talks and its unwillingness to take action against those who violate the peace has been detrimental to reaching an agreement. Instead, the AU has used to subsidiarity principle of deferring to a regional body, in this case IGAD, to justify standing back.

IGAD is a regional organization of African states in the horn of Africa, made up of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, and Uganda. According to the subsidiarity principle previously referred to, IGAD is the first actor to take charge of key negotiations, mediation, and peacekeeping.³⁴ As a result of this arrangement, IGAD “has driven negotiations for a power-sharing arrangement in the country.”³⁵ However, this has been problematic. Since IGAD membership includes Sudan, South Sudan, and other countries with ties to one faction or another in South Sudan, it is often unable, or unwilling, to compromise. This is where the AU has

important expertise to contribute to this process. It has shown leadership in other countries in an ad-hoc nature, and now it is time for it to lead South Sudan to a peaceful resolution.

Recommendation: *The AU should take on the primary role in the mediation process, engaging on justice matters, peacekeeping, economic pressure, and civil society.*

As the new primary actor in the region, the AU will need to rally support from the UN, EU, and US as well as other important sources of international pressure. In particular, it should establish a relationship with IGAD that rebalances the burden sharing of South Sudan's conflict. IGAD should be reminded that "in ratifying the AU's legal instruments, African states have consented to be bound by the decisions of the Union...when crises erupt."³⁶ Having IGAD at the helm of peace talks has meant that there is no discernable action being taken. As a 2018 report found, "since the conflict's 2013 start the African Union has issued 13 statements that threaten action against violators of any of the truces in effect [over] the past four years."³⁷ IGAD alone has issued seven. However, none of these threats have been acted upon. This lack of enforcement has given politicians in South Sudan the belief that even the most unconscionable actions will not be punished.

The AU has shown in other contexts that it can take on an active role, and it must do so in South Sudan. To begin, it needs to establish an institutional mechanism for selecting mediators. The Panel of the Wise can be used for ad-hoc and flexible appointments, but an institutionalized process should be implemented as it would help the AU assert itself more in mediation settings. The High Level Ad-Hoc Committee of the AU should become the primary negotiating group because of the valuable experience it provides. Additionally, it is more objective than IGAD's negotiators, who often have direct interests in South Sudan. Other appointments must include strong individual leaders with political clout at the table. The mediation process, instead of focusing just on mediation with major leaders, must be more inclusive with regards to the multitude of different groups that make up the population. Public interest groups, grassroots

organizations, local leaders, and women are also an important part of the process, and the AU should work to include them.

A successful AU-led strategy in South Sudan must focus on four pillars: judicial reform, civil society, peacekeeping, and economic development. Judicial actions include mediating amongst government and civil society leaders and establishing a hybrid court with the South Sudanese government. The AU must observe all dialogues to ensure they are inclusive, safe, and use diplomatic engagement to bring more voices into decision making. Peacekeeping during mandated ceasefires and advocating for an arms embargo by all neighboring and international countries will be an additional part of this work. Finally, the AU should advocate for both economic sanctions that target the guiltiest leaders and financial measures that will place more accountability on government officials. Overall, the proactive engagement of the AU is imperative to the success of South Sudan.

Leadership

South Sudan's leadership has been one of the biggest failures in this conflict-plagued nation. From the country's inception, many leaders have made extracting all the oil and other resources the country has to offer their primary goal. Between the two of them, President Salva Kiir and opposition leader Riek Machar have driven the newly formed African nation into an all-out civil war, which inequality, greed, corruption, and the sacking of this resource-rich nation have perpetuated. Since the war's beginning in December 2013, over 50,000 people have been killed, and about 4,000,000 have been displaced.³⁸ As discussed previously, food insecurity and poverty are also ongoing problems. Rather than proactively address these issues and work toward peace and economic development, Kiir and Machar have chosen to enrich and empower themselves at the expense of the South Sudanese people. Both have multi-million dollar mansions outside of the country, drive luxury cars, and have personal or familial stakes in a wide range of companies.³⁹ In 2015, the last time they were pushed into a reluctant peace agreement, both showed up to negotiate in Juba with armies at their backs. Not long later, their bodyguards broke out into fighting, and Machar had to flee the country.⁴⁰


Salva Kiir, in fact, was an accidental transitional president who was never meant to take charge of the country as early as he did. After the signing of the CPA in January 2005, John Garang was the natural choice to lead the newly autonomous region because he was a unifying force with strong backing in both southern and northern Sudan. The long-term consequences of his unexpected death in a helicopter crash just a few weeks after his inauguration as Sudan's First Vice President are hard to overstate. All of a sudden, Kiir was thrust into the spotlight because his status as Garang's deputy made him the most natural choice, though an imperfect one. As academic John Young put it in late 2005, "Salva Kiir has few of Garang's attributes – he is not an intellectual, not urbane, has little understanding of the niceties of diplomacy, appears to have a limited interest in the rest of the country and hence cannot be expected to magically resolve the conflicts in Darfur and the east as the West expected from Garang."⁴¹ Instead of rising to the challenge, Kiir lived down to Young's assessment. He became a dictator, a perpetrator of human rights abuses, and one of the biggest obstacles to peace in South Sudan. Without first disposing of the current leadership and supporting sounder leaders in their place, the conflict in South Sudan will continue, and the death toll of the South Sudanese will increase through preventable violence, disease, and famine.

