

Emerging from the Rubble:



Rebuilding a Unified Yemen

Institute for the Study of Diplomacy
Georgetown University

May 2017

DISCLAIMER

This is a Georgetown University student publication from the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy. The information provided in this publication is not official U.S. Government information and does not represent its views.

AUTHORS

David Anderson, Alfredo Balderas, Alexandra Bro, Amy Davis, Adriana Teran Doyle, Teresa Eder, Linnea Hincks, Ross Hollister, Ryan Hubeny, Natalia E. Shafi, and Lea Thurm, *Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University*

FACULTY ADVISOR

Ambassador Barbara Bodine, Director, *Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University*

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors are deeply grateful to Georgetown University and Ambassador Bodine for making this report possible.

DATE

May 1st, 2017

COVER PHOTO

AFP/Huwais



Map 1: Yemen, Administrative Divisions - Source: CIA



Map 2: Middle East - Source: ArcGis.com

Table of Contents

Executive Summary	1
Introduction	4
INCLUSIVITY	9
ACCOUNTABILITY.....	16
SUSTAINABILITY	22
Conclusion.....	28
APPENDIX	
Individual Papers	30
Endnotes.....	33
Bibliography	38

Acronyms

AQAP	al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
COCA	Central Organization for Control and Auditing
CSO	Civil Society Organization
EU	European Union
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
NAP	National Action Plan
NDC	National Dialogue Conference
NGO	Non-governmental organization
ODA	Official Development Assistance
TVET	Technical Vocation and Education Training
UN	United Nations
UNCDF	United Nations Capital Development Fund
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollar
USG	United States Government
YSF	Yemen Security Force

Executive Summary

With an emphasis on inclusivity, accountability, and sustainability during the reconstruction process, the Yemeni government and international partners can ensure that new institutions and processes forge a lasting peace and durable bond between the Yemeni state and its people. Through these values, Yemenis can create a new government that lives up to the promise of the original National Dialogue Conference (NDC). The conference has maintained widespread legitimacy, even after the collapse of the transitional government and the outbreak of war, because it showcased the best of Yemeni society: its great diversity, strong social cohesion, and fundamentally democratic and communal approach to decision-making. Conflict appears likely to continue in the short-term, but Yemenis and their international partners must begin planning how to translate the inclusive spirit of the NDC into stable governance.

Yemen is engulfed in a two-year civil war with no end in sight. At least 10,000 people have been killed in the fighting, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that 185,000 Yemenis have fled to nearby Middle Eastern and Sub-Saharan countries. A sustainable peace accord will need to balance the political grievances fueling the war with Yemen's need for infrastructure, institutional capacity, and social development. Yemen struggles with inadequate governance, insufficient basic services, a burgeoning population, a stalled economy, and environmental challenges, as well as food, fuel, water, and assistance insecurity. These have all been exacerbated by the conflict and will bedevil Yemen's stability long after the current fighting ends.

Reconstruction can only begin once the violence stops, but planning for Yemen's future must begin now. Current and emerging leaders must recommit to a negotiated ceasefire and political agreement. Resolution of the conflict includes four core assumptions:

- Saudi Arabia and its primary coalition partners must be convinced that it is in their strategic interest to engage in meaningful peace talks that produce a Yemeni-led transition. Saudi interests are centered on a secure border, a non-hostile if not compliant neighbor, and a denial of an Iranian foothold on their southern flank. These are non-negotiable. Guaranteeing these interests is the key to end the conflict. This will come from either sufficient international or domestic calculus that the conflict does not advance Saudi and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) interests, that it is too costly in financial and military terms, and/or that

international condemnation of the humanitarian toll imposes too great a political cost. The countervailing calculation would be to press for significant military gains including the recapture of major population centers like Ta'ez, Hodeida or Sana'a.

- The Houthis and their allies must agree to the basic terms of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2216 and cease shelling across the border in exchange for participation in the post-conflict Yemeni political process. As a corollary, arms transfers to Houthi rebels must be stopped. These arms transfers only serve to prolong the conflict and are illegal under UNSCR 2216.
- Yemeni leaders, particularly President Hadi (backed by the Saudi coalition) and former President Saleh (allied with the Houthis), must exit the political landscape. Their legitimacy is doubtful and both have already demonstrated their ability to act as spoilers.
- The NDC should be revived as a model for inclusive debate on governance and political structure, as part of a limited transition to elected government.

The reconstruction effort must be built on inclusivity, accountability, and sustainability. A sustainable peace in Yemen will require an inclusive political structure. Politically marginalized actors, such as the Houthi insurgency and Southern Movement, have actively undermined government legitimacy and helped drive instability. Moreover, women and young people, which make up a majority of the population, have lacked avenues into formal decision-making processes. Reconstruction efforts should revisit the successes of the NDC model to maximize inclusion during the process of restructuring national governance. To promote inclusion in the long-term, the education system should be rebuilt and improved through physical infrastructure, curriculum development, and teacher training. Education can reduce the potential for radicalization and empower citizens to participate in the government and economy. The Yemeni government and international partners should also support Yemeni civil society to promote access to political institutions and processes. Yemen has a proud tradition of strong social cohesion and discourse, which civil society groups can leverage to help rebuild the country.

In addition to inclusive governance, the reconstruction effort should emphasize accountability. Accountable and responsive governance at both the central and local level should begin with an assessment of current Yemeni institutions and practices. This assessment should be as transparent as possible, conducted by a multilateral committee composed of Yemeni political leaders, inter-governmental bodies, and civic associations. International organizations with governance expertise, such as the World Bank, should provide technical guidance when solicited by the Yemeni participants. Building on the

multilateral assessment, the Yemeni government should establish a new framework of institutional best practices, including a professionalized and properly compensated civil service and localized decision-making. It should also leverage technology to promote transparency and facilitate interaction between the government and citizens. Promoting accountability and increasing capacity within the civil and security services will also be essential to rebuilding effective Yemeni governance.

Finally, reconstruction efforts in Yemen must be financially and environmentally sustainable. Yemen will require substantial and consistent assistance; financial, political, and technical. Past donor commitments have tended to fail all three of these criteria, hindering the Yemeni government's capacity to effectively plan and execute service delivery.

No discussion of Yemen's future can ignore the most basic challenge: water. In the short-term, water scarcity poses major challenges, especially as populations continue to grow far beyond what the local water supply can support. In the long-term, climate change threatens to increase food insecurity, spread infectious diseases, and could ultimately displace coastal populations as sea levels rise. Water scarcity and other environmental changes amplify the effects of war and multiply other factors that threaten to spark renewed violence. Reconstruction efforts should promote better water management, including modern irrigation methods, and climate resiliency by investing in local capacity and devolving significant decision-making responsibility to local leadership. The government of Yemen should focus on policies to reduce water demand and develop knowledge of the local climate and climate science.



Introduction

Saudi Arabia began its air campaign against the Houthi rebels on March 25, 2015. Since then, Yemen has been engulfed in a civil war that has caused an estimated 10,000 conflict-related fatalities.¹ Given the on-going state of hostilities, it is imperative to balance any proposals for Yemen's long-term development with a clear-eyed appraisal of how the war might end. As of April 2017, the war is in a stalemate. Neither side in the conflict will concede, nor can either side win militarily. The Saudi-led coalitionⁱ has the advantage of superior weaponry and international authority; the Houthi insurgency and its allies have the advantage of terrain, local knowledge, and commitment. A peace accord will require difficult concessions on both sides absent an intensification of coalition-led hostilities that significantly alter the military facts on the ground: a level of hostilities that would further devastate the country, exacerbate the humanitarian crisis, and cause international approbation. If history² is a guide, such an intensification would likely fail.

Unfolding Humanitarian Crisis

As many as 18 million Yemenis - over 60 percent of the population - are food insecure.³ Yemen's economy is also in tatters, witnessing a 35 percent decline in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2015 alone.⁴ The profound humanitarian impact of these developments, the spread of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in poorly governed regions, imperiled sea-lanes and ports, and the increased likelihood of regional conflict all suggest that Western nations, the Gulf Cooperation Council,ⁱⁱ and Yemeni leaders **must take bold and persistent action to end the fighting and help Yemenis rebuild their**

ⁱ Comprised of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Senegal, and Sudan, with support from the United States, United Kingdom, and France among others.

ⁱⁱ The GCC is a political and economic alliance of six Middle Eastern states: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman.

shattered country.

Since former President Saleh stepped down from the presidency in 2012, Yemen's political landscape has witnessed dramatic shifts. The GCC-agreed framework of fall 2011 formalized former Vice President Hadi's assumption of the presidency, established the NDC, and called for new parliamentary and presidential elections – based on the pre-2011 political parties – after a new constitution was to be drafted. The delay of the constitution, the elections, and the transition to an elected leadership, among other issues, fueled a resurgence of the Houthi insurgency, now aligned with their old foe Ali Abdullah Saleh, which ultimately led to Hadi's exile in Riyadh.

This reversal prompted Saudi Arabia to launch Operation Decisive Storm and, ultimately, impose a naval and air blockade which exacerbated the country's severe food crisis as well as medicine and fuel shortages in Houthi-controlled areas. Compounding the Saudi-imposed blockades and infrastructure destruction, Houthi forces have also begun appropriating aid shipments for sale on the black market.⁵ As President Hadi plots his return to power from exile in Riyadh, and Saudi Deputy Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman flexes his Kingdom's military muscles to bolster his succession prospects, the Houthi-Saleh alliance continues to display tactical cunning and geopolitical savvy, having enlisted support from the Islamic Republic of Iran.^{6,7}

Controlling Yemen

The political, economic, and military dynamics in Yemen suggests that neither the Houthi-Saleh alliance nor the Saudi-Hadi coalition will lose its will to fight anytime soon.⁹ The coalition controls much, but not all of the coast and the desert periphery; the

Who Are the Houthis?

The Houthis, originally a Sa'ada-based clan closely associated with the old Imamate, has evolved over the decades into a political movement in the 1990s and an insurgency in the early 2000s. Zaydism, the Islamic school embraced by the Houthis and their followers, is a branch of Shi'a Islam that accounts for roughly 35 percent of the Yemeni population. The Houthis and their followers, often referred to as neo-Zaydis, increasingly perceived themselves and their religious traditions to be under siege from an upsurge in Wahhabi Salafism from Saudi Arabia and felt marginalized by the Yemeni government. Starting in 1992, neo-Zaydi scholars attempted to revive their branch of Islam by establishing schools throughout the provinces of Sa'ada and Sana'a.

The Houthis fought six wars with the Yemeni Government between 2004 and 2010. The Government of Yemen claimed, with little evidence, that they received support from Iran. The Houthis, who did not represent a majority of the northern Zaydi, were, however, active and accepted participants in the Change Square protests and the National Dialogue Conference as well as the constitution-drafting committee. However, an extension of Hadi's "transition" status, and delays in implementation and elections fueled further grievances. In 2014, the Houthi militia captured the capital of Sana'a. In January 2015, the group placed President Hadi and the Prime Minister under house arrest, precipitating the current iteration of the war in March 2015.

insurgents control the highlands and most of the population centers.

While the possibilities are many, there are three basic ways the conflict might end.

