Perhaps nowhere on Earth are the composite risks of poor governance, unfavorable geography, and climate vulnerability more perilous than in Yemen. Thirty-one years since the unification of the North and South, peace and stability remain elusive. Stretching into its sixth year, the current civil war is driven by a kaleidoscope of actors—both domestic and international—each with its own competing vision for the Yemeni state, and each with its own sense of marginalization and grievances. On one side is the internationally recognized, Saudi-coalition-supported government of President Abdul Mansour Hadi. On the other is the Iran-backed neo-Zaydi Shia militant group Ansar Allah, widely known as “the Houthis.” In addition, the Southern Transition Council (STC), a relative newcomer backed by the United Arab Emirates (UAE), aims to establish an independent southern state. At the same time, there are a range of Yemeni political players and individual figures in the mix, an ever-shifting matrix of alliances and enmities.
The consequence of so many actors vying for control is a fractured, incapacitated Yemen that lacks fundamental aspects of statehood. The civil war has taken an incalculable toll, leaving in its wake the deaths of nearly a quarter of a million Yemenis and the displacement of four million more. Exacerbating the humanitarian crisis are the many challenges posed by crumbling state institutions, poor resource management, and catastrophic infrastructure damage. Together, these factors have pushed Yemen to near the bottom of most global human development and gender equality indexes.
Eventually, the violence will subside. When it does, key determinants of Yemen’s future will be the degree to which its many political actors can first coalesce efforts to resuscitate the state and then take appropriate measures to prevent a relapse into conflict. One crucial element of any successful peace effort will be proper recognition and response to the real and perceived grievances across Yemen’s citizenry. Whether in absolute or relative terms, complaints of disenfranchisement plagued the political and social climate in the pre-war years.
This report does not forecast victors in the current civil war. Nor does it argue for a specific political settlement or prescribe a particular pathway to peace in the immediate term. Instead, it identifies the components that are indispensable for building an inclusive, durable Yemeni state in the medium and long term. National institutions and governance structures that are responsive to local grievances are preconditions for a stable Yemeni state and national reconciliation. Because this conflict is, at its core, a grievance-based one, this report bases its analysis and recommendations on an approach of “grievance-centered governance” that must be Yemeni-centered and Yemeni-driven, uses existing networks of service-provision to provide critical services equitably to all citizens, and enhanced the capacity of existing institutions and government structures in Yemen, whenever possible. The three pillars of this are: institutionalization of local civil society and local actors; the remagination of core state institutions and governance frameworks that are inclusive, decentralized, and oriented around local needs; and, the development of sustainable, outward-facing policies that allow Yemen to regain its sovereignty and represent the interests of its people on the international stage.