Recommendation: *The international community, including the AU and IGAD, should pressure Salva Kiir to resign, forming a transitional government in his wake.*

This recommendation targets Salva Kiir because Riek Machar has already been removed to South Africa by the international community. However, this sidelining may have backfired because it appears to be a seal of approval of Kiir and his leadership in South Sudan.⁴² Currently, certain regional dynamics are in his favor, as Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni has reassured him that Uganda will defy a recent US arms ban and continue to deliver weapons to him,⁴³ Kenya has increasing business interests in South Sudan that they do not want to isolate,⁴⁴ and Ethiopia has become indifferent due to internal issues.⁴⁵ To surmount these difficulties, the international community, including the AU, need to begin by pressuring Museveni to withdraw his support from Kiir. Museveni has been one of Kiir's strongest international backers for years, which has

given Kiir the diplomatic cover he needs in the IGAD the body weakly pushing peace negotiations in South Sudan forward. Once Museveni no longer supports Kiir, the other regional players are likely to turn on him as well. With enough pressure, he will have no choice but to resign.

Identified steps to improved governance



However, if Kiir refuses to leave, the international community should offer him a deal that includes amnesty, security, and relocation. This will protect him from previous crimes he has committed, incentivizing his departure, but will not cover any crimes that take place after the deal's signing. Once he is gone, there should be a detailed implementation matrix with fixed deadlines for the institution of a transitional government, internal reforms within the SPLM/A, national elections, and a permanent constitution. For practical reasons, it is likely that a power-sharing mechanism will have to continue in the transitional government for an extended period, but neither Kiir nor Machar should be allowed in it.⁴⁶ Instead, the international community should take a more proactive role in identifying potential leaders from all sides of the conflict and civil society, including women, youth, and other traditionally marginalized groups. Ideally, top leaders in the transitional government would be barred from running for office in the elected government to follow, incentivizing them to focus on rebuilding the country than consolidating personal political power.

Transitional Justice Project

The South Sudanese civil war is one of the most complex cases of state building not only in Africa, but in the entire world. Previous attempts at stability have been marred by big personality clashes, corruption, and a severe lack of institutions and the insight needed to create conditions conducive to peace. Most devastatingly, the attempts at transitional justice outlined in the 2005 CPA and 2015 ARCSS agreements were not sufficient to create a long-lasting peace. Any successful policy recommendations for South Sudan must be based not only on learning from

the failures of the previous accords, but also the needs of the South Sudanese people. This alone, however, is not sufficient, as the nation must look towards the successes of other countries' peace accords, transitional justice projects, and democratic transitions from war to peace to see what would work best for them.

Recommendation: *Create a transitional justice project that increases accountability for the perpetrators of violence, addresses the position of the conflict's victims, and creates stronger institutions.*

A peace accord with focused, serious commitments from both the government and the opposition is desperately needed. This includes setting up a system through which aggressors can come clean in exchange for amnesty or a reduced sentence. The transparency this would bring would establish a common ground of historical memory, from which the nation could rise out of civil strife and shape an all-important identity around which they could construct a long-lasting peace. There are serious questions about how far back the accountability project should go. In South Sudan, it would be beneficial to follow a model that addresses the needs of the entire population. For some communities, it may be sufficient to go back to the start of the conflict in December 2013. For others, it may be necessary to go to the pre-independence interim period or even the pre-CPA civil war with Sudan.

This project, which ideally would be taken on by a hybrid court, would have to start with the senior commanders most responsible for crimes against humanity and other atrocities. Those at the lower level who were just following orders should go through reconciliation processes that allow them to rebuild their communities and positively reintegrate. This, above all, means involving women in transitional justice projects much more than they have historically been involved in peace negotiations since they are the group that has suffered the most. That is a more substantive, inclusive solution than simple reparations because it establishes women as a key part of civil society, political groups, and truth commissions. In fact, it is unlikely that compensation for individual victims will ever be possible due to the country's long history of violence, exploitation, and poverty. Thus, political restitution is the best option available. It

should start with structural changes to the system and the creation of a society based on justice and equality, incorporating justice at a local level. From there, new leaders will rise up to lead South Sudan in a better direction.

Additionally, there has to be a reconciliation process focused on community resiliency and peace-building exercises that complement the restitution process. Perhaps the greatest failure of South Sudan's previous peace agreements was the lack of a forward vision creating the greatest good for the most people. Schools need to be built, roads need to be constructed, and corruption needs to be rooted out. Unfortunately, the CPA did nothing to address questions of identity – what it means to be South Sudanese. A political agreement is unlikely to answer this question directly, but it can set up mechanisms for how the South Sudanese can approach this issue, such as a reconciliation process. There are huge individual and societal grievances that have never been addressed nationally, and new institutions, peace-building efforts, and avenues of leadership are needed to do that. With hope, the next generation of South Sudanese leaders will bring a new mindset and different set of answers to the challenges of their country.