1. The Saudi coalition builds on recent gains – such as the February 2017 capture of the Red Sea port of Mokha¹⁰ – to launch a ground offensive to take the strategic port of Hodeida before pivoting for an offensive on the Yemeni capital of Sana’a. By gaining key population centers and, therefore, greater leverage at the negotiating table, the Saudi coalition may be willing to continue to engage in meaningful talks to end the fighting. However, seizing Hodeidah has major political costs, as it shifts responsibility for the humanitarian crisis squarely onto Saudi Arabia, and would not significantly enhance coalition opportunities of taking Sana’a, just as coalition control of the desert to the east of Sana’a has not guaranteed military success. The Houthi insurgents control the mountains and the highlands.
2. The second path would be a deepened stalemate between Houthis and Saudi-coalition forces and a de facto partition of the country along the current battle lines.¹¹ Spiraling humanitarian conditions in Yemen and Saudi perceptions of being trapped in a quagmire could undermine support for former President Saleh and current President Hadi, while intensifying international pressure on both actors to negotiate a deal.
3. In the third scenario, the United Nations (UN) special envoy to Yemen, Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed, would build on the constructive talks held in the summer of 2016 in Kuwait and in December 2016 in Muscat to finalize a deal which would transition Hadi and his key lieutenants out of power in exchange for an end to the Saudi-led military offensives, Houthi adherence to the broad terms of UNSCR 2216, and Houthi inclusion in post-conflict political structures. This is the only scenario that can plausibly end the fighting, retain Yemeni unity, alleviate the humanitarian crisis, and set the stage for a successful political transition. However, the Kuwait and Muscat peace talks had the full and active support of the United States Government (USG) – a factor that may no longer be guaranteed, given the new Administration.

International and regional partners may also bolster UN mediation efforts by taking several interim measures, including stepping up efforts to stem illegal arms transfers to Houthi fighters, negotiating the permanent exit of President Hadi and former President Saleh from Yemeni politics, and diplomatic and public endorsement of the NDC as a model to guide political reconciliation and coordination of reconstruction priorities.

Interim Measures

Firstly, international and regional partners should intensify their current efforts to stem illegal arms shipments to Houthi fighters. The Houthis, with the help of Saleh's loyalists and weaponry, were emboldened by their successful capture of the Yemeni capital in 2014 and their swing as far south as Aden by early spring 2015 and reassured by material backing from Iran¹² that blunts the Saudi coalition's military edge. The UN reports that the Houthis receive smuggled arms overland via Oman¹³ and the Hadramaut, in contravention of the UNSCR 2216 arms embargo. Western powers, GCC states, and the UN should continue to work together to intercept these deliveries, which breathe life into ongoing hostilities.

The second interim measure involves quiet diplomacy between international and regional partners and the two most prominent Yemeni politicians: President Hadi and former President Saleh. Their departure from Yemeni political life will likely be a precondition to achieving a durable peace. Both actors have limited legitimacy within Yemen and external powers can facilitate their exit from public life by offering both leaders "golden parachutes" and comfortable lives in exile. Their departure from the political scene will clear the way for more technocratic and effective executive leadership to emerge in Yemen, a key objective of the Houthis and many participants in the Change Square protests and NDC.

The final interim measure will involve a revival of the NDC model. This mechanism successfully incorporated young people, women, Houthi and Southern Movement activists, among many others that felt excluded from traditional politics. Through mandatory quotas for every conceivable demographic, geographic, and political grouping and a commitment to constructive dialogue, the conference successfully debated the Yemeni social contract and political structure. The NDC ultimately failed when the ineffective Hadi transitional government was granted an additional year by the UN and the promised elections and the installation of a new legitimate government were postponed. However, the validity of the NDC as a model remains sound.¹⁴

NDC as a model

A reconstituted version of the NDC should be tasked with assessing and prioritizing Yemen's reconstruction needs as well as partnering with international donors and organizations to develop a plan for Yemen to emerge from the present conflict with stronger and more inclusive institutions. The new body will be empowered to make recommendations to the Yemeni government, which in turn will be responsible for implementation.

Revitalizing a national dialogue would act as an effective vehicle to promote the norms of inclusion, accountability, and sustainability, which will be critical for achieving durable peace and effective reconstruction.

Iran's Role in Yemen: A Proxy War?

Since Houthi forces swept into Sana'a in 2014 and forced President Hadi into exile, Saudi Arabia has sought to restore its influence in Yemen by rallying GCC nations around their shared fear of Iranian expansionism. While there is convincing evidence that Iran provides some degree of military and ideological support to the Houthis – such aid is relatively inexpensive and distracts the Saudis from the ongoing war in Syria – it is misleading to conflate the Houthi movement's objectives and worldview with those of Hezbollah or Shi'a militias in Iraq.

The Houthis have battled Saudi influence for the last ten years, and are motivated to fight based on local grievances, rather than because of allegiance to any regional movements or sectarian associations. Houthi acceptance of Iranian aid and Tehran's choice to provide aid are both motivated by circumstances more than conviction. Houthi ties to Iran did not begin to flourish until 2011 and have been limited relative to other Shi'a militias.⁸

Iran's primary motivation appears to be a low cost/high yield goading of the Saudis and creating a distraction from their core interest, the survival of the Assad regime. It has not been a formal party to the peace talks. If the United States ramps up its military support to the Saudi coalition and/or designates the Houthis a terrorist group, the proxy-war narrative, which has been slowly growing, may take on more salience between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Beyond interim measures, international partners need to make long-term commitments. Once hostilities have ended, Yemen will require massive and sustained investment to restore Yemen even to its inadequate pre-2011 infrastructure standards. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) recently estimated that the costs of repairing damaged infrastructure alone will exceed 19 billion USD¹⁵ Given the breadth of challenges Yemen faces, international donors must increase and regularize aid. Yemen receives only 12.70 USD per capita in Official Development Assistance (ODA) while the average per capita assistance for Least Developed Countries is 33.40 USD, more than twice that received by Yemen.¹⁶ Aid flows to Yemen vary significantly from year to year, complicating and un-

dermining long-term investments in critical infrastructure and institutions. Reliable and predictable aid commitments are essential for planning and financing the large-scale infrastructure and service delivery projects necessary for successful long-term reconstruction. The United States, the European Union (EU), and the GCC and other partners should work to ensure Yemen has the significant, long-term, stable support it needs to create an inclusive, accountable, and sustainable state.



Inclusivity

Yemen's recent history vividly illustrates the danger posed by groups who feel excluded from governing institutions and processes. From the Sa'ada-based Houthi group to the Southern Movement, too many Yemenis (potentially a majority given the nation-wide turnout during the Change Square protests and the strength of the insurgency) felt marginalized economically and politically. Substantial parts of the Yemeni citizenry, youth and women in particular, have traditionally lacked avenues into formal decision-making. The reconstruction efforts in Yemen must ensure meaningful participation and inclusive governance for all Yemenis in order to prevent a relapse of violence. This requires promoting political participation, improving the education system, and supporting civil society organizations (CSOs).

Ensure Broad Political Participation

Yemeni women and youth, who long felt alienated from formal decision-making processes, took to the streets in the Yemeni uprising, played key roles in the NDC, and now demand a greater say in the reconstruction process and their country's future. Youth played a central part in driving the protests¹⁷ and women were at the frontlines of the Change Square demonstrations¹⁸ and subsequent NDC.

The participation of these groups in the protests—particularly the active role of women—may have shocked outside observers, but did not surprise Yemenis themselves. Their participation was a product of the country's "egalitarian ethic," deliberative practices, and women's strong role in the local economy and in family life which has created "an openness of men and women towards female leaders."¹⁹ Even though women have been underrepresented on the national level, they have historically been active in communities, and their political rights are enshrined in the constitution.²⁰ Many women

demonstrated to express discontent over their formal political exclusion and what they perceived to be the regime's co-optation of gender issues.²¹

The high level of participation in the demonstrations continued into the political transition phase. The NDC was premised on an inclusive formula, and 40 seats each were allocated to so-called independent constituencies: women, youth, and civil society.²² Apart from the independent constituencies, all other political factions and delegations were required to include a minimum of 30 percent women, 50 percent Southerners, and 20 percent youth.²³ The youth constituency ultimately comprised 20 percent of the NDC, and women constituted 28 percent of all participants, successfully negotiating the recommendation of a 30 percent quota for women at all levels of government.²⁴ The broad inclusion of women in the NDC is noteworthy, not only in terms of Yemen's own domestic context, but from a global perspective as well. Some have claimed that, "[f]or the first time, women entered politics in meaningful numbers,"²⁵ and the outcomes of the NDC have been heralded as "the most advanced version of rights and freedoms that Yemen has ever witnessed."²⁶

Elections	Candidates			Winners		
	Women	Men	Percentage of Women (%)	Women	Men	Percentage of Women (%)
Parliamentary election, 1993	42	3,140	1.3	2	299	0.7
Parliamentary election, 1997	19	2,096	1.3	2	299	0.7
Local Elections, 2001	147	24,864	0.6	35	7,032	0.4
Parliamentary election, 2003	11	1,644	0.6	1	300	0.3

Female Participation in Yemen's political system, International Institute for Democratic and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) and the Arab NGO Network for Development (ANND), 2015

Yemen's ongoing civil war threatens to reverse these recent advances. Many are concerned that the progress made and the inclusiveness of the NDC will not outlive the armed conflict, and that women's concerns will be sidelined in future negotiations and decision-making fora.²⁷ Inclusive governance is important for post-conflict stability. Research indicates that countries with higher levels of gender equality and female political participation are less likely to resort to conflict and violence.²⁸ The efforts of marginalized groups to participate in political decision-making processes should be supported and encouraged during the reconstruction phase and beyond.

RECOMMENDATION

The Yemeni government should revisit and strengthen the inclusive NDC model, which institutionalized the country's tradition of deliberative social practices.

The failure of the original NDC was not due to its design, but to the delayed implementation of its recommendations, which led to friction with the Houthis and other newly-activated Yemenis who questioned whether the outcomes and timeline had been negotiated and decided upon in good faith.²⁹ Delayed elections and a controversial supra-federalism plan compounded growing dissent.³⁰ Yet, the process addressed concerns across a wide spectrum of society and is considered a success story by many Yemenis.³¹ During the reconstruction process, the NDC formula should therefore inform future decision-making processes and provide the basis for restoring the promise of an inclusive social contract.³² Women and youth participated as full partners at Change Square and in the NDC. They are unlikely to settle for less after the war. Their participation and demands for inclusion should continue to be supported by the international community

RECOMMENDATION

The Yemeni government should adopt a National Action Plan (NAP) for the implementation of UNSCR 1325, which encourages states to strengthen women's participation in decision-making.

Adopting and implementing a NAP would allow Yemen to: identify the most pressing challenges, priorities, and resources related to women's participation in decision-making; determine responsibilities and reasonable timeframes; initiate concrete actions to increase women's political participation; and establish accountability measures.³³ Women's concerns are often among the first to lose priority during political negotiations. It is therefore imperative to institutionalize Yemeni women's recent increased political space to prevent regression in rights or representation.

Invest in Education

Increasing formal political space for young people and women is necessary but not sufficient to ensure inclusive governance. Education is critical to providing all citizens with the capacity to participate in the decision-making process. Current disparities in access and quality of education limit many Yemenis' prospects for meaningful participation. According to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) study, the literacy rate for Yemeni adults above the age of 15 was 70 per-


cent in 2015.³⁴ Thus, 30 percent of Yemenis, many rural and poor, face the significant hurdle of illiteracy when attempting to participate in public and political life. Women are disproportionately impacted with a literacy rate of 55 percent.³⁵ Indeed, only 40 percent of women were enrolled in secondary education in 2013.³⁶ Even the architecture of schools discriminates against girls; many rural schools are not equipped with separate female bathrooms, prompting parents to keep their daughters home.³⁷

Unfortunately, the quality of Yemen's education system was poor before the civil war began, suffering from years of poverty and instability. Compounding decades of underinvestment, the current conflict has left much of Yemen's education infrastructure in shambles throughout the country. More than 1,600 schools are unfit for use due to conflict-related damage or occupation,³⁸ and since March 2015, approximately 3,600 schools have closed.³⁹ As a result, an estimated 2 million children are displaced from school, and what educational infrastructure remains is severely damaged; few teachers and resources are available to provide for a growing population of children.⁴⁰ Most functioning schools are overcrowded, with some averaging 90 students per classroom.⁴¹ Apart from physical infrastructure, there are also challenges in terms of curriculum and teacher training. A World Bank study found that teaching methods in Yemen are limited to rote memorization of state-issued textbooks,⁴² and up to 60 percent of basic education teachers are unqualified for their positions.⁴³

Education Expenditure and Enrollment	Percentage
Public Expenditure on Education in % of GDP	4.6
Public Expenditure per Pupil as a % of the GDP per capita (Primary)	18.2
Net Enrollment Rate 2010 (Primary, Total)	77.6
Net Enrollment Rate 2010 (Primary, Female)	70.0
Gross Enrollment Rate 2013 (Primary, Total)	97.5
Children out of School 2013	14.6

Source: World Bank and UNESCO

Due to the government's limited financial resources, human capacity, and legitimacy, young Yemenis have developed significant grievances, including unemployment,⁴⁴ and they will continue to demand jobs and education. In Yemen, 40 percent of the population is below the age of 15 and 20 percent is between 15 and 24 years old.⁴⁵ Approximately 29.9 percent of youth are currently unemployed, which is nearly double the national unemployment rate.⁴⁶ Worse, the unemployment rate among women has been significantly higher at around 40 percent throughout the last years.⁴⁷



Population Pyramids. UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs. "Population Pyramids: Yemen." 2015.

