In the spring of 2024, the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy (ISD) convened a New Global Commons working group over two meetings titled “Mission Critical: Securing America’s Critical Minerals.” Working group participants represented academia, think tanks, government, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector, bringing a broad range of experience and global perspectives to the discussions. Participants discussed definitions of critical minerals and the need for a successful green energy transition to support digital technology and fulfill 21st-century defense needs. Participants weighed the complexity of overlapping issues and how the United States and its partners might best effectively coordinate and balance these issues.
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Executive Summary
The United States and its allies and partners face a two-pronged crisis. Increases in global
temperatures call for the rapid expansion of critical mineral infrastructure—to include
mines and refinement—if we hope to deploy the technology needed to avoid the worst
effects of climate change. Meanwhile, the United States’ primary geopolitical adversary
has obtained a near-monopoly position in the supply of most of these minerals. Heavy use
of certain minerals in our defense-industrial base further underscores the need to reduce
reliance on People’s Republic of China (PRC) supplies. Both our climate and our national
security demand concerted efforts to wean us away from fossil fuels and the PRC’s market
power.
The green energy transition and technological advancement are projected to drive a dramatic increase in critical mineral demand. Under our current trajectory, demand will double by 2030 and more than triple by 2040, with several minerals expected to see ten-fold increases. Artificial intelligence and its advanced components account for some of this trend—but clean energy adoption continues to be its main driver. These create unprecedented pressure on global supply chains and highlight the urgent need for expanded production capacity.
Despite some measures taken so far by the United States and its partners, the PRC dominates the market, from rare earth elements to cobalt and graphite. China now also uses its mineral dominance as an economic weapon and, at times, implements stringent export controls on certain minerals and restricts the export of refinement technologies. The threat extends further to the military domain, where the United States is reliant on China for almost all of the 400 kilograms of refined rare earth elements needed for each F-35 fighter jet—and countless more weapons of strategic significance. At present, even if the United States mined all of its own raw materials, it would still be dependent on the PRC to transform its resources into usable ingredients.
China’s first-mover advantage is considerable, but the United States, with its allies and
partners, can meet this challenge. If the United States can establish the requisite economic
relationships, both with long-time partners and with awkward friends, it can supplement
its own considerable reserves and satisfy the oncoming demand from consumers, the energy grid, and its military.
Despite progress across administrations, Washington has yet to give the issue the attention it deserves, especially in regard to international partnerships. U.S. firms and diplomats have expanded cooperation beyond traditional partners, as seen in former President Biden’s Lobito Corridor initiative, which leverages African mineral resources, but many more such partnerships will be needed. President Trump is also heavily focused on critical minerals, invoking emergency powers to increase supply and exempting most critical minerals from his sweeping tariff policies. His rhetoric internationally, however, including his threats to annex Greenland, risks the alienation of allies and partners when we need them most.
In Spring 2024, the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy (ISD) convened a working group to analyze the state of play and provide long-term policy recommendations to the United States, partner nations, and the private and non-profit sectors, with participants from all relevant sectors.
Policy recommendations included:
- Refine and centralize a critical minerals methodology. The U.S. government, together with close partner nations, should pool intelligence and modeling capabilities to develop a definitive set of priorities and vulnerabilities. This could include the Five Eyes (Canada, the UK, New Zealand, Australia), Europe, Japan, and South Korea, at a minimum.
- Align national policies with key allies. In the face of the PRC’s vast lead, it is crucial that the United States and its partners coordinate closely. This should include, at least, long-term alignment on permitting goals, and the coordination of government funds for private sector projects.
- Invigorate stockpiling. U.S. capacity for modeling critical minerals security is severely under-resourced. Congress must appropriately fund the Defense Logistics Agency’s mandate to monitor and prioritize U.S. mineral supplies, especially for defense purposes. This should be done in concert with trusted allies.
- When it comes to economic diplomacy, “show up.” Showing up—the basic component of successful diplomacy through a consistent presence and engagement, rather than episodic photo ops and summits—is vital in the mission to secure long-term and durable economic relationships. It needs to be remembered when approaching raw material-producing nations, especially in Africa, where the PRC deploys considerably more diplomatic and trade presence and continues to make strong enticements. President Trump’s heavy focus on critical minerals thus far in his second term is appropriate, though his tactics risk undercutting vital U.S. relationships.
- Make mining trusted again by going all in on ESG standards. Understandably, modern societies, both developed and developing, are not pro-mining. Environmental degradation and labor exploitation hit both—and the latter far worse. Only through the development of a comprehensive, transparent, and enforceable set of standards can governments and the private sector hope to secure the support of populations that are wary of mass-scale industrial processes close to their communities.
- Address the minerals skills shortage. Most developed countries have a significant deficit of qualified workers in the mining and processing industries. China does not. It is vital to rapidly institute proper funding for relevant education now, grounded in partnerships between the private sector and universities.
Without wide-ranging and internationally coordinated measures, the United States and its partners will not catch up to the PRC and will risk the short window of opportunity that remains to avoid the worst effects of climate change. Without support from populations, too, the massive expansion of heavy industries will be doomed by decades of political infighting and legal battles over land usage. By contrast, the mass adoption of clean technology and the proliferation of artificial intelligence can provide this century with unprecedented prosperity. The resources exist—if we can overcome, not bulldoze through, the political constraints.