EXPANDING THE TABLE

The international community has focused much of its energy and attention on sovereignty for South Sudan. A lack of focus on local challenges and grievances led to misinterpretations of conflict following independence, the most important being that the fighting is taking place between two groups: the legitimate government and opposition forces driven by two competing ethnic groups of Dinka and Nuer people. This misinterpretation has led the international community to engage with the government and treat opposition grievances as representative of all South Sudanese people, and it has focused previous attempts at peace deals solely on government and opposition demands.⁴⁷ Specifically, IGAD and UNMISS have failed to fully address the true realities of South Sudan following independence in 2011.

Conflict Narrative

There are local grievances in South Sudan with long histories, such as the clashing livelihoods of pastoralism and farming, land disputes, and inter-communal conflicts. As a result, there is a deep-seated war being fought at a more fundamental level. Widespread insecurity across the country is directly related to resource competition between communities and is rooted in the failure of state and local government to provide basic public goods and services. These local conflicts are not trickle-down versions of a fight within the political and military elite. On the contrary, many of these communal conflicts pre-date the ongoing civil war. The 2015 ARCSS neither acknowledges nor offers solutions to any of these grievances – lack of services, violence between pastoralists and farmers, longings for meaningful decentralization, and inclusive governance.⁴⁸ Unless these needs are recognized as primary matters at a political level,

communal violence will continue. Ethnic cleavages and popular dissatisfaction will subvert any national effort towards peace.

The lack of sufficient national and international attention to these tensions has fueled the divide between multiple ethnic groups that have their own languages, traditions, laws, sources of revenue, and security providers. Resolution efforts must go beyond a power-politics perspective and the idea of peace as politics. The narrative of the conflict must thus be expanded to address two phenomena: underlying local dynamics and structural constraints of the conflict. Examining local conflicts reveals serious grievances against the government and identifies trusted communal peacemakers. Operationalizing this holistic perspective demands a new lens by which to view the political peace process. This lens is guided by two principles: 1) True peace must be fostered, not forced; 2) Sustainable change requires domestic ownership.

Recommendation: *IGAD, UNMISS, and the newly established transitional government should create opportunities for underlying drivers and structural constraints to be addressed by incorporating more localized narratives in consultation forums, peace talks, and negotiations.*

Women, Peace, and Security

Women's groups and other civil society organizations were relatively successful in influencing the provisions of the 2011 Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan. Multiple articles in the Constitution, Bill of Rights, and Penal Code stipulate that women and men are equal and should be accorded full and equal rights. These documents make it clear that women and men have the right to equal pay and to property, and that women have the right to maternity and child care. Article 16 of the Bill of Rights stipulates that women have full and equal dignity of the person with men, the right to equal pay for equal work, and the right to property.⁴⁹ Article 14 of the Constitution states that, "all persons are equal before the law and are entitled to the equal protection of the law without discrimination as to race, ethnic origin, color, sex, language, religious creed, political opinion, birth, locality or social status." The Constitution states that laws should be enacted at all levels of government to combat harmful traditions and customs

that violate these rights. However, this has not happened, and harmful customs are still widely practiced. These provisions have been both misunderstood and ignored, as people adhere to customary law and feel immune in the face of weak rule of law.⁵⁰

Despite some progressive articles in the Constitution, there are certain key provisions missing from the South Sudanese legal framework that leave women vulnerable to discrimination or marginalization. There are no explicit laws against gender-based violence or child marriage,⁵¹ leaving women and girls vulnerable to rampant violence, as will be described in more detail below.⁵² Moreover, women are not allowed to work in the same industries or do the same tasks as men, there are no specific laws around nondiscrimination based on gender in employment, and there is no legislation on sexual harassment or criminal penalties for sexual harassment in employment.⁵³ These laws leave women economically disadvantaged and could pose challenges for women seeking greater political participation.

In addition to general rights and protections for women, the Transitional Constitution stipulates a quota system for the national government (executive and legislative) with 25 percent representation for women.⁵⁴ Currently, 27 percent of parliamentary seats in South Sudan are held by women,⁵⁵ which is not insignificant, but this does not ensure that women have an equal voice in political decisions. According to Dr. Priscilla Joseph Kuch, Deputy Minister of Gender, Child and Social Welfare for South Sudan, men are still making the decisions, and women still rely on men. She has stated that there is a capacity problem – to fill the quota and to continue having female leaders in South Sudan, the nation must address the high rates of female illiteracy, child marriage, and discrimination.⁵⁶ Furthermore, qualitative research has shown that the quota is often conflated with gender equality, which has led to the neglect of other key empowerment and equality initiatives, such as female participation in peace talks.⁵⁷