The nation’s weak education system threatens not only inclusive governance, but basic security. When education effectively leads to employment, it provides resilience against the siren song of radicalization by improving economic opportunities and social and economic empowerment, thus “inoculating communities against Al-Qaeda’s violent prescriptions.”⁴⁸ Research shows that AQAP strategically targets vulnerable youth for recruitment, especially young men.⁴⁹ Ultimately, education is the primary linkage between the state and its younger population. Investing in education is an effective strategy for the new government to build a productive relationship with the younger half of its population and promote employment and sustained economic growth.

RECOMMENDATION

International donors should partner with civic organizations and community leaders to support the Yemeni government in reconstructing Yemen’s Ministry of Education to improve the country’s education infrastructure and curriculum.

- Repair damaged buildings, construct new schools where needed, and ensure that facilities include bathrooms for both boys and girls.
- Reform and strengthen curricula to emphasize critical thinking skills relevant to the modern economy and improve the prospects of employment after graduation.
- Revitalize the Technical Vocation and Education Training (TVET) program, which is designed to provide skills relevant to the job market.⁵⁰
- Invest in teacher training by developing continuing education programs for teachers that provide up-to-date teaching skills.

Support Civil Society

Yemen has a strong tradition of civil society, community-based governance, and de facto decentralization. CSOs have been an integral part of political change for decades, and Yemeni CSOs “have a higher status and greater capability than other organizations in the Middle East because they have more space to engage directly with local communities.”⁵¹ In 2013, there were approximately 8,317 CSOs in Yemen, and a World Bank assessment of five governorates found that a majority of these focused on education and women’s empowerment.⁵² Other CSOs focus on activities related to service delivery, providing training programs, and engaging in advocacy and lobbying.⁵³ Some organizations also have the capacity to partner with local businesses and organizations in order to offer training or education programs that are tailored to local needs.

The 2011 uprising spurred even broader civic engagement around the country. A recent United States Agency for International Development (USAID) study reports that “increased participation in activism and volunteerism” is one of the most significant trends in Yemen today.⁵⁴ The World Bank attributes rising engagement to recent political and social openings as well as increased demand for better public service delivery and stronger government accountability.⁵⁵ Local CSOs have also remained important—and sometimes essential—partners for international donors and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) during the war. Smaller CSOs are appearing around the country to provide humanitarian relief in places where international aid organizations lack a strong presence.⁵⁶

RECOMMENDATION

The international community and Yemeni government should support civil society organizations and community-based governance to provide space for all citizens to organize and participate.

- Improve inclusion for young people through local organizations that advocate for youth concerns; create a space for young people to gather and organize; and utilize CSOs to fulfill capacity-building functions.
- Support linkages and networks between different CSOs, domestically and regionally, so that they can identify common interests and strategies as well as share experiences and lessons with each other.

Following the outbreak of the current conflict, Yemeni civil society has suffered from relative underdevelopment and underfunding⁵⁷ and needs capacity-building support. CSOs can fill some gaps in Yemen’s education

system by providing young people with practical training in areas where the government lacks ability and reach, with the potential of boosting youth employment.

Support for Yemeni civil society is a prescription that attracts an unusually broad agreement among Yemeni women activists, who expect that “women will likely continue to exercise most of their leadership in the nongovernmental sector for the foreseeable future.”⁵⁸ Their active engagement in civil society continues to represent one of the most viable ways for women to gain entrance into the formal political arena.⁵⁹ CSOs can provide women with credentials, legitimacy, and leadership skills; all essential qualities for future political candidates or party leaders.

Given the limits of the Yemeni state’s service provision — from security to education — constructive non-state actors, and CSOs in particular, can play a key role in filling current gaps. A strong and vibrant civil society is also important for rebuilding a democratic and inclusive society, and should be one component in the larger strategy to address exclusion. Ultimately, the Yemeni government and international and regional actors can use CSOs as partners in their efforts to broaden access to political institutions and processes.



Accountability

Accountability lies at the heart of the relationship between government institutions, whether security forces or civilian bureaucracies, and the citizenry. In order to rebuild the connections damaged by conflict, the Yemeni government must begin by conducting an honest evaluation of the country's institutions, including by engaging traditional social fora and taking advantage of new technologies, when possible. Each government sector will need to enact reforms to introduce better accountability and oversight mechanisms. The government should pay particular attention to establishing an accountable, professionalized civil service and national police force that can provide basic services and support good governance. Empowering a judiciary that can function in an independent role will be critical to check future corruption and abuses. These measures will not be a quick-fix; investing in good governance is an iterative, incremental, and institutional process designed to produce a government that serves its citizenry in the long-term.

Leveraging the technical expertise of international donors, the government of Yemen must conduct a transparent assessment of current institutions and practices, harness the power of communications technology and e-government to connect with the citizenry, professionalize the civil service and security services, and safeguard the independence of the judiciary.

Yemen ranks a dismal 170 out of 176 countries on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index.⁶⁰ Indeed, Yemeni institutions lack basic accountability mechanisms, which allows "corrupt power blocs" to appropriate and misuse scarce public resources.⁶¹ The state's long-term success will depend upon a successful redefinition of the social contract between the central government and the public. This will require effective anti-corruption measures and other good governance mechanisms. Additionally, Sana'a needs to be more responsive to public needs.

Assess Institutions

Implementing accountability measures begins with a thorough review of the Yemeni state's current governing institutions, structures, and practices with an eye toward improved oversight and transparency. After a ceasefire and negotiated settlement, a working group that includes government and community stakeholders as well as international partners should draw on recommendations from the original NDC to build a framework for assessing institutional capacity and accountability. The multilateral committee should include leaders from the district, governorate, and federal levels as well as technical advisers from inter-governmental bodies and the NGO community. International organizations could include the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF). NGOs such as Global Witness and Transparency International could provide good-governance expertise, while civic organizations, notably the Yemen Polling Center, could offer locally-based data and insight. The group would conduct an institutional assessment of government bodies and functions including the cabinet, ministries, anti-corruption bodies, and parastatals to identify areas that require capacity development.

The multilateral working group's findings and recommendations should then be submitted to the President and Legislature to be considered and implemented. The executive branch should create a Yemeni body to continue the work of the multilateral group and demonstrate an enduring commitment to reform.

RECOMMENDATION

The President should establish a standing body focused on issues of accountability and capacity building within Yemen's Central Organization for Control and Auditing (COCA)⁶² to ensure an ongoing public dialogue on Yemeni accountability efforts.

The governance improvement committee would continue the evaluation process using a standardized framework and all assessments would be publicly available. The committee should also develop a broad roadmap to guide and coordinate reform efforts based on the results. The public assessments act as a recurring process to support the improvement of Yemeni government institutions. The impact of these institutional assessments depends heavily on both national and international commitment and capability to enact the resulting guidelines. In Yemen, the government and international community must ensure this effort is properly funded as well as protect the advisory group from fiscal, political, and personal retribution.

Promote Public Participation

Often, information regarding corruption or inefficient and exclusive government practices can be obtained directly from citizens.

RECOMMENDATION

Capitalizing on Yemen's strong history of democratic social practice, COCA can leverage town hall meetings modeled on less formal qat chews to foster direct interaction with citizens.

Qat chews are an example of a public space in which civil society can discuss issues surrounding transparency, political participation, and accountability. Anthropologist Shelagh Weir has described the gatherings as a “kind of institutionalized grapevine” where information on political issues is exchanged and widely debated.⁶³ In the past they served as a forum for discussing the role of political parties and term limits.⁶⁴ Regular town hall style gatherings modeled on qat chews will allow the public to hold their government institutions accountable and reinforce their own stake in national governance.

RECOMMENDATION

The Yemeni government should harness modern technologies to better engage Yemeni citizens.

Internet, cellular, and satellite technologies can create a direct link between constituents and the government. In particular, cellular applications are a promising channel for government and citizen interaction. Four in five Yemenis already use cell phones.⁶⁵ Yemenis could use their phones to request services and information or answer brief survey questions. Communications technology would also enable platforms for reporting corruption or abuse, such as India's Central Vigilance Commission.⁶⁶ The government should also study how to best implement anonymous hotlines as well as collect administrative information via text.

Though the vast majority of Yemenis have access to cell phones, relatively few have access to the Internet. According to a 2015 estimate, only one in five Yemenis is online.⁶⁷ Investing in the country's information infrastructure would enhance measures toward effective, transparent, and accessible governance. Therefore, broader internet access should be a national goal. Citizens could file paperwork, taxes, and requests online, while monitoring the process. Digitizing various processes also reduces some opportunities for bribery and other forms of petty corruption. International partners, including Esto-

nia, and NGOs, such as Neocapita and the E-governance Academy, can provide advice on establishing e-governance platforms. European partners can also provide needed recommendations and expertise to ensure that e-governance efforts are balanced with necessary privacy protections. Moreover, the telecommunications sector could provide much needed employment opportunities while enhancing Yemen's human capital, technical expertise, and connectivity to global markets.

Strengthen the Civil Service, Security Services, and Judiciary

Improved governing capacity and accountability rely upon improved human capital within the civil service, security sector, and judiciary. The Yemeni government can draw on recommendations outlined under the original NDC⁶⁸ and Local Development Program⁶⁹ to enhance civil service professionalism and develop technical skills within the bureaucracy. Before undertaking training programs or other initiatives, the government should assess the current capacity landscape and identify where development is most needed. This information would also be used by international partners to tailor aid and assistance to meet the Yemeni needs and context, in consultation with Yemenis themselves.

RECOMMENDATION

The Yemen Executive Branch should leverage international technical assistance to develop training programs that enhance capacity and accountability within the civil service.

- Professionalize Yemeni civil service as a meritocracy accountable to the law, rather than patronage networks.
- Encourage Yemenis who have left to study and work abroad to return and work in the public sector.⁷⁰
- Address capacity shortfalls in core service areas such as education, healthcare, human rights, employment, agriculture, and water management.

The Security Sector

Similarly, Yemen will need to address the critical issues of accountability and professionalism in its security forces, particularly focusing on policing.⁷¹ Police and military forces have been among the least accountable state institutions, eroding confidence in the government and hampering the provision of security and administrative services. Loyalty was bought through employment, and security forces were accountable to powerful, often competing, leaders rather than to the public.⁷² This environment fostered tactical

incompetence and malfeasance ranging from human rights abuses to petty corruption. Moving forward, the emphasis within the security sector should be on reversing the trend of unaccountable, unprofessional personal armies and militias. Security provision is one of the most basic links between the government and the public.⁷³

RECOMMENDATION

The security sector in Yemen should be reformed to focus on civil order and civilian protection in an accountable way.

