This case explores the minutiae of shuttle diplomacy conducted between the United States, Israel, and Egypt as a result of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, exploring the transformation of U.S.-Egypt relations after 1973. It dissects the impacts of Nixon, Kissinger, and Sadat’s personalities in their navigation of Cold War politics and holds important lessons for the past and present of the Arab-Israeli situation.
This case study will enhance a range of political science and history courses. For international relations courses or political science and history courses on US foreign policy, the case study raises questions about the relative roles of domestic politics, geopolitical interests, crisis management, and bureaucratic rivalry in the formulation of US policy. For courses on strategy, diplomacy, and conflict resolution (including in professional military education settings), the case provokes thinking on the relationship between war and its political context, highlighting the frequent disconnect between military victory and strategic success. For courses on the Arab-Israeli conflict or the Cold War, the case highlights a moment in the 1970s that transformed both those conflicts and allows us to use the past to better analyze the persistent rivalries of our own time.