Recommendation: *The transitional government should focus on enacting a permanent constitution with commitments to women's rights and gender equality at all levels of the government. They should also educate the public on these rights, strengthen regulatory mechanisms, and seek funding and training from the international community.*

In the 2015 peace talks, three of the ten delegates from the SPLA-IO negotiation team were women, but there were no female representatives on the government's side.⁵⁸ Furthermore, while there were representatives from various civil society organizations, reports show that these seats were highly politicized, and the representatives were not welcome to speak on behalf of themselves or even women more broadly.⁵⁹ The IGAD High Level Revitalization Forum (HLRF) was relatively more inclusive, thanks in part to commitments made by IGAD. Both Angelina Teny, wife of Riek Machar, and Rebecca Garang, widow of John Garang, were present along with a number of women from various civil society organizations. Sources from inside the talks have cited women from at least four different civil society organizations as being very brave, focused and critical in speaking up and providing their opinions on the negotiations.

Women's organizations have been active in South Sudanese political, social, and humanitarian affairs since before independence. However, since 2011 several key female leaders have moved from these organizations to senior positions within the government, starving the women's movement and civil society in general of important leadership.⁶⁰ Therefore, there is a need to rebuild capacity across these organizations and encourage them to come together, build coalitions, and find common ground. It will be up to women's groups to continue working together to create a shared vision, and they must advocate to have that vision represented at future negotiations.

Civil Society

Grassroots organizations, women, religious leaders, and youth have taken great initiative to meet the immediate needs of their local communities. Thus, not including their voices in negotiations risks perpetuating the conflict further.⁶¹ Civil society and local stakeholders have thus far provided expertise and monitoring in combination with international non-governmental organizations for government initiatives such as the National Dialogue and the IGAD HLRF. Local stakeholders are connected in a way that governments and international organizations are not. They have access to a wide array of people such as elites, grassroots leaders, and victims of conflict. By engaging and investing in local leadership, the international community can develop

credible and constructive narratives that engage diverse target groups transcending ethnic and religious divisions.⁶²

The South Sudan Council of Churches (SSCC) plays an integral role in local peace efforts in conflict-affected communities. In 2017, the SSCC started a nationwide peace initiative called the “Action Plan for Peace.”⁶³ Its aim is to promote a holistic peace process by mobilizing the public and supporting political peace processes on a national and international level. In addition to this advocacy, localized efforts also include neutral dialogue forums, trauma-related reconciliation, and women’s programs.⁶⁴ The SSCC is arguably the only institution left in South Sudan that enjoys the trust of the whole population by fostering cooperation beyond ethnic boundaries and ensuring neutral peace and reconciliation work.⁶⁵


Additionally, youth are recognized as the most optimistic age group about peace in South Sudan. Yet, youth are perceived as active participants in conflict – by both instigating violence and defending their homes – thereby increasing their likelihood to join armed militias. However, despite being considered instigators of violence, youth have also been surveyed and shown to prefer dialogue or non-response to deal with conflicts.⁶⁶ Thus, they were found to be the age group most optimistic about peace in South Sudan. As the most recent generation, youth also have the greatest potential to provide new leadership and unify their nation around the building of a national identity that transcends ethnic divisions. This movement is already in motion – several young people from the South Sudan Young Leaders Forum, a group of 70 bright young South Sudanese leaders from various tribes throughout the country, have been identified as strong leadership figures.^{67,68}

It is important to include women and civil society in formal and informal consultations. It is also important to recognize that norms take time to cascade and that the inclusion of civil society and women must be pushed to previously uncomfortable limits in order for this norm to be internalized by the government of South Sudan and international community. Thus far, the international community has not done a sufficient job of implementing UNSCR 1325, which encourages the participation of women in peace and security efforts, nor clauses in the South Sudanese Transition Constitution related to the inclusion of women and civil society in a holistic

way. It is time that not just governments, but also international institutions move past the rhetoric of quota-based representation and focus on a proper, more organic inclusion of civil society from the beginning to the end of the ongoing peace process.

Recommendation: *Women, youth, and religious leaders must be ensured a voice and influence in negotiations from the beginning to the end of the peace process.*

A top-down approach to a peace agreement has proven to be myopic, exclusionary, and prescriptive. It is necessary for IGAD, UNMISS, and the US to explore alternatives for managing tensions and relationships and avoiding violence, for instance through local mediation, dialogue, and community-bridging initiatives at the village and county levels. Stronger local mechanisms lead to sustainable peace when central government cannot be entrusted to uphold the peace.⁶⁹



ENSURING SUSTAINABLE PEACE

Humanitarian Response

At this point in time, the conflict in South Sudan continues unabated. In April 2018, former SPLA chief Paul Malong announced in an open letter that he has formed a new rebel movement after falling out of favor with Salva Kiir last year, being dismissed from his post, and being placed under house arrest for six months. Meanwhile South Sudan's government has just approved IGAD's decision to relocate the exiled rebel leader Riek Machar from his house arrest in South Africa to another country outside the region. Humanitarian workers continue to be targeted by armed troops. In April 2018, humanitarian aid workers traveling in a marked car belonging to the Catholic Organization for Relief and Development Aid were attacked by armed men. One South Sudanese working for Hope Restoration, a national NGO, was killed in the incident. The same day, staff members from CARE International were robbed at gunpoint. Seven aid workers are presumed to still be held by SPLA-IO forces after their convoy was attacked on March 25, 2018.⁷⁰