Yemen does not need an expeditionary, offensive military capability and its defense force should be built around defending the country's borders and coastline and fighting a resurgent AQAP.⁷⁴ International commitments to secure Yemen from outside threats and assist with counterterrorism will provide the space to establish better policing.

The country's past experience with national gendarmerie forces should be leveraged to establish the Yemeni Security Force (YSF) as a gendarmerie. The force would draw on the example of the former Central Security Force and the Najda, which were generally regarded as the least corrupt and most capable of Yemen's security services.⁷⁵ The YSF would be tasked with country-wide security, including in rural and poorly governed areas, where many Yemenis lack a permanent police presence.⁷⁶

The YSF could provide robust support to local police in matters of civil order, emergencies, and terrorist activities. It could also incorporate humanitarian responsibilities, such as protecting aid deliveries and providing emergency medical response. YSF employees would be vetted for previous serious abuses and receive professional training. Most importantly, the YSF would operate under strong civilian oversight to ensure accountability.

Given their resources and experience, the UN and EU have the best capacity to deploy national-level gendarmerie units to raise and train forces in Yemen.⁷⁷ As the United States lacks a comparable national police force, European nations should guide the development of the YSF.⁷⁸ This assistance should not be limited to the YSF, as capacity building efforts in proper law enforcement training for local police will also be important over the long-term.

The Judicial Sector

Yemen's judiciary has struggled to maintain its presence in Yemeni society throughout the crisis. Courts have been constrained by a lack of trained jurists and support personnel as well as interference from political factions.⁷⁹ As a result, those few courts that are still functioning are overloaded with cases.⁸⁰

RECOMMENDATION

Reinforce this critical component of accountable governance in Yemen by training court management and scholarship for a new generation of judges and judicial staff. Additionally, to affirm the principle of judicial independence.

The judiciary will be an important player in the rehabilitation of good and credible governance. Accordingly, the judiciary should be given a greater level of oversight in police matters. While still falling under the purview of the Ministry of the Interior, the YSF should be subject to district and governorate level court investigations and oversight. Local police should likewise be responsive to the judiciary. In areas where traditional mediation and adjudication methods are preferred, local leaders should be given some latitude to address minor issues at their level, so long as all parties concerned are willing to forego formal proceedings.⁸¹




Sustainability

Water security is not the cause of the civil war in Yemen, but it is a conflict threat multiplier that contributed to the breakdown of the relationship between the central government and the population. Scarcity itself can have multiple causes, and has the potential to cause conflict in multiple ways.⁸² In Yemen, anecdotal evidence exists of conflicts over access to water occurring at the local level,⁸³ though such conflicts do not extend beyond the local level and are often resolved at the same level.⁸⁴ Scarcity has caused people in some regions to migrate from rural to urban areas,⁸⁵ and the violence of the civil war has caused further displacement that puts greater stress on the service infrastructure, but conflicts explicitly over water have not arisen as a result of these migrations. General deprivation of life-sustaining services or resources, among which access to water is critical, leading to societal breakdown and civil strife is the best way to describe the relationship of water to Yemen's civil war.

Therefore, in resolving Yemen's civil war and rebuilding society, the Yemeni government and international partners must consider environmental sustainability to ensure a lasting peace. Donors should emphasize regularizing and increasing aid, while the Yemeni government should prioritize managing the country's dwindling water supply and building knowledge of climate science.

Civilization thrived for millennia in Yemen despite its arid climate, yet the modern era has brought with it an increasingly dire water scarcity crisis that is likely to be exacerbated by climate change. Yemen's water resources amount to 130m³ per person per year compared to the world average of 8,300m³ per person per year, which indicates an exceptional level of scarcity. The amount of water available per capita in Yemen is barely sufficient to meet domestic uses, and far below the level necessary for the county to achieve self-sufficiency in food production.⁸⁶

Furthermore, the country is particularly vulnerable to climate change due to both geographic features and institutional weaknesses. Though climate models differ in their exact predictions, all predict higher temperatures and increasingly erratic rainfall with more frequent droughts, flooding, and storms,⁸⁷ which will only exacerbate water scarcity. Unless both of these challenges are addressed, they will have great adverse effects on the livelihoods of Yemenis through lack of access to life-sustaining resources and potentially through violent conflict as competition for scarce resources increases.



Average Monthly Temperature and Rainfall for Yemen from 1990 to 2012, World Bank 2017

Yemen has poor governance institutions that prevent it from managing water scarcity and adapting to climate change. The relationship between poor governance institutions, climate change, and scarcity is important because poor institutions are unable to adapt and manage effectively, which can lead not only to humanitarian crises, but to violent conflict.⁸⁸

Assessing the relationship between water scarcity and conflict in Yemen is critical due to the country being in the midst of a complex civil war with no clear to resolution. In Yemen, the effects of climate change are not yet severe or clear enough to be considered a significant cause of conflict, but lessons drawn now about the interaction between water scarcity and conflict could prove relevant to assessing secondary effects of climate change in the future.

Institutional Capacity

Limited institutional capacity and a deteriorating security, economic, and humanitarian situation complicate Yemen's ability to craft effective, sustainable responses to mitigate the worst effects of water scarcity and climate change. Lack of consistent or significant foreign aid is a contributing factor to Yemen's inability to improve service delivery and increase institutional capacity across the whole range of governmental activities, but the effects of this are particularly pronounced in the water and climate sectors. Water scarcity and environmental challenges demand large-scale, long-term, and coordinated responses which will be impossible in the absence of significant governmental capacity.

RECOMMENDATION

The international community should help Yemen manage the pressures of both existing water scarcity and the future effects of climate change by increasing and regularizing aid.

The United States and other donor countries should commit to stable levels of aid medium and long-term, while requiring that one third of the donated amount be spent strengthening national, governorate, district, and local institutions and infrastructure to help meet long-term challenges. Overall, donors should emphasize building state and local capacity to ensure sustainability.

Limited government capacity undermines possible solutions to water scarcity and climate change. The state cannot manage the water supply if it lacks the ability to monitor water usage and the capacity to enforce limits. Likewise, the Yemeni government cannot effectively prepare for the impact of climate change if it lacks the tools and machinery needed to gather climate data and the personnel needed to interpret that data and develop informed policies.

Water Supply Management

Managing water scarcity is not a new problem in Yemen. For centuries Yemen was known throughout the region for its terraced agriculture, judicious norms governing water rights, and feats of ancient engineering such as the Marib Dam. However, a variety of factors related to Yemen's integration into modern global political and economic structures have led to impending depletion of the country's water resources beyond the ability of the national government and traditional institutions to manage.⁸⁹ These factors include rapid population growth, the abrupt introduction of new technologies and power structures, and distortions in agricultural markets.

Like many countries in the Middle East and the rest of the developing world, Yemen saw a rapid increase in its population during the second half of the twentieth century. In 1960, Yemen's population was just 5,166,311 and by 2015 the population increased more than five times to 26,832,215.⁹⁰ While Yemen's water resources may have been enough to support a smaller population, the population now appears too large for the country's water resources.

New well drilling and pumping technologies were introduced in Yemen in the 1970s, allowing irrigated agricultural area to expand from 37,000 hectares to more than 500,000

hectares between 1970 and 2005, with most of this increase dependent on groundwater. Modern irrigation and pumping technologies allow extraction to occur at rates much faster than the recharge rate for Yemen's groundwater resources,⁹¹ which will further reduce the available supply of water over the long-term.

Along with new technologies, there were new political forces and forms of government introduced in Yemen in the latter half of the twentieth century. The most important of these changes were the rise of the centrally governed nation-state and significant cash flow from external sources. These two changes interacted to tilt the balance of power away from communities and toward central leadership, as well as introduce new, lucrative routes for dishonest individuals to seek self-enrichment over social good. Corruption, resource capture, and political favoritism in enforcing laws governing water rights and other resources have become the norm and created a situation in which some sectors of the Yemeni population experience far greater scarcity than others.⁹²

Lastly, Yemen's integration into the world economy caused distortions in the agricultural market that have encouraged irresponsible water use. The switch from indigenous subsistence agriculture to commercial agriculture encouraged Yemeni farmers to cash plant crops poorly suited to such an arid climate. The growth of irrigated agriculture at a time when Yemen's central government was consolidating its power complicated the situation because, though environmentally irresponsible, it was politically advantageous for the central government to subsidize diesel fuel, which encouraged less efficient water use and extraction at ever-higher rates.⁹³ Furthermore, the importance of qat – a water intensive crop – in Yemeni culture has led to an outsized portion of Yemen's water resources being devoted to its cultivation.⁹⁴ All of these diverse factors have contributed to water scarcity and poor water management in Yemen, both of which will be enhanced by climate change while also hindering the country's ability to adapt.

RECOMMENDATION

The Yemeni government must direct its resources to programs that will contribute to bringing water demand in line with water supply.

- Conduct technical training for community members to monitor their own water resources.
- Provide technical assistance to help farmers switch to more efficient irrigation techniques.

- Offer logistical support for health services to ensure that child spacing services are readily available throughout the country.
- Introduce monetary incentives and education to encourage farmers to switch from qat cultivation to cultivating nutritious, low-water crops.

RECOMMENDATION

The Yemeni government must make a commitment to inclusion and accountability by decentralizing significant decision-making to local communities and undertaking rigorous reform to prevent the reformation of networks of corruption and political favoritism.

Local leaders in consultation with their communities are best able to decide how local water and resources should be used, as well as what resources the community needs to adapt to climate change. Greater local engagement will prevent corruption and increase sustainability, both in environmental and institutional terms. Reform combating monetary corruption and political favoritism will help ensure that all Yemenis feel included and are able to access the resources they need.

Climate Knowledge; Climate Change Resilience

Yemen is likely to become more arid and experience more extreme weather events because of climate change. Higher average global temperatures and rising seas are likely to increase the number and intensity of tropical storms.⁹⁵ These storms as well as unpredictable rainfall patterns are likely to increase the frequency and severity of floods in Yemen. Both tropical storms and flooding are likely to have great adverse impacts on Yemen because of the country's poverty and lack of good governance which place it among the least resilient societies in the world.⁹⁶ Furthermore, Yemen's climate varies widely from region to region, meaning the effects of climate change will differ throughout the country, and each locality will be required to adapt in unique ways.⁹⁷

Climate change is also likely to increase food insecurity in Yemen. Due to the great degree of water scarcity in Yemen, the country is already food insecure. Current food insecurity in Yemen is driven in a large part by the same factors that have caused water scarcity, and climate change will only exacerbate these in the near and distant future, as decreasing crop yields lead to higher food prices.

Additional future effects of climate change include the spread of infectious diseases⁹⁸ and displacement of coastal populations.⁹⁹ Changing climates can cause populations of

disease-carrying insects such as mosquitoes to spread to new areas. Finally, as sea levels rise, erosion occurs, and tropical storms worsen, populations in coastal cities like Aden may be displaced, putting further stress on national welfare and service provision institutions.

RECOMMENDATION

Leveraging the support of international donors, the Yemeni government must build and support programs that develop knowledge of climate science within institutions and help the country prepare for the impact of climate change.

- Conduct technical training for community members to collect data relevant to assessing the progress and impacts of climate change.
- Encourage communities to engage in dialogue about their needs.
- Work with international partners to give young Yemenis the opportunity to gain expertise in climate science.
- Increase funding for the Ministry of Water and the Environment.

