The Institute for the Study of Diplomacy (ISD) is pleased to announce the publication of “The Donroe Doctrine and the Future of the Western Hemisphere,” the latest report in the Schlesinger Series in Strategic Surprise.
Authored by Ambassador (ret.) Barbara K. Bodine, ISD Director, and Dr. Kelly M. McFarland, ISD Director of Programs and Research, the report examines how the Trump administration’s assertion of hemispheric dominance — dubbed the “Donroe Doctrine” — is reshaping U.S. relations across the Americas.
In the spring of 2026, ISD convened a working group of former ambassadors, senior diplomats, intelligence professionals, and scholars with deep regional expertise to assess this shift. Over two meetings, moderated by Georgetown Professor of the Practice Emeritus Chester A. Crocker and ISD Director of Research Kelly M. McFarland, participants evaluated whether an approach built on coercion, militarization, and ideological alignment can sustainably serve U.S. interests — and what it means for hemispheric stability.
Our key finding was that coercion can produce short-term compliance, but the working group found it carries a high risk of accelerating the very trends the United States seeks to counter — deepening hemispheric partners’ hedging toward China, the EU, and other powers, and eroding the institutional relationships that once made the U.S. the region’s indispensable partner.
Read the full report to explore the working group’s complete analysis and recommendations for a durable U.S. strategy in the Western Hemisphere.
Executive Summary
The Trump administration has aggressively reoriented U.S. policy in the Western Hemisphere. This new “Donroe Doctrine” replaces decades of post-Cold War engagement with a strategy built on three pillars: a caudillo-led coalition of sympathetic right-wing governments organized through the Shield of the Americas; militarized regional security focused on counter-narcotics and border enforcement; and the punitive use of tariffs as instruments of political coercion. The administration’s aggressive rhetoric and policy shifts have been manifested in the removal of Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela and increased pressure on the regime and people of Cuba. This retrograde shift frames the hemisphere primarily through the lens of military dominance, denial of adversary (China) access, and border security. Whether dominance through coercion is sustainable or ephemeral is an open question.
In the spring of 2026, the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy (ISD) convened a Schlesinger Series in Strategic Surprise working group to assess the implications of this shift. Over two meetings, former ambassadors, senior diplomats, intelligence professionals, and other experts with deep regional expertise evaluated whether this approach can sustainably achieve its stated objectives and what it portends for American interests, hemispheric stability, and the countries caught in its wake.
The working group found that coercion can produce short-term compliance but runs a high-risk of accelerating the very trends the United States seeks to counter. The hemisphere’s three largest economies, Canada, Mexico, and Brazil, are actively diversifying their partnerships away from an increasingly unpredictable Washington. Chinese trade in the region continues to grow and it maintains a formidable physical and economic footprint. The region’s rightward political shift, while creating a short-term constituency for the administration’s coalition, rests on an electorate that voted for personal security and economic performance, not ideology or submission, and whose patience depends upon the delivery of good governance.
The working group identified a number of priority areas to focus on to create a durable hemispheric
strategy:
- Pursue stability, not just security. Reorient U.S. hemispheric policy from narrow security objectives toward the broader pursuit of stability. This includes functioning, legitimate institutions, broad economic opportunity, reliable public services, and the rule of law.
- Recognize migration as a shared hemispheric challenge requiring cooperative management, not as a weapon of political leverage.
- Engage on governance and rule of law. We must not become indifferent to legitimacy erosion. An American competitive advantage relative to China lies in its embrace of civil society, independent media, and pluralistic governance. Future administrations should insist on governance improvements without making purity of outcome a precondition for engagement.
- Restore diplomatic and development capacity. Rebuild the institutional capacity dismantled with USAID, staff and fund it adequately within the State Department, and reengage international organizations such as the OAS and the Inter-American Development Bank as platforms for multilateral cooperation.
- Rebuild the economic toolkit. Expand the Development Finance Corporation, negotiate modern trade frameworks, and invest in nearshoring infrastructure to compete with Chinese investment. AI, quantum computing, health technology, and renewable energy represent areas of genuine U.S. competitive advantage that should be brought to the table, with the help of the U.S. business community.
- Modernize trade frameworks. Update the USMCA for contemporary realities, such as digital trade, clean energy supply chains, and labor mobility, rather than as a vehicle for further coercion.
- Compete with China through engagement, not exclusion. Pursue strategic displacement rather than exclusion by offering credible alternatives in infrastructure, digital networks, critical minerals, and energy. Align financing, diplomacy, and industrial policy behind long-term objectives.
- Engage Congress as a partner. Congress controls budgets, authorizes trade agreements, and retains the capacity for bipartisan action. Legislative frameworks for USAID reconstruction, DFC authorization, Cuba policy, and trade preferences should begin now.
The “Donroe Doctrine” is not a strategy built for long-term success. Policies based on coercion,personalization, and militarization risks accelerating the diversification of hemispheric partnerships away from the U.S., the expansion of Chinese influence, and the erosion of the institutional architecture that once made the United States the hemisphere’s indispensable partner. The United States must show up consistently, predictably, and with something to offer beyond threats.
The Donroe Doctrine is not a strategy for hemispheric preeminence; it is a strategy for irrelevance.