The following recommendation is aimed at policymakers. It is specifically meant to address the immediate humanitarian needs facing South Sudan. While it is not a political solution, the humanitarian response depends upon a clear and focused political intervention to lay the groundwork for a peace negotiation between the warring factions. Whilst the fighting continues, humanitarian needs will only increase, potentially putting millions more South Sudanese at risk and exacerbating conflicts and humanitarian needs throughout East Africa.

Recommendation: *Continue to robustly fund humanitarian assistance, and improve protection for civilians and aid workers.*

The humanitarian assistance environment in South Sudan will continue to deteriorate without sustained funding, and the risk of famine and prevalence of severe hunger are likely to drive up the funding deficit for 2018. The government of South Sudan does not have the resources or capacity to meet current projected needs. It thus falls upon the international community to leverage its collective advocacy efforts to attract and maintain new funding sources for the crisis in South Sudan.

It is also imperative to improve protection for civilians and aid workers. Violence against vulnerable South Sudanese citizens and ethnic tensions continue to mount throughout the country. Aid workers who are trying to provide lifesaving assistance are risking their own lives to help. The international community must support and hold UNMISS accountable to its mandate of protecting civilians and aid workers. This requires that peacekeeping forces be adequately equipped and logistically supported. Human rights violators must also be held accountable to end impunity and restore justice to the country.

Local Peacebuilding

The trauma and offenses the government has committed against its people are a critical driver of the conflict in South Sudan. Nevertheless, despite being more severely devastated by the war than the actual combatants, many civilians deeply crave peace and justice. To address the multilayered grievances they have against the government, local actors are essential to the peace process.

In broadening the understanding of the conflict, local conflict dynamics must be addressed and assimilated into the overall conflict situation. South Sudan is made up of 64 tribes.⁷¹ Despite the binary narrative of an ethnic-based war between Salva Kiir (Dinka) and Riek Machar (Nuer), the Dinka and the Nuer are not the only tribes in combat with each other.

Tribalism dominates relations, as explosive community divisions around ethnic cleavages isolate tribes.⁷² Armed groups also manipulate ethnic identities for political ends. As tribalism is further entrenched, armed groups are fragmenting, criminality is increasing, and violence is becoming more normalized.⁷³ Issues manifested in local tribal conflicts can be understood through studying three cases: the Shilluk and the Padang Dinka in the Upper Nile, the Equatorians and Dinka in Greater Equatoria, and the Lou Nuer and the Murle in Jonglei State.

The first case of the Shilluk and the Padang Dinka in the Upper Nile revolves around resources and ethnic discrimination. Conflict erupted over access to the Nile River when Kiir divided South Sudan from 10 states into 28 states in October 2015.^{74,75} The Shilluk have accused the government of modifying regional borders to give their land along the Nile River to neighboring Dinka clans. Kiir's decree divided Upper Nile into three states along the positions of military forces in Upper Nile state.⁷⁶ The east bank of the Nile, claimed by the Dinka and Shilluk alike but currently held by the government, was placed in Eastern Nile state. Thus, contested territories are now exclusively under Padang Dinka control. Exacerbating a long-standing battle, the creation of new states is evidence of Shilluk marginalization.⁷⁷

The second case of the Equatorians and Dinka in Greater Equatoria arose over land and grievances against the government. When the civil war began in 2013, Equatoria remained neutral and largely peaceful.⁷⁸ However, when the ARCSS peace deal fell apart in July 2016, Kiir's most notorious Dinka militia, the Mathiang Anyoor, launched a campaign of terror against the Equatorian population to purge the region of anyone with suspected links to the SPLM-IO.⁷⁹ The slaughter of Equatorian inhabitants in Yei was even deemed an ethnic cleansing by the UN. Aggrieved by abuses, several Equatorian armed groups now oppose the government. A longstanding ethnic divide also intensified between farming Equatorians and livestock-rearing Dinka in the region.⁸⁰ Historic bids of Equatorian autonomy and perceived Dinka favoritism further inflamed ethnic antagonism.⁸¹

The final case of the Lou Nuer and the Murle in Jonglei State centers on livelihood and political representation. A historic animosity between the Lou Nuer and the Murle is manifested through resource conflicts and cattle-raiding. Cattle-raiding is central to the nomadic lifestyle as a drought-coping strategy and a cultural practice.⁸² However, the influx of small arms has turned what was once a social practice into a deadly, commercialized activity.⁸³ This tribal hostility from battles over cattle and access to water is exacerbated by political exploitation of ethnic tensions. Both tribes feel economically and politically marginalized by the dominant Bor Dinka.⁸⁴ But unlike the Nuer, the Murle are under-represented at the national and state level.⁸⁵ Amidst a security vacuum, mutual fears and suspicions have triggered severe communal violence between these two tribes.