The Changing Climate in Aden

The challenges facing the southern city of Aden illustrate the broader threat of climate change in Yemen. Arguably the country's most important port, Aden is highly vulnerable to rising sea levels. The Gulf of Aden will likely flood significant areas of the city. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the port is the sixth most vulnerable city to rising sea levels anywhere in the world.¹⁰⁰ Indeed, many "highly populated residential areas" of the city will be inundate.¹⁰¹ The Yemeni government calculates that 5.7 to 6 percent of Aden governorate may be submerged by rising waters.¹⁰² Under this scenario, roughly 12 percent of buildings in the governorate would be inundated and 100,000 people would be displaced.¹⁰³ To compound these challenges, rising sea levels will likely cause saltwater intrusion, poisoning the Bir Ahmed and Abyan aquifers, which supply 50 percent of the water used in Aden governorate.¹⁰⁴ In addition, swollen seas will increase in the number and intensity of tropical storms in Aden.¹⁰⁵ The city's dense coastal populations and infrastructure will be subjected to towering wave heights by an additional 4.6 to 5.6 feet during increasingly frequent storms in the near future.¹⁰⁶ In Aden, as well as in Yemen more broadly, the government's limited capacity undermines the possibility of effective, long-term responses like mobile barriers, locks, and pumping technologies.



Conclusion

The challenges facing Yemen are a microcosm of the ills plaguing the broader Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa: weak and illegitimate government institutions, minority groups struggling for equal rights and inclusion in the political tapestry, and acute environmental stress. If Yemen's international supporters can partner with a diverse array of Yemenis to overcome these challenges, the example could serve as a model for similar reconstruction efforts in fragile states from the Levant to the Sahel.

Predictable Foreign Aid

This effort will require sustained, substantial, and predictable allocations of foreign aid over the next decade. Furthermore, the investment will yield critical benefits for the Yemeni people and for broader regional stability. Even though an estimated 38 percent of the Yemeni population is in acute need of humanitarian assistance,¹⁰⁷ the country receives only 12.70 USD per capita in ODA while the average per capita assistance for Least Developed Countries is 33.40 USD, more than twice that received by Yemen.¹⁰⁸ Aid flows to Yemen vary significantly from year to year. In 2016, the United States government gave Yemen 144,340,000 USD in foreign assistance; in 2017, planned assistance is 55,880,000 USD, or 39 percent of the assistance received last year.¹⁰⁹ Worse, the United States' attention and assistance is heavily focused on counterterrorism priorities, which limits investment in civilian capacity and infrastructure.¹¹⁰ Reliable and predictable aid are essential for supporting Yemenis in transforming their country into a source of stability and inspiration throughout the region.

Substantial parts of the Yemeni citizenry, youth and women in particular, have felt excluded from, and lacked avenues into, governing institutions and processes. The recon-

struction efforts in Yemen must ensure meaningful participation and inclusive governance for all Yemenis in order to build trust and prevent a relapse of violence. This requires promoting political participation, improving the education system, and supporting civil society.

Accountability, by definition, is the idea of being answerable to a constituency rather than acting solely on one's own interests. In the case of Yemen, this means a government that acts on behalf of the people in a way that is responsive and transparent enough to inspire trust and cooperation, thereby mending the social contract between officials in Sana'a and the people they should represent.

Limited institutional capacity has inhibited Yemen's ability to craft sustainable responses to water scarcity and climate change, and both of these impending crises have the potential to adversely affect the humanitarian situation in Yemen while increasing the likelihood of civil unrest. During reconstruction, the Yemeni government and its international partners must focus resources on transparent, participatory approaches to solving water scarcity and adapting to climate change in order to ensure that peace and prosperity will be sustainable in Yemen.

Moving Forward

It is imperative that Yemen's international and regional partners revitalize negotiations to end the violence in Yemen. Once a political agreement is reached, Yemenis and their international partners should work together in a process similar to the NDC to tackle Yemen's pronounced institutional, societal, and environmental problems. In building off the successes of the NDC model, this joint effort will bolster local commitment to accountability, inclusivity, and sustainability, while creating institutions capable of providing basic services including security, education, employment, and environmental management.

Appendix

Individual Papers

30

Security Sector Reform: A Focus on National Gendarmerie

by David Anderson

Yemen's critical security needs, post conflict, will be peace maintenance and civilian protection. Additionally, the security forces will need to be part of a reestablished link between the Yemeni people and their national government. This will require a vetted and trained, professional, and accountable police force. Such a Yemen Security Force (YSF) would provide law enforcement and civilian protection support to municipal police in remote areas and help maintain civil order in urban ones. Yemen has a history of gendarmes and European partners would be ideal in helping them revitalize this type of force. By working with the judiciary and providing critical services, the YSF would enhance the rule of law, provide security, and keep the peace.

Education to employment: Addressing the drivers of instability in Yemen

by Alfredo Balderas

The United States approach with the Republic of Yemen is overly focused on the prevention of terrorism, a symptom of instability, and misses the opportunity to address the true drivers of instability that have led to a failed state. One of the main drivers of instability in Yemen is the lack of education that leads to employment and opportunity for personal improvement. In *Exploiting Grievances*, Harris Alistair states that Yemenis are mostly focused on improving governmental responsiveness, accountability, and service provisions, especially in relation to employment. He believes that addressing these concerns is the key to "inoculating communities against Al-Qaeda's violent prescriptions."

The United States must rebalance the strategic priorities towards Yemen to include a focus on education-to-employment in order to develop a stable, and reliable partner nation in the Middle East. This shift in policy should produce a reduced terrorist threat, but that should not be the end goal of engagement. Having a stable and reliable partner produces far more benefits for the United States, Yemen and our regional allies than simply defeating violent extremism.

Mind the Gap: Supporting Women's Political Participation in Yemen

by Alexandra Bro

Yemen's civil war risks reversing recent advances in political inclusion that Yemeni women have gained. Women were at the frontlines of peaceful protests during the Change Square movement and constituted a significant number of the participants in the National Dialogue Conference. Given the importance of

women's political participation for stability, the Yemeni government and international partners should: promote women's participation in peace negotiations and decision-making processes; support women's civil society efforts; and encourage the adoption of a National Action Plan for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325.

The Role of Water Scarcity in Conflict

by **Amy E. Davis**

Yemen faces severe water scarcity brought on by demand outpacing supply and structural factors leading to mismanagement. Water scarcity is a threat multiplier for violent conflict in Yemen because its mismanagement has deepened political grievances and contributed to Yemenis' perception of their deprivation. The Yemeni government should commit to meeting Yemenis' basic needs in an inclusive and accountable manner through decentralization and reform. International partners should assist the Yemeni government in building its capacity to provide basic services sustainably and fund programs and policies designed to bring water demand in line with water supply.

“Low Investments with High Returns” – Iranian Interests in Yemen

by **Teresa Eder**

The war in Yemen is often portrayed as a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran over regional power. This characterization is though deeply misleading since for both actors at this point the stakes are not equally high and underlying interests differ vastly. This paper examines the current Iranian investment in Yemen, and identifies strategic implications for the United States and Saudi Arabia which can either de-escalate or escalate the Houthi-Iranian alliance.

Behemoth to the North: The Saudi Role in Yemen

by **Ross Hollister**

Saudi Arabia is the most important external actor shaping Yemen's future. It exercises immense influence over its southern neighbor through political, economic and security channels and plays an indispensable role in determining whether Yemen will know peace or continued war. After examining the three likeliest outcomes of the current conflict in Yemen, this paper outlines how Saudi Arabia can contribute to the country's sustainable reconstruction.

Rebuilding Yemen: Civil Society for Youth Inclusion

by **Ryan Hubeny**

Managing the youth bulge in Yemen will be essential to ensuring the sustainability of reconstruction efforts in Yemen. The international community and the Yemeni government should foster youth advocacy groups and opportunities for employment. Investing in youth economic stability and political and social inclusion will promote long-term stability as Yemen moves forward.

Building Blocks to Yemeni Institutions

by Natalia Shafi

In preparation of rebuilding a sustainable Yemen, it is imperative that government structures are reformed through transparency, genuine political participation, and accountability. It is recommended that when donors intervene in the rebuilding process, that democratization is not pushed too hard. Instead, a more careful, calculated, and catered approach should be taken to ensure that the transition to a strong and sustainable state structure is achieved. Policy and program recommendations suggested in the report include (1) designing the “Yemeni Institutional Framework”, (2) building professionalism and competency of civil servants through the “Civil Service Reform Program”, and (3) driving economic development through projects at the Port of Aden.

Facing the Unknown: The Impact of Climate Change in Yemen

by Adriana Teran Doyle

Though Yemen contributes little to global greenhouse gas emissions, the country is particularly vulnerable to climate change. Limited government capacity, existing water scarcity, and a deteriorating security, economic and humanitarian situation complicate Yemen’s ability to craft effective long-term climate change programs. National and international actors should emphasize building the infrastructure needed to enable local resilience.

Creating A State: A New Social Contract for Yemen

by Lea Katharina Thurm

Saleh’s regime and the war led to the erosion of the social contract in Yemen. Rebuilding Yemen needs to involve renegotiating the social contract for sustainable peace. A new NDC should be the forum for defining the new state-people relationship. Dialogue spaces, such as town halls, should build on the Yemeni culture of dialogue to foster government-people relationships to strengthen the social contract.

Endnotes

- 1 “Crisis Watch, Trends, and Outlook,” n.d. Crisis Group International, accessed April 21, 2017, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen>.
- 2 Time Magazine. “The Siege of Sana’a.” Vol. 90, Issue 24, December 15, 1967.
- 3 “Yemen: Citizens Under Siege,” n.d. International Rescue Committee, accessed April 27, 2017, <https://www.rescue-uk.org/country/yemen>.
- 4 Ibid.
- 5 Tarek Radwan, “Winning Yemen, But at what Price?,” The Atlantic Council, April 4, 2017.
- 6 Alexander Corbeil and Amarnath Amarasingam, “The Houthi Hezbollah: Iran’s Train-and-Equip Program in Sanaa,” Foreign Affairs, March 31, 2016.
- 7 Behnam Ben Taleblu, and Amir Toumaj, “Analysis: IRGC Implicated in Arming Yemeni Houthis with Rockets.” FDD’s Long War Journal (2016).
- 8 Mareike Transfeld, “Iran’s Small Hand in Yemen.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 14, 2017. <http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/67988>.
- 9 UN Security Council, “Final Report of the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen,” United Nations Panel of Experts, January 2017.
- 10 “Gulf-backed Yemeni Forces Capture Red Sea Coast City: Agency.” February 7, 2017, Reuters, accessed April 27, 2017. <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-idUSKBN15M2FI>.
- 11 Bruce Riedel, “Saudi Arabia’s Moment of Truth in Yemen,” Al-Monitor, August 7, 2016.
- 12 Ahmad, Majidiyar, “Arab Leaders Accuse Iran of Sharing Missile Technology with Houthi Rebels in Yemen,” Middle East Institute, March 27, 2017.
- 13 UN Security Council, “Final Report,” United Nations Panel of Experts, January 2017.
- 14 Thania Paffenholz and Nick Ross, “Inclusive Political Settlements: New Insights from Yemen’s National Dialogue,” Prism: A Journal of the Center for Complex Operations 6 (1) (2016).
- 15 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Plan, January, 2017. Accessed April 14, 2017. http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2017_HRP_YEMEN.pdf.
- 16 Republic of Yemen “Intended Nationally Determined Contribution Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,” Report, 2015.
- 17 Mareike Transfeld, “The Youth Movement and Its Activists,” Policy Brief. Sana’a, Yemen: Yemen Polling Center, 2013.
- 18 Daniel Martin Varisco, Women in Yemen: A Force for Change, Insight on Conflict, May 8, 2015, accessed March 3, 2017, <https://www.insightonconflict.org/blog/2015/05/women-in-yemen-a-force-for-change/>.
- 19 Marie-Christine Heinze, Women’s Role in Peace and Security in Yemen – Literature Review, Center for Applied Research in Partnership with the Orient, December 2016, p.5, accessed March 3, 2017, <http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/1095-womenas-role-in-peace-and-security-in-yemen>.
- 20 “Women’s Participation”, n.d., National Democratic Institute (NDI), accessed March 3, 2017, <https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/Parl%20Elections%20Yemen%20part4.pdf>.
- 21 Saleem Haddad and Joshua Rogers, Public Protests and Visions for Change, Saferworld, November 2011, accessed March 3, 2017, <http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/601-public-protest-and-visions-for-change>.
- 22 Paffenholz and Ross, “Inclusive Political Settlements,” Prism 6 (1) (2016).
- 23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 Wameedh Shakir, *Women and Peacemaking in Yemen: Mapping the Realities*, Crisis Management Initiative, September 2015, p. 13, accessed March 3, 2017, http://cmi.fi/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Women_and_Peacemaking_in_Yemen_EN.pdf.

