In the spring of 2025, the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy (ISD) convened the Schlesinger Series in Strategic Surprises and New Global Commons working group titled “Aftershocks from Gaza.” Over two meetings, participants examined the cascading regional and global effects of the October 7 Hamas attacks and Israel’s subsequent war in Gaza.
The participants analyzed the conflict in concentric circles — from its epicenter in Gaza, Israel, Lebanon, and Syria, to its reverberations across the Middle East and into global politics. Given the rapid flow of events, Part II of Aftershocks leverages the working group’s analysis to assess the prospects and pitfalls of the 20-Point Plan for peace in Gaza, and what they portend for the future of US policy and regional stability.
Click here to read part two of the report.
Summary Brief
Two years of devastating war in Gaza — sparked by Hamas’ horrific terrorist attack against Israel — accelerated existing regional faultlines and have, for the moment, reached an uneasy middle ground between peace and war. President Trump’s willingness to take a tougher stance toward the Israeli government and his administration’s 20-Point Plan have demonstrated that the United States is still capable, and now, at least in the short term, willing to use its political capital in the region. This newfound American political will must be sustained for recent gains to solidify.
Israel has become militarily dominant in the region, and acts with seemingly unfettered impunity. Israel’s attack on Qatar and the ensuing backlash from the United States underscored that the Netanyahu government can also overstep, though. Iran is arguably in its weakest regional position since the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s. Meanwhile, the Gulf states, have demonstrated their political, economic, and diplomatic heft as middle powers. We are in a precarious moment, suspended between a longer-term ceasefire and a renewed push for peace, or renewed chaos and war.
Ultimately, a viable regional strategy must start at the epicenter — the Palestinians. US policy should prioritize tangible improvements in Palestinian governance, self-determination, personal security, and economic opportunity, laying the groundwork for broader Arab-Israeli normalization.
Another lesson from the Gaza War is, at the end of the day, that the United States cannot escape its interests and role in the region. Presidents before Trump have sought to pivot away. It rarely works. US engagement need not and should not always default to military engagement. It does require sustained political engagement.
The Gaza War and its aftershocks demonstrated that the absence of US regional leadership and responsibility is not an option. There are too many spoilers that can set off cascades of events that spin out of control. These cannot long be ignored, or left to burn out on their own. The United States has partners and friends, but as former Secretary of State George Shultz said, the garden needs to be tended.
The United States has major national security interests in the region, and many of those same interests overlap with those of the current Trump administration. The Institute for the Study of Diplomacy’s recommendations recognized this crossover and offer a number of policies with these interests in mind, which:
- Build upon the United Nations Security Council Resolution on the 20-Point Plan. The Trump administration should center its policies and actions on ensuring that the Plan’s and the resolution’s goals and objectives move forward.
In regard to Israel:
- Make clear, high-level, and repeated statements that signal that the United States does not endorse or excuse extremist Israeli government rhetoric and actions, and draw a firm line to protect American interests. Washington should openly distance itself from any Israeli government measures, direct or indirect (to include settler violence, the crippling of the Palestinian Authority, or de facto annexation) that jeopardize movement toward the 20-point plan, prospects for a self-governing Palestinian entity, or expansion of the Abraham Accords.
- Clearly differentiate between Israel’s government and violent settlers’ actions on the one hand, and the people of Israel on the other.
- Condition (or curtail) military and intelligence cooperation. Future cooperation with the military and security service, including intelligence sharing, should be made contingent upon Israeli actions that do not undermine the 20-Point Plan and US law.
- Commit clearly to the goal of a viable two-state solution. A Palestinian state is and will remain the key to stabilization and security in the region.
In regard to Gaza and the West Bank:
- Continue to actively and publicly support long-term Day After efforts in Gaza, especially a well-staffed and resourced multinational/multisectoral Civil-Military Coordination Center.
- Marshal the global support necessary to rebuild Gaza’s infrastructure, administration, and local security to create a viable political and social entity that does not threaten its neighbors. America’s active participation in the CMCC and the direct financial and security engagement from Turkey, Egypt, and the Gulf Arab states as well as other international actors is critical.
- Support mechanisms to implement Hamas disarmament or leaders’ exile.
In regard to the broader region:
- Build upon the growing partnership with the Arab Gulf states. The moment is ripe for the United States to extend cooperation with these countries that goes beyond the rhetorical and/or glaringly short-sighted transactionalism, and creates long-term strategic partnerships.
- Support Lebanon’s efforts to fully implement its obligations under the agreement with Israel. The United States should continue acting as a bridge between the Israeli and Lebanese governments, support Gulf partners’ investments in Lebanese reconstruction, and pressure the Israeli government on its commitments to withdraw from Lebanon.
- Support the stabilization of Syria and efforts between Syria and Lebanon to secure their border against Hezbollah supply lines.
- Push for détente with Iran. Reports that Iranian President Pezeshkian reaffirmed his government’s openness to resume talks via Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman should be taken seriously.