Recommendation: *UNMISS should reintroduce a new peace-building support plan that focuses on local peace-building mechanisms, such as engaging civil society, police institutional development, rule of law, and justice sector support to better manage the conflict at the community level.*

Corruption

To create a successful, sustainable peace in South Sudan, anti-corruption efforts must be strategically prioritized and implemented. Corruption is prevalent at all levels of government, resulting in billions of lost dollars and conflict fueled by opaque flows of oil money.⁸⁶ In Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index 2017, South Sudan ranked 179 out of 180 countries studied, beating only Somalia. In raw numbers, it scored 12 out of 100 possible points, well below the 32 average of sub-Saharan Africa, the worst-performing region in the world.⁸⁷ This kleptocracy comes from pre-CPA civil war patronage systems, which SPLM/A commanders brought with them when they transitioned into government roles.⁸⁸ The country's incredible oil wealth and lack of strong institutions also act as enabling conditions for corruption by reducing the level of transparency and accountability in the government and Nilepet, South Sudan's state-owned oil enterprise. Though the country has an Anti-Corruption Commission

(ACC), its authority is primarily limited to investigation, which hinders its ability to carry out its mission.⁸⁹

Recommendation: *The newly established transitional government should expand the powers of the ACC and join the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).*

The power to tackle corruption is fractured between multiple offices of the government, diminishing the ACC's effectiveness. To be potent, it must be able to prosecute the people it investigates. It should also be able to seize evidence and prevent the dissipation of assets by subjects under investigation. Ideally, the government should further back the ACC in its efforts by elevating its internal anti-corruption strategy to the national level, taking a holistic view of the problem, and reforming the environment to be more antagonistic toward corruption. Two ways to do this would be to criminalize the illicit gain of wealth and integrate anti-corruption lessons into the education system.

South Sudan could greatly benefit from the transparency and accountability that the EITI's third-party oversight would bring to their oil industry. The EITI requires participating countries to double disclose their extractive resource finances to outside scrutiny. In South Sudan's case, that would mean the state-owned Nilepet and other companies involved in the oil industry would have to reveal their payments to the government, while the government would have to report each receipt of oil money. It would also mean that international companies would have to disclose oil-related payments to the South Sudanese government.⁹⁰ All of these actions would make embezzlement more challenging as the flow of oil money would become public, making military purchases with siphoned oil money more difficult and reducing the ability of commanders to fund conflict with oil money.

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR)

The continuous mobilization of soldiers throughout South Sudan's history has caused great instability, heightened the risk of conflict, and hindered economic development as military commanders prioritize their personal interests over those of the country. Moving forward, it is clear that failed approaches toward DDR contributed to the post-CPA relapse of violence in 2013 and post-2015 agreement relapse of violence in 2016.⁹¹ Without international pressure to reduce the size of their armies and reintegrate them into the civilian population, Kiir, Machar, and other commanders maintained their forces as the base of their power. That encouraged them to resort to military conflicts to solve political disagreements even during ceasefires and times of nominal peace. As for the soldiers, joining and remaining in an armed force is rational because it usually pays better than civilian employment.⁹² As long as the rewards for militarization outweigh those of demilitarization, commanders will retain their soldiers, soldiers will serve their commanders, and South Sudan will stay mired in a vicious cycle of violence.

Recommendation: *During peace negotiations and immediately after the conclusion of a peace agreement, the international community should prioritize DDR focused on a modern, community-based approach with long-term, sustainable reintegration as its ultimate goal.*

After the CPA was signed in 2005, a well-intentioned DDR program quickly stalled because South Sudanese leaders had little interest in demobilization and the international community failed to make it a priority. By the time they did get around to it, the initial post-CPA enthusiasm had subsided, and local buy-in was even more difficult.⁹³ Because of the inherent tendency of militarization to promote instability that leads to conflict, a comprehensive solution to this problem should be deliberately built into the next peace agreement and implemented immediately once it takes effect. This solution should follow what is known as the second-generation model, which assumes that conflict is present or imminent, places ownership of the program with the UN instead of the government, and encourages local involvement in decision-

making. This community engagement increases the chances that the DDR program will be successful, which itself increases the chances that the peace will last.⁹⁴

Similarly, local communities should participate in the process of reintegrating ex-combatants into civilian ranks. Out of the three stages of DDR, reintegration was not a priority during the post-CPA DDR initiative. Of the 12,525 troops that demobilized by 2012, only 69 percent completed reintegration training and received two follow-ups. Out of that percentage, many were unable to find jobs related to their reintegration training and were forced to pursue other livelihoods under their own initiative.⁹⁵ To boost the chances of success and reduce the incentive to return to violence as a means of generating income, DDR program managers should focus on successful, long-term socioeconomic reintegration as their ultimate goal. This involves consulting locals about what skills their market demands and addressing the social and psychological needs of ex-combatants settling into both new and old communities. With more attractive civilian training and education options, the rate of recidivism into one of South Sudan's armed groups will fall.