26 Rasha Jarhum, *For Lasting Peace in Yemen, Bring Women to the Table*, The London School of Economics and Political Science Middle East Center Blog, May 5, 2013, accessed March 3, 2017, <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2016/05/13/for-lasting-peace-in-yemen-bring-women-to-the-table/>.

27 Atiaf Alwazir, Nadwa Al-Dawsari, William Picard, and Mohammad Al-Shami, *What the Women Say. We will Survive: Women's Rights and Civic Activism in Yemen's Endless War*, ICAN, 2016, accessed March 22, 2017, <http://www.icanpeacework.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/What-the-Women-Say-Yemen-Winter-2016.pdf>.

28 Marie O'Reilly, *Why Women? Inclusive Security and Peaceful Societies*, Inclusive Security, October 2015, accessed April 15, 2017, <https://www.inclusivesecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Why-Women-Inclusive-Security-and-Peaceful-Societies.pdf>.

29 Erica Gaston, *Process Lessons Learned in Yemen's National Dialogue*, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, accessed March 3, 2017, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR342_Process-Lessons-Learned-in-Yemens-National-Dialogue.pdf.

30 Dana Greenfield, "Yemen: President Hadi's Gamble with the Houthis," *The Atlantic Council*, September 24, 2014.

31 Gaston, "Process Lessons Learned", 2017.

32 Ibrahim Sharqieh, *A Lasting Peace? Yemen's Long Journey to National Reconciliation*, Doha: Brookings Doha Center, 2013.

33 Inter-Agency on Women and Gender Equality, "National Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000)", n.d., accessed March 4, 2017, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ianwge/taskforces/wps/national_level_impl.html.

34 UNESCO Institute for Statistics, "Yemen," n.d., accessed April 14, 2017. <http://uis.unesco.org/en/country/YE#slideoutmenu>.

35 Ibid.

36 World Bank, *Secondary Education, Pupils (% Female)*, n.d., accessed April 14, 2017, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.SEC.ENRL.FE.ZS?locations=YE>.

37 Roman Woronowycz, "Girls in Front Row of Yemen's New Education Drive," *Frontlines*, Online Edition, September/October 2012, accessed April 20, 2017, <https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/frontlines/youth-mobile-technology/girls-front-row-yemen%E2%80%99s-new-education-drive-0>.

38 UNOCHA, *Humanitarian Response Plan*, January, 2011.

39 Emily Marshall, *Six Things to Know About Education in Yemen*, The Borgen Project, December 6, 2016, accessed March 2, 2017 <https://borgenproject.org/education-in-yemen/>.

40 UNOCHA, *Humanitarian Response Plan*, January, 2017.

41 Raj Wadhvani, *Interview with Alfredo Banderas*, February 27, 2017.

42 World Bank, *Yemen: An Integrated Approach to Social Sectors towards a Social Protection Strategy* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007).

43 Ibid.

44 Sasha Gordon, *Taiz: The Heart of Yemen's Revolution*, Critical Threats Project, January 2012, accessed April 14, 2017, <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/taiz-the-heart-of-yemens-revolution>.

45 "The World Factbook: Yemen," Central Intelligence Agency, last modified January 12, 2017, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ym.html>.

46 World Bank, *Youth Unemployment Rate for the Republic of Yemen*, last modified January 25, 2016, retrieved from FRED, <https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SLUEM1524ZSYEM>.

47 World Bank, *Factbook: Yemen*, accessed April 30, 2017, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.FE.ZS?locations=YE>.

- 48 Alistair Harris, *Exploiting Grievances: Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Middle East Program, Number 11, May 2010, p. 10, accessed April 14, 2017, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/exploiting_grievances.pdf.
- 49 Ibid.
- 50 Navtej Dhillon and Tarik Yousef, "Generation in Waiting", The Brookings Institution (2009).
- 51 Mohammad Al-Shami, "Youth and Civil Society: The Missing Powers in Yemen," (Washington, DC: Wilson Center: Middle East Program, August 10, 2015): p.1, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/youth-and-civil-society-the-missing-powers-yemen>.
- 52 World Bank, *Yemen Civil Society Organizations in Transition: A Mapping and Capacity Assessment of Development-Oriented Civil Society Organizations in Five Governorates*, June 2013, accessed March 3, 2017, <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/248881468171555118/pdf/810950WP0ENGLI0Box0379828B00PUBLIC0.pdf>.
- 53 Ibid.
- 54 Brittany Gleixner-Hayat and Bilal Al-Ayoubi, *Yemen Country Study: A Sociopolitical Analysis of Current Conditions in Yemen*, USAID/Office of Transition Initiatives, January 13, 2017, p.19-20, accessed April 15, 2017 http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00MMRW.pdf.
- 55 World Bank, *Yemen Civil Society Organizations in Transition*, (June 2013).
- 56 Hafsa Halawa, "Egypt and the Middle East: Adapting to Tragedy," *Global Civic Activism in Flux*, edited by Richard Youngs, 13-18 (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017).
- 57 UNDP, *United Nations Development Programme Project Document for the Government of the Republic of Yemen*, (May, 2014), accessed March 3, 2017, http://www.ye.undp.org/content/yemen/en/home/operations/projects/crisis_prevention_and_recovery/capacity-development-for-national-ngos-.html.
- 58 Mary Hope Schwoebel, *Women in Yemen's Protests*, (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, April 4, 2011), accessed March 3, 2017, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2011/04/women-yemens-protests>.
- 59 United Nations, *Women & Elections: Guide to Promoting the Participation of Women in Elections*, (March 2005), accessed March 23, 2017, <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/wps/publication/WomenAndElections.pdf>.
- 60 "Corruptions Perceptions Index 2016," Transparency International, accessed April 28, 2017, http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016.
- 61 Abdulmoez Dbwan, *Fighting the Culture of Corruption in Yemen*, *Voices and Views: Middle East and North Africa*, December 4, 2014, accessed April 27, 2017, <http://blogs.worldbank.org/arabvoices/fighting-culture-corruption-yemen>.
- 62 Laila Al-Zwaini, *The Rule of Law in Yemen: Prospects and Challenges*, The Hague: The Hague Institute for the Internationalisation of Law, HiIL, 2012.
- 63 Lisa Wedeen, *Peripheral Visions: Publics, Power, and Performance in Yemen* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2008), p.120.
- 64 Ibid.
- 65 Fotini Christia, Leon Yao, Stephen Wittels, and Jure Leskovec, "Yemen Calling," *Foreign Affairs* (April 25, 2017), accessed April 25, 2017, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/yemen/2015-07-06/yemen-calling>.
- 66 World Bank, *Reforming Public Service in India: Drawing Lessons from Success* (New Delhi; Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2006).
- 67 Christia et. al, "Yemen Calling".
- 68 Barbara K. Bodine and Danya, Greenfield, "A Blueprint for a Comprehensive US Counterterrorism Strategy in Yemen," *The Atlantic Council*, October 2014.
- 69 UNDP and UNCDF, *Yemen: Decentralization and Local Development Support Programme*, June 2008.
- 70 Emma Brown, "'We Don't Know What We Are Going to Do': Yemeni Students, Unable to Return Home, Face Uncertain

- Status in America,” *The Washington Post*, February 15, 2017, accessed March 5, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/we-dont-know-what-we-are-going-to-do-yemeni-students-unable-to-return-home-face-uncertain-status-in-america/2017/02/14/496927d8-f204-11e6-8d72-263470bf0401_story.html?utm_term=.3ec184b12cb6&wpisrc=nl_buzz&wpm=1.
- 71 Yezid Sayigh, “Crumbling States: Security Sector Reform in Libya and Yemen,” *Carnegie Middle East Center, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, June 2015. http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Paper_Yezid-Sayigh_crumbling_states.pdf.
- 72 Jeremy Sharp, “Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention,” *Congressional Research Service*, November 16, 2016. <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=796880>.
- 73 Tor Tanke Holm and Espen Barth Eide, *Peacebuilding and Police Reform Vol. 7*. (London: Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2000).
- 74 “Yemen’s Al-Qaeda: Expanding the Base,” n.d., *International Crisis Group*, accessed April 27, 2017, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/174-yemen-s-al-qaeda-expanding-base>.
- 75 Dimitris Soudias and Mareike Transfeld, “Mapping Popular Perceptions: Local Security, Insecurity, and Police Work in Yemen,” *Sana’a, Yemen: Yemen Polling Center*, July 2014.
- 76 *Ibid.*
- 77 James Dobbins, *The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Security Research Division, 2007.
- 78 Robert M. Perito, *Afghanistan’s Civil Order Police: Victim of Its Own Success*, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, May 2012, accessed April 27, 2017, <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR307.pdf>.
- 79 Al-Zwaini, *The Rule of Law in Yemen*, 2012.
- 80 Erica Gaston and Nadwa Al-Dawsari, “Justice in Transition in Yemen: A Mapping of Local Justice Functioning in Ten Governorates,” *United States Institute of Peace Peaceworks* 99 (2014). <http://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo58018>.
- 81 Nadwa Al-Dawsari and Danya Greenfield, “The Role of the Tribal System in Developing a Democratic, Civil State in Yemen,” in *Reconstructing the Middle East: Political and Economic Policy*, Eds. Abdulwahab Alkebsi et al. (UK: Routledge, 2017).
- 82 *Ibid.*
- 83 *Small Arms Survey: Yemen Armed Violence Assessment Project, Under Pressure: Social Violence over Land and Water in Yemen*, 2010. <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/G-Issue-briefs/SAS-Yemen-AVA-IB2-ENG.pdf>
- 84 Taha M. Taher, Bryan Bruns, Omar Bamaga, Adel Al-Weshali, Frank van Steenberg, “Local Groundwater Governance in Yemen: Building on Traditions and Enabling Communities to Craft New Rules,” *Hydrogeology Journal*, 20 (1) (2012).
- 85 National Water Resources Authority (NWRA), *Groundwater Management and Agricultural Development*, Sana’a: Ministry of Water and Environment, 2009.
- 86 Christopher Ward, Satoru Ueda, and Alexander McPhail, *Yemen: CDR Building Block - Water Resources Management in Yemen*, (Washington, DC: World Bank 2000).
- 87 Republic of Yemen, “Second National Communication Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,” Report, 2013.
- 88 Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases,” *International Security*, 19 (1) (1994).
- 89 Taher et al., “Local Groundwater Governance in Yemen,” (2012).
- 90 “Yemen, Rep.” *World Bank Open Data*, accessed March 1, 2017, <http://data.worldbank.org/country/yemen-rep?view=chart>.
- 91 National Water Resources Authority (NWRA), *Groundwater Management*, 2009.
- 92 Frank Van Steenberg, Assefa Kumsa, and Nasser Al-Awlaki, “Understanding Political Will in Groundwater Management: Comparing Yemen and Ethiopia,” *Water Alternatives*, 8 (1) (2015).
- 93 *Ibid.*
- 94 Peter Gatter, Mustapha Rouis, and Steven Tabor *Toward Qat Demand Reduction*, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007.