CONCLUSION

There are no easy solutions to the problems facing South Sudan. All sides are trapped in a vicious cycle that incentivizes greed, distrust, and violence, perpetuating conflict against each other and against the civilians they should be protecting. Because South Sudan's leaders are failing their people, the country as a whole is failing. To its credit, the international community has put forth many valiant efforts to help South Sudan. It has donated billions of dollars in humanitarian and development aid, sent peacekeepers to protect the defenseless, pushed leaders off the battlefield and into the negotiating room, built up institutions from nothing, and encouraged peace at every turn. Yet even with these efforts, there is still a lot of work to be done in South Sudan.

This report suggests a new approach to ending the war in South Sudan and setting the country up for future success. The recommendations spread throughout target a variety of actors in turn: the South Sudanese government, the US, IGAD, the AU, the EU, the UN, and others. All of these stakeholders have at least some interest in peace and stability for South Sudan, and all of them must actively engage in the peace process for it to succeed.

This report offers recommendations that allow for clear, concrete, strategic goals for the peace process, outlined under three categories. First, a vision for the future must be established. the AU should take ownership of mediation efforts in an active way by removing the current leadership and installing a transitional government until new leaders can be elected. This would bring the possibility of change and a fresh start for the country.

Second, the negotiation table must be expanded. The perpetrators of violence have also been conducting negotiations, leaving civilian and marginalized populations on the sidelines. The narrative of this conflict must grow to incorporate the voices of women, youth, and other civilians who have disproportionately suffered in this conflict and are actively seeking solutions on the ground. The international community should bring these actors as well as civil society organizations into discussions to ensure that everyone is heard and taken into account in peace agreements.

Third, the foundations for a sustainable peace must be ensured. It is not enough to include sustainability conceptually during negotiations – its precepts must be acted upon in the aftermath of any ceasefire or peace agreement. Fully addressing the humanitarian situation with adequate funding, manpower, and protection for civilians and aid workers is a start. Introducing local peace-building mechanisms is the next step, and eliminating underlying conditions of violence like corruption and military mobilization is the next after that.

These goals are ambitious, but only ambitious actions will end the conflict. If they are not taken, thousands if not millions more in South Sudan will continue to suffer from violence, rape, hunger, and disease. The people of South Sudan need and deserve peace. A new vision of the future built on inclusivity and sustainability is the best way forward.

Appendix: Individual Paper Summaries

The Case for the African Union in South Sudan

By: Meghan Boroughs

My paper examines the African Union in South Sudan and argues that it should take on a larger role in 2018 and beyond. As war rages on, current negotiations to revitalize the ARCSS have broken down, and the AU must take a more decisive stance in the country than it has in the past. The subsidiarity principle has allowed the AU to justify standing back and deferring to IGAD. But since IGAD membership includes Sudan and South Sudan, as well as other countries with ties to one faction or another in the conflict, it is often unable, or unwilling, to compromise. The AU's absent leadership as a result of this principle and its reluctance to take demonstrative action against those who violate the peace process have been detrimental. It seems that now we are experiencing a vital shift in the AU's willingness to act due to increasing frustration with the pace of current negotiations and the protracted nature of the conflict. The AU has important expertise to contribute to mediation. They have shown leadership in other countries and now must use their experience more prominently in South Sudan.

The Role of Women in Establishing Peace and Security in South Sudan

By: Kelly Dale

One of the most important challenges facing South Sudan today is the creation of an inclusive political system which allows for women's meaningful participation at all levels and a legal framework that respects women's rights. Furthermore, it will be essential that as the nation works towards negotiating a peace agreement, women have a seat at the negotiation table and have their voices heard. Involving women in peace, security, and politics is not only the right thing to do, it is the smart thing to do. It is unlikely that South Sudan, the world's youngest nation, will be able to establish and sustain peace without the meaningful participation of women. But establishing quotas will not be enough to encourage participation as long as discriminatory social and cultural norms and practices, including gender-based violence, are prevalent. These norms and practices that are harmful to women multiply the effects of conflict and violence. Therefore, reducing gender-based violence, taking concrete steps to encourage gender equality, and

ensuring women’s participation in peace talks and the political process should not only be a goal but should also be considered a tool to help South Sudan end its civil war, stabilize, and prosper. This paper examines why gender-based violence is often heightened during conflict; shows the power of women’s involvement in peace, security, and politics; presents the current state of these issues in South Sudan; and proposes key recommendations that would facilitate a more inclusive and sustainable peace process and lead to greater gender equality.