- 95 Dasgupta, Benoit Laplante, Siobhan Murray, and David Wheeler, Climate Change and the Future Impacts of Storm-Surge Disasters in Developing Countries, Center for Global Development Working Paper, 2009.
- 96 Clemens Bresinger, Oliver Ecker, Rainer Thiele, and Manfred Wiebel, The Impact of the 2008 Hadramout Flash Flood in Yemen on Economic Performance and Nutrition: A Simulation Analysis, Kiel Institute for the World Economy Working Paper, 2012.
- 97 World Bank, Yemen: Assessing the Impacts of Climate Change and Variability on the Water and Agricultural Sectors and the Policy Implications, April 2010, accessed April 21, 2017, <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/979121468153566240/pdf/541960ESW0Gray1OFFICIAL0USE0ONLY191.pdf>.
- 98 World Health Organization, "Chapter 6: Climate and Infectious Diseases," (Presentation), <http://www.who.int/globalchange/environment/en/chapter6.pdf>.
- 99 World Bank, Climate Resilient Integrated Coastal Zone Management, (Project Information Document, 2009).
- 100 Climate Investment Funds, "Strategic Program for Climate Resilience for Yemen," Proposal, (2012)
- 101 Republic of Yemen, "Second National Communication," 43.
- 102 Ibid.
- 103 Ibid.
- 104 Ibid.
- 105 Ibid.
- 106 Ibid.
- 107 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Plan, January, 2017.
- 108 Republic of Yemen, "Intended Nationally Determined Contribution," Report, 2015.
- 109 "Yemen," ForeignAssistance.gov, accessed March 3, 2017, <http://beta.foreignassistance.gov/explore/country/Yemen>.
- 110 Kenneth Pollack, "Security and Public Order," The Atlantic Council, (Working Group Report, February, 2016).

Bibliography

Ahram, Ariel, and Frederic Wehrey. "Taming the Militias: Building National Guards in Fractured Arab States - CIAO." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 2015.

Albrecht, Holger. "The Security Sector in Yemen: No State, No Problem?" Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, March 27, 2013. Accessed April 21, 2017. <https://www.usip.org/publications/2013/03/security-sector-yemen>.

Al-Dawsari, Nadwa and Danya Greenfield. "The Role of the Tribal System in Developing a Democratic, Civil State in Yemen." In *Reconstructing the Middle East: Political and Economic Policy*, edited by Abdulwahab Alkebsi, Nathan J. Brown and Charlotta Sparre, 129-146. UK: Routledge, 2017.

Ali, Walid. *Governance of Climate Change in Yemen*. United Nations Development Programme Report, 2012.

Al-Shami, Mohammad. "Youth and Civil Society: The Missing Powers in Yemen." Washington, DC: Wilson Center: Middle East Program, August 10, 2015. Accessed April 27, 2017. <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/youth-and-civil-society-the-missing-powers-yemen>.

Al-Shami, Mohammad. "Safety and Security in Yemen: Main Challenges and Stakeholders." Viewpoints. Washington, DC: Wilson Center: Middle East Program, November 2015.

Alwazir, Atiaf, Nadwa Al-Dawsari, William Picard, and Mohammad Al-Shami. *What the Women Say. We will Survive: Women's Rights and Civic Activism in Yemen's Endless War*. ICAN, 2016. Accessed March 22, 2017. <http://www.icanpeacework.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/What-the-Women-Say-Yemen-Winter-2016.pdf>.

Al-Yemeni, Ahmed A. Hezam. "The Dynamic of Democratization – Political Parties in Yemen". February 2003. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Germany. Accessed March 25, 2017. <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.578.2795&rep=rep1&type=pdf>.

Al-Zwaini, Laila. *The Rule of Law in Yemen: Prospects and Challenges*. The Hague: The Hague Institute for the Internationalization of Law, 2012.

Ben Taleblu, Behnam, and Amir Toumaj. "Analysis: IRGC Implicated in Arming Yemeni Houthis with Rockets." FDD's Long War Journal (2016).

Blanchard, Christopher M. "Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations." Congressional Research Service, September 20, 2016.

Bodine, Barbara, and Danya Greenfield. "A Blueprint for a Comprehensive US Counterterrorism Strategy in Yemen." The Atlantic Council, October 2014.

Brown, Emma. "‘We Don't Know What We Are Going to Do’: Yemeni Students, Unable to Return Home, Face Uncertain Status in America." The Washington Post, February 15, 2017. Accessed March 5, 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/we-dont-know-what-we-are-going-to-do-yemeni-students-unable-to-return-home-face-uncertain-status-in-america/2017/02/14/496927d8-f204-11e6-8d72-263470bf0401_story.html?utm_term=.650541a31406&wpisrc=nl_buzz&wpmmm=1.

- Bresinger, Clemens, Oliver Ecker, Rainer Thiele, and Manfred Wiebelt. *The Impact of the 2008 Hadramout Flash Flood in Yemen on Economic Performance and Nutrition: A Simulation Analysis*. Kiel Institute for the World Economy Working Paper, 2012.
- Carapico, Sheila. "Dialectics of Fashion: Gender and Politics in Yemen." In *Women and Power in the Middle East*, edited by Joseph Suad and Susan Slyomovics, 183-190. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001.
- Caton, Steven. *Yemen Chronicle: An Anthropology of War and Mediation*. New York, NY: Hill & Wang, 2005.
- Central Intelligence Agency. "The World Factbook: Yemen." Last modified January 12, 2017. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ym.html>.
- Chatham House. "The Role of Youth Activists in Yemen's Transition Process." Workshop Summary, Chatham House, London, 2012.
- Climate Investment Funds. "Strategic Program for Climate Resilience for Yemen." Proposal, 2012.
- Corbeil, Alexander and Amarnath Amarasingam. "The Houthi Hezbollah: Iran's Train-and-Equip Program in Sana'a." *Foreign Affairs*, March 31, 2016.
- "Corruption Perceptions Index 2016." Transparency International. http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016.
- Christia, Fotini, Leon Yao, Stephen Wittels, and Jure Leskovec. "Yemen Calling." *Foreign Affairs*, April 25, 2017. Accessed April 25, 2017. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/yemen/2015-07-06/yemen-calling>.
- Dahlgren, Susanne. "Revisiting the Issue of Women's Rights in Southern Yemen." *International Journal of Archaeology and Social Sciences in the Arabian Peninsula* (2013). Accessed March 3, 2017. <https://cy.revues.org/2039#tocto1n1>.
- Dasgupta, Susmita, Benoit Laplante, Siobhan Murray, and David Wheeler. *Climate Change and the Future Impacts of Storm-Surge Disasters in Developing Countries*. Center for Global Development Working Paper, 2009.
- Day, Stephen W. *Regionalism and Rebellion in Yemen: A Troubled National Union*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- Dbwan, Abdulmoez. *Fighting the Culture of Corruption in Yemen*. *Voices and Views: Middle East and North Africa*, December 4, 2014. Accessed April 27, 2017. <http://blogs.worldbank.org/arabvoices/fighting-culture-corruption-yemen>.
- Dhillon, Navtei and Tarik Yousef. *Generation in Waiting*. The Brookings Institute (2009).
- Dobbins, James. *The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Security Research Division, 2007.
- Durac, Vincent. "The Joint Meeting Parties and the Politics of Opposition in Yemen". *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*. December 2011. Accessed March 17, 2017.
- Gaston, Erica. *Process Lessons Learned in Yemen's National Dialogue*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2014. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR342_Process-Lessons-Learned-in-Yemens-National-Dialogue.pdf.
- Gaston, Erica and Nadwa Al-Dawsari. "Justice in Transition in Yemen: A Mapping of Local Justice Functioning in Ten Governorates." *United States Institute of Peace Peaceworks* 99 (2014): 1-84. https://permanent.access.gpo.gov/gpo58018/PW99_Justice-in-Transition-in-Yemen.pdf.

- Gatter, Peter, Mustapha Rouis, and Steven Tabor. *Toward Qat Demand Reduction*. World Bank: Washington, DC, 2007.
- Gleixner-Hayat, Brittany, and Bilal Al-Ayoubi. *Yemen Country Study: A Sociopolitical Analysis of Current Conditions in Yemen*. USAID/Office of Transition Initiatives, January 13, 2017. Accessed April 15, 2017. http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00MMRW.pdf
- Gordon, Sasha. *Taiz: The Heart of Yemen's Revolution*. Critical Threats Project, January 2012. Accessed April 14, 2017. <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/taiz-the-heart-of-yemens-revolution>.
- Greenfield, Dana. "Yemen: President Hadi's Gamble with the Houthis." *The Atlantic Council*, September 24, 2014.
- Haddad, Saleem, and Joshua Rogers. *Public Protests and Visions for Change*. Saferworld, November 2011. Accessed March 3, 2017. <http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/601-public-protest-and-visions-for-change>.
- Halawa, Hafsa. "Egypt and the Middle East: Adapting to Tragedy." In *Global Civic Activism in Flux*, edited by Richard Youngs, 13-18. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017.
- Harris, Alistar. *Exploiting Grievances: Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Middle East Program, Number 11, May 2010. Accessed April 14, 2017. http://carnegieendowment.org/files/exploiting_grievances.pdf.
- Heinze, Marie-Christine. *Women's Role in Peace and Security in Yemen - Literature Review*, Center for Applied Research in Partnership with the Orient, Saferworld, December 2016. Accessed April 14, 2017. <http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/1095-womenas-role-in-peace-and-security-in-yemen>.
- Hill, Ginny, and Gerd Nonneman. "Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States: Elite Politics, Street Diplomacy, and Regional Diplomacy." *Chatham House, The Royal Institute of International Affairs*, May 2011.
- Homer-Dixon, Thomas F. "Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases." *International Security*, 19 (1) (1994): 5-40.
- Holm, Tor Tanke, and Espen Barth Eide. *Peacebuilding and Police Reform Vol. 7*. London; Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2000.
- Human Rights Watch "Yemen: Transition Needs Accountability, Security Reform." Last modified April 6, 2012. Accessed April 21, 2017. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/04/06/yemen-transition-needs-accountability-security-reform>.
- Inter-Agency on Women and Gender Equality, "National Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000)." N.d.. Accessed March 4, 2017. http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ianwge/taskforces/wps/national_level_impl.html.
- International Crisis Group. "Crisis Watch, Trends, and Outlook." N.d. Accessed April 21, 2017. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen>.
- International Crisis Group. "Yemen's al-Qaeda: Expanding the Base." N.d. Accessed April 27, 2017. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/174-yemen-s-al-qaeda-expanding-base>.