Transformative Action in South Sudan: Expanding the Narrative of Conflict

By: Kayla Elson

The South Sudanese conflict has been reduced to an elite power struggle manifested as an ethnic civil war. This restricted narrative has guided international diplomatic efforts to negotiate peace but has completely neglected underlying local and structural dynamics of the conflict. Examining local conflicts reveals serious grievances against the government. Furthermore, identified structural constraints exacerbate political tensions and violent problem-solving – regardless of who holds political power. Ultimately, this intractable civil war fundamentally reflects a conflict-habituated system in need of transformation. Operationalizing this holistic narrative of the conflict demands a new lens by which to view the political peace process. This lens is guided by two principles: 1) True peace must be fostered, not forced; and 2) Sustainable change requires domestic ownership. Under these two principles, the three levels of dynamics – local, political, and structural – can be addressed in an integrative manner. Towards this essential effort, three specific recommendations include bringing critical issues of dispute to the negotiation table, allowing obstacles to be overcome, and empowering local champions of peace.

Corruption and Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration: Two Priorities for a Peaceful South Sudan

By: Amy Gradin

After peace agreements were concluded in South Sudan in 2005 and 2015, two key factors underlying the previous violence largely went unaddressed: corruption and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR). Corruption is prevalent at all level of government,

resulting in billions of lost dollars and a conflict fueled by opaque flows of oil money. Because of patronage networks set up during the pre-independence civil war with Sudan, and because the rewards for continued graft are so high, there is little political will to address the problem. The continued mobilization of soldiers, in turn, leads to greater instability, a heightened risk of conflict, and lack of economic development as military commanders prioritize their personal interests over those of the country. These commanders have little incentive to disband their troops because having a larger force means having greater personal power, while the soldiers themselves want to remain because the armed groups in South Sudan pay better than civilian jobs. This paper reviews the historical background of South Sudan as it pertains to corruption and DDR, discusses those challenges in depth, and concludes with recommendations for policymakers seeking to resolve them.

South Sudan's Humanitarian Crisis

By: Alysson Riutta

The South Sudanese people continue to suffer nearly five years into the civil war. The result is a humanitarian crisis with displacement, severe food insecurity, and protection issues being of greatest concern for 2018. Civilians and humanitarian aid workers continue to be targeted by armed forces from both sides. The UN, EU, and US have been leading the response in terms of coordination, providing life-saving services through implementing organizations, and as donors. However, without a political solution, efforts to provide humanitarian aid will continue to be thwarted.

Civil Society and Local Peace-Building in South Sudan

By: Fatima Salman

Thus far, mediators in the South Sudanese conflict have been criticized for concentrating solely on meeting the demands of the top leadership and overlooking deeper causes to the conflict. After analyzing specific efforts made by the UN Mission to South Sudan (UNMISS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the South Sudanese government, I have concluded that the lack of sufficient national and international attention to local tensions has fueled the divide on a hyper-local level. Local leaders have been left out of the greater South

Sudanese narrative and analysis of the conflict by academics, policymakers, and mediators. What they have failed to recognize is that local stakeholders are connected in a way that governments are not. They have access to a wide array of people such as elites, grassroots leaders, and victims of conflict. Stronger local mechanisms lead to sustainable peace when central governments cannot be entrusted to uphold peace. This paper seeks to understand particular ways to target key stakeholders to build a local infrastructure that promotes social cohesion, resilience, and the peaceful resolution of conflicts among individuals and communities in South Sudan.

South Sudan: Leadership, Women, and Conflict Resolution

By: Diego Suárez Salazar

The newly formed nation of South Sudan became a focal point as it quickly fell into civil war, a war that has plagued the people of South Sudan for at least half a decade and continues today. This paper uses a comparative lens to analyze the South Sudan case. The longest armed conflict in the Western Hemisphere, the Colombian Armed Conflict, came to a historic end in 2016. While the peace process in Colombia was not perfect, a successful implementation of certain strategies used in the resolution of the Colombian case could become instrumental in South Sudan's pursuit of peace. Colombia's successful peace strategies revolved around three important pillars: strong leadership, the protection and leadership of women, and a supportive international community. By contrast, those are the same three pillars that have plunged South Sudan into civil strife: poor leadership, the disregard of women, and a lack of support from the international community following independence. This paper analyzes the major challenges faced by the current conflict in South Sudan and gives recommendations derived from a comparison to Colombia that could potentially lead the newly formed nation out of conflict and onto a path of stability.

The Failures of Peace in South Sudan: Identifying What Went Wrong and Forging a Path Forward

By: Cameron Trimpey-Warhaftig

The South Sudanese civil war is one of most complex cases of state building not only in Africa, but in the entire world. The attempts at stability have been marred by clashes of big

personalities, corruption, and a severe lack of institutions and insight needed to create conditions conducive to peace. Most devastatingly, the South Sudanese peace agreements and attempts at transitional justice as outlined in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the 2015 agreement were not sufficient to create a long-lasting peace for its people. In order to address these issues, the framing questions of this work include: Where did the South Sudan peace agreements go wrong? What were the main issues and failures of the CPA and 2015 agreement? Additionally, examples of transitional justice projects and truth commissions in South Africa and Colombia are reviewed to discover possibilities for success in the South Sudanese case. The idea is to shape achievable ideas and goals for the nation to come to a successful peace accord by rectifying past mishaps and forging legitimate agreements on transitional justice projects and truth commissions.

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