- International Crisis Group. "The Huthis: From Saada to Sana'a." Middle East Report No. 154, (June 2014). <https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/the-huthis-from-saada-to-sana'a.pdf>.
- International Rescue Committee. "Yemen: Citizens Under Siege." N.d. Accessed April 27, 2017. <https://www.rescue-uk.org/country/yemen>.
- Jarhum, Rasha. For Lasting Peace in Yemen, Bring Women to the Table. London School of Economics Middle East Center Blog, May 5, 2013. Accessed March 3, 2017. <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2016/05/13/for-lasting-peace-in-yemen-bring-women-to-the-table/>.
- Juneau, Thomas. "Iran's Policy towards the Houthis in Yemen: A Limited Return on a Modest Investment." *International Affairs* 92 (3) (2016): 647-663.
- Lichtenthaler, Gerhard. "Water Conflict and Cooperation in Yemen." *Middle East Report*, 254 (1) (2010): 30-35.
- Majdyar, Ahmad. "Arab Leaders Accuse Iran of Sharing Missile Technology with Houthi Rebels in Yemen." Middle East Institute, March 27, 2017.
- Marshall, Emily. Six Things to Know About Education in Yemen. The Borgen Project, December 6, 2016. Accessed March 2, 2017. <https://borgenproject.org/education-in-yemen/>.
- McKenzie, David, Nabila Assaf, and Ana Paula Cusolito. "The Demand for, and Impact of, Youth Internships: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Yemen." *IZA Journal of Labor and Development* 5 (1) (2016): 1-15.
- Middle East Institute. "The Yemen Conflict in Perspective: Geopolitical and Humanitarian Challenges." March 31, 2017.
- Muqbil, Kamal, Anwar Al-Taj, and Kamal Haidara. Evaluating Parliament Performance Reporting Period: November 2011 - January 2013. Sana'a, Yemen: Yemen Polling Center, 2014. Web. 1 Mar. 2017. [http://www.yemenpolling.org/Projects-en/English-Evaluating_Parliament_Performance_\(November%202011-January%202013\).pdf](http://www.yemenpolling.org/Projects-en/English-Evaluating_Parliament_Performance_(November%202011-January%202013).pdf).
- National Water Resources Authority (NWRA). Groundwater Management and Agricultural Development. Sana'a, Yemen: Ministry of Water and Environment, 2009.
- "New CIVIC Report: Stability in Yemen Rests on Civilian Protection." Center for Civilians in Conflict, January 10, 2017. Accessed February 13, 2017. <http://civiliansinconflict.org/resources/pr/new-civic-report-stability-in-yemen-rests-on-civilian-protection>.
- O'Reilly, Marie. Why Women? Inclusive Security and Peaceful Societies. Inclusive Security, October 2015. Accessed April 15, 2017. <https://www.inclusivesecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Why-Women-Inclusive-Security-and-Peaceful-Societies.pdf>.
- Ottaway, Marina and Julia Choucair-Vizoso. Beyond the Façade. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008.
- Perla, Charles. "Saudi Aid to Yemen: Stability Over Development?" AidData, May 8, 2015.
- Perito, Robert M. Afghanistan's Civil Order Police: Victim of Its Own Success. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, May 2012. Accessed April 27, 2017. <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR307.pdf>.
- Paffenholz, Thania, and Nick Ross. "Inclusive Political Settlements: New Insights from Yemen's National Dialogue." *PRISM*, 6 (1) (March 2016): 199-210. Accessed March 3, 2017. <https://www.inclusivesecurity.org/publication/inclusive-political-settlements-new-insights-from-yemens-national-dialogue/>.
- Phillips, Sarah. Yemen and the Politics of Permanent Crisis. London: Routledge, 2011.
- Pollack, Kenneth. "Security and Public Order." The Atlantic Council (Working Group Report, February 2016).

- Quincy, Erin. "Civil Society the Key to Yemen's Future." *The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs* (August 2015): 49-50.
- Radwan, Tarek. "Winning Yemen, But at what Price?" *The Atlantic Council*, April 4, 2017.
- Reuters. "Gulf-backed Yemeni Forces Capture Red Sea Coast City: Agency." February 7, 2017. Accessed April 27, 2017. <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-idUSKBN15M2FI>.
- Republic of Yemen. "Second National Communication Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change." Report, 2013.
- Republic of Yemen. "Intended Nationally Determined Contribution Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change." Report, 2015.
- Riedel, Bruce. "Will There Be Peace in Yemen?" *Al-Monitor*, March 10, 2016.
- Riedel, Bruce. "Saudi Arabia's Moment of Truth in Yemen." *Al-Monitor*, August 7, 2016.
- Rocha Menocal, Alina. *Inclusive Political Settlements: Evidence, Gaps, and Challenges of Institutional Transformation*. Birmingham, UK: International Development Department, 2015. http://publications.dlprog.org/ARM_PoliticalSettlements.pdf.
- Salisbury, Peter. "Yemen and the Saudi-Iranian 'Cold War'." *Chatham House, The Royal Institute of International Affairs* (2015): 1-14. Accessed April 21, 2017. <https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/yemen-and-saudi-iranian-cold-war>.
- Salisbury, Peter. "Yemen: Stemming the Rise of a Chaos State." *Chatham House, The Royal Institute of International Affairs* (2016): 1-45. Accessed April 20, 2017. <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/chathamhouse/publications/research/2016-05-25-yemen-stemming-rise-of-chaos-state-salisbury.pdf>.
- Sayigh, Yezid. "Crumbling States: Security Sector Reform in Libya and Yemen." *Carnegie Middle East Center, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, June 2015. http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Paper_Yezid-Sayigh_crumbling_states.pdf.
- Schwoebel, Mary Hope. *Women in Yemen's Protests*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, April 4, 2011. Accessed March 3, 2017. <https://www.usip.org/publications/2011/04/women-yemens-protests>.
- Shakir, Wameedh. *Women and Peacemaking in Yemen: Mapping the Realities*. Crisis Management Initiative. September 2015. Accessed March 3, 2017. http://cmi.fi/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Women_and_Peacemaking_in_Yemen_EN.pdf.
- Sharp, Jeremy. "Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention." *Congressional Research Service*, November 16, 2016. <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=796880>.
- Sharqie, Ibrahim. *A Lasting Peace? Yemen's Long Journey to National Reconciliation*. Qatar: Brookings Doha Center. February 2013. Accessed April 20, 2017. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/BDC_Yemen-National-Reconciliation_Sharqieh.pdf.
- Small Arms Survey: Yemen Armed Violence Assessment Project. *Under Pressure: Social Violence over Land and Water in Yemen*, (2010): 1-12. <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/G-Issue-briefs/SAS-Yemen-AVA-IB2-ENG.pdf>.
- Soudias, Dimitris, and Mareike Transfeld. "Mapping Popular Perceptions: Local Security, Insecurity, and Police Work in Yemen." *Sana'a, Yemen: Yemen Polling Center*, July 2014.
- Taher, Taha M., Bryan Bruns, Omar Bamaga, Adel Al-Weshali, Frank van Steenbergen. "Local Groundwater

- Governance in Yemen: Building on Traditions and Enabling Communities to Craft New Rules.” *Hydrogeology Journal*, 20 (1) (2012): 1177-1188.
- Terrill, Andrew. W. “Iranian Involvement in Yemen.” *Orbis* 58 (3) (2014): 429-440.
- “The Siege of San’a.” *Time Magazine*, Vol. 90, Issue 24, December 15, 1967.
- Transfeld, Mareike. “The Youth Movement and Its Activists.” Policy Brief. Sana’a, Yemen: Yemen Polling Center, 2013.
- Transfeld, Mareike. “Iran’s Small Hand in Yemen.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 14, 2017. Accessed April 21, 2017. <http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/67988>.
- United Nations Development Program and United Nations Capital Development Fund Local Development Programme. Yemen: Decentralization and Local Development Support Programme. June 2008.
- United Nations Development Program. Governance for Peace: Securing the Social Contract. January 2012. Accessed April 21, 2017. http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/crisis-prevention-and-recovery/governance_for_peacesecuringthesocialcontract.html.
- United Nations Development Program. United Nations Development Programme Project Document for the Government of the Republic of Yemen. May 2014. Accessed March 3, 2017. http://www.ye.undp.org/content/yemen/en/home/operations/projects/crisis_prevention_and_recovery/capacity-development-for-national-ngos-.html.
- UNESCO Institute for Statistics. “Yemen.” N.d. Accessed April 14, 2017. <http://uis.unesco.org/en/country/YE#slideoutmenu>.
- UNESCO World TVET Database. “Yemen.” Last modified April 2017. Accessed April 25, 2017. <http://www.unevoc.unesco.org/go.php?q=World+TVET+Database&lang=en&ct=YEM>.
- United Nations. Women & Elections: Guide to Promoting the Participation of Women in Elections. March 2005. Accessed March 23, 2017. <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/wps/publication/WomenAndElections.pdf>.
- United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Crisis Overview 2016. Accessed April 21, 2017. <http://www.unocha.org/yemen/crisis-overview>.
- United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 2017 Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan. January 2017. Accessed April 14, 2017. http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2017_HRP_YEMEN.pdf.
- United Nations Security Council. “Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2140 (2014).” United Nations Panel of Experts, January 2017.
- Van Steenberg, Frank, Assefa Kumsa, and Nasser Al-Awlaki. “Understanding Political Will in Groundwater Management: Comparing Yemen and Ethiopia.” *Water Alternatives*, 8 (1) (2015): 774-799.
- Varisco, Daniel Martin. Women in Yemen: A Force for Change. *Insight on Conflict*. May 8, 2015. Accessed March 3, 2017. <https://www.insightonconflict.org/blog/2015/05/women-in-yemen-a-force-for-change/>.
- Wadhvani, Raj. Interview with Alfredo Banderas. February 27, 2017.
- Ward, Christopher, Satoru Ueda, and Alexander McPhail. Yemen: CDR Building Block - Water Resources Management in Yemen. World Bank: Washington, DC: 2000. Wedeen, Lisa. *Peripheral Visions: Publics, Power, and Performance in Yemen*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008.

- Weiss, Matthew I. "A Perfect Storm: The Causes and Consequences of Severe Water Scarcity, Institutional Breakdown, and Conflict in Yemen." *Water International*, 40 (2) (2015): 251-272.
- Wiebelt, Manfred, Clemens Breisinger, Olivier Ecker, Perrihan Al-Riffai, Richard Robertson, and Rainer Thiele. "Climate Change and Floods in Yemen: Impacts on Food Security and Options for Adaptation." International Food Policy Research Institute Discussion Paper, 2011.
- "Women's Participation." N.d., National Democratic Institute (NDI). Accessed March 3, 2017. <https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/Parl%20Elections%20Yemen%20part4.pdf>.
- World Bank. Secondary Education, Pupils (% Female). N.d. Accessed April 14, 2017. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.SEC.ENRL.FE.ZS?locations=YE>.
- World Bank. *Reforming Public Services in India: Drawing Lessons from Success*. New Delhi; Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2006.
- World Bank. Yemen: An Integrated Approach to Social Sectors towards a Social Protection Strategy. World Bank: Washington, DC: 2007. World Bank. *Climate Resilient Integrated Coastal Zone Management*. Project Information Document, 2009.
- World Bank. *Yemen: Assessing the Impacts of Climate Change and Variability on the Water and Agricultural Sectors and the Policy Implications*. April 2010. Accessed April 21, 2017. <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/979121468153566240/pdf/541960ESW0Gray1OFFICIAL0USE0ONLY191.pdf>.
- World Bank. *Yemen Civil Society Organizations in Transition: A Mapping and Capacity Assessment of Development-Oriented Civil Society Organizations in Five Governorates*. June 2013. Accessed March 3, 2017. <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/248881468171555118/pdf/810950WP0ENGLI0Box0379828B00PUBLIC0.pdf>.
- World Bank. *Youth Unemployment Rate for the Republic of Yemen*. Last modified January 25, 2016. Retrieved from FRED. <https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SLUEM1524ZSYEM>.
- World Health Organization, "Chapter 6: Climate and Infectious Diseases." (Presentation). <http://www.who.int/globalchange/environment/en/chapter6.pdf>.
- Woronowycz, Roman. "Girls in Front Row of Yemen's New Education Drive." *Frontlines*. Online Edition. September/October 2012. Accessed April 20, 2017. <https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/frontlines/youth-mobile-technology/girls-front-row-yemen%E2%80%99s-new-education-drive-0>.
- "Yemen." *Foreign Assistance.gov*. Accessed March 3, 2017. <http://beta.foreignassistance.gov/explore/country/Yemen>.
- "Yemen, Rep." *World Bank Open Data*. Accessed March 1, 2017. <http://data.worldbank.org/country/yemen-rep?view=chart>.
- Yuki, Takako and Yuriko Kameyama. *Improving The Quality Of Basic Education For The Future Youth Of Yemen Post Arab Spring*. The Brookings Institution and the Japan International Cooperation Institution Working Paper 59, 2013.
- Zovighian, Diane. "Public Employment Programs in the Republic of Yemen." In *Building Effective Employment Programs for Unemployed Youth in the Middle East and North Africa*, edited by Angel-Urdinola, Diego F., Arvo Kuddo, and Amina Semlali, 151-162